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Abstract

A Domain-General Perspective on Deviancy:
People’s Sensitivity to Deviancy and its Social Consequences
Anton Gollwitzer
2021
In this dissertation, I propose that people’s sensitivity to deviancy is a domain-general
phenomenon—an aspect of the individual experience that manifests across distinct
domains. Supporting this possibility, across a multi-faceted approach (cross-cultural,
developmental, nonconscious processes), I document that people’s responses to
deviancy—their evaluative and affective responses to distortions in regularities and
patterns—overlap across highly divergent domains (e.g., nonsocial stimuli, social actions,
physical characteristics, nonvisual stimuli, visual stimuli). Additionally, in line with this
broad conceptualization of deviancy, I find that people’s domain-general responding
towards deviancy is largely negative in affect, emerges at a young age, exists crossculturally, and may even causally contribute to complex social phenomena, such as
prejudice. Collectively, these findings highlight the potential of adopting a broad domaingeneral conceptual understanding of deviancy to gain new traction on fundamental
questions asked in social and cognitive psychology.
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An Overview: Deviancy as a Domain GeneralPhenomenon
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1.1

Abstract
In this chapter, I first propose that people’s sensitivity to deviancy can be

reconceptualized as a broad phenomenon involving people’s evaluative and affective
responses to the violation of regularities and patterns across highly divergent domains (e.g.,
nonsocial stimuli, social actions, physical characteristics, nonvisual and visual stimuli).
After presenting this hypothesis, I provide a brief overview of the existing scientific
literature on the concept of deviancy (both in sociology and psychology), and cover
research showing that people generally respond in a negative manner to deviancy.
Additionally, I discuss how the proposed domain-general reframing of people’s responses
to deviancy is supported by past work, can be applied to shed new light on established
psychological phenomena and findings, and can further our understanding of the mind from
a social-cognitive perspective. Finally, I present a succinct overview of the three Chapters
that follow in this dissertation, each of which present evidence supporting the proposed
domain-general conceptualization of deviancy and that this conceptualization can inform
established psychological phenomena.
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1.2

Introduction

1.2.1 Prior Conceptualizations of Deviancy
From a scientific and theoretical standpoint, the study of deviancy has traditionally
been constrained to anti-normative behavior. By and large, the founding force of sociology,
Émile Durkheim, brought the concept of deviancy to the forefront and defined this
construct as behaviors that violate perceived social norms, customs, or rules (Durkheim,
1985). For instance, drug use, theft, and wearing clothes of the opposite gender all fall
under the sociological definition of deviancy. Durkheim’s interest in the concept of
deviancy was largely based on an attempt to categorize actions as “normal” versus
“pathological” in a society. Moreover, he proposed the functionality of deviancy to be the
creation of a common collective conscience or moral system (by revealing to the populace
which actions deviate from the norm). Additionally, he suggested that deviancy exists as
an effective instigator of change by reducing stagnation in a society (also see Mead, 1918,
for a similar functionality argument in terms of punishment).
Illustrating the importance of deviancy as a scientific concept, Durkheim and other
sociologists, such as Erik Erikson (1962), argued that deviancy exists in every society, no
matter how just or egalitarian that society. For instance, Durkheim describes the existence
of deviancy in a society of “saints” or perfect exemplary citizens. He writes:
“Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly
so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create
there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousness. If, then,
this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and
will treat them as such.”

18

As the example illustrates, deviancy is conceptualized as existing in every society
and group-context. At the same time, the thought experiment additionally reveals an insight
regarding deviancy, namely, that deviancy is context-dependent. Simply put, what is
considered deviant in one culture or society, may not be considered deviant in an alternate
society. For instance, while eating exotic animals (e.g., scorpions) may be considered
deviant in many western cultures, it is largely considered acceptable in other cultures (e.g.,
China). As such, and as highlighted by other theorists and researchers in sociology, the
concept of “deviancy” is largely dependent on the standards and perspectives in a specific
society, group, or situation (e.g., Becker, 1963; Kitsuse, 1980; Lemert, 1951).
Not only sociology has considered the concept of deviancy. Deviancy, in terms of
anti-normative behaviors, has also been studied in psychological research (though
researchers have not necessarily used the exact term “deviancy”). In line with work in
sociology, researchers studying social norms in psychology have examined deviancy in
terms of actions that break descriptive norms (what people actually do) and prospective
norms (what people should do; Bicchieri, 2005, Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993; Sherif,
1936). And further, several contemporary researchers have explicitly referred to social
norm violations as distortions of social regularities or disruptions of patterns of thought
and behavior (Mackie, Moneti, Denny, & Shakya, 2015; Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015;
Muldoon, Lisciandra, & Hartmann, 2014).
Deviancy has also been considered, both directly and indirectly, in psychological
domains aside from social norms. On a broad theoretical level, deviancy was already
discussed by early, seminal figures in psychology, such as Kurt Lewin (1947), who noted
19

that cognitive (and motivational) systems pressure the individual and society towards social
regularities and away from irregular, deviant behaviors. Moreover, on a more concrete
level, researchers have, for instance, discussed the role of deviancy in extremism and rightwing authoritarianism (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2017; Mentor & Dorne, 1998), argued that
deviancy can involve “positive” psychological constructs (e.g., creativity; Eisenman, 1991;
Mertens, Recker, Kohlborn, & Kummer, 2016), and found that whether irregular nonsocial
objects are perceived as more or less deviant is dependent on an individual’s cultural
background (Kim & Markus, 1999).
Researchers examining complex social phenomena that play a major role in social
psychology have also considered the role of deviancy. For instance, psychologists have
argued that intergroup prejudice (against Black people in the United States) may be based
on perceiving minority groups as socially deviant (Katz & Hass, 1988), and that the
development of morality, what is perceived as “right” versus “wrong” and “good” versus
“bad”, may be informed by violations of regularities or standards (Kagan, 1984;
Kochanska, Casey, Fukumoto, 1995; Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2017). And, these are just
several examples of the many references to deviancy that appear in social psychological
research.
Finally, work in cognitive psychology has also considered deviancy. For instance,
cognitive scientists have examined patterns and patterns distortions (Posner, 1973;
Näätänen et al., 1993), non-prototypical stimuli (e.g., Farkas, 2002; Halberstadt & Rhodes,
2000, 2003; Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 2012; Rhodes, 2006), prediction errors (e.g.,
D’Astolfo & Rief, 2017), mismatch negativity (Garrido, Kilner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009),
20

expectancy violations (e.g., Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996), and contextual deviations in
visual presentations (e.g., examining unexpected objects in a scene for longer periods of
time; Friedman, 1979). Given the many areas in which deviancy plays a role, then, the
current work should have substantial theoretical and applied implications. That is,
reframing our understanding of deviancy sensitivity as a domain-general phenomenon
should help inform our understanding of numerous past findings and, more generally,
numerous diverse and influential topics in psychology.
1.2.2 People Generally Experience an Aversion Towards Deviancy
To begin to examine whether people’s sensitivity to deviancy is domain-general,
we must first consider how people generally respond to deviancy. Although the jury is
technically still out, people—all else being equal—appear to be overwhelmingly averse to
deviancy (e.g., Evers, Inbar, & Zeelenberg, 2014, Heintzelman et al., 2013; Okimoto &
Gromet, 2016; Winkielman et al., 2006). For one, a large number of areas in psychology
have indirectly and directly observed humans’ tendency to prefer regularities and repeated
forms. On a broad level, for instance, humans are creatures of habit (even when these habits
are harmful; e.g., James, 1890; Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006), and one of the founders of
modern psychology, William James, stressed the importance of behavioral regularities in
shaping our lives, referring to habits as the ‘enormous fly-wheel of society’ (James, 1890).
Additionally, societies’ general acceptance and adherence to social norms (Sherif, 1936),
individuals’ arbitrary preference for stimuli they have seen before (mere exposure; Zajonc,
1968), people’s resistance to changes in their environments (Jost, 2015), and people’s
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tendency to conform (Asch, 1952; see Berg & Bass, 1961) indicate that we, as humans,
seem to prefer regularities as compared to irregularities and atypicalites.
On top of research documenting people’s adherence to regularities, research has
also more directly documented people’s discomfort with deviancy. For instance, people
tend to exhibit prejudice and discriminate against those in society who break regularities
(e.g., minorities, social outliers, those with physical disabilities; Goffman, 1963;
Gollwitzer, Marshall, Wang, & Bargh, 2017). Relatedly, individuals at the forefront of new
movements in the arts and sciences are generally approached with scorn and derision at
first (e.g., the avant-garde). Additionally, from a more cognitive perspective, researchers
studying prediction errors have suggested that a unifying motivational framework to
understanding prediction error is one that focuses on inconsistencies across domains as
causing aversive arousal (Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012).
Other areas of research also suggest that people hold a general aversion to deviancy
(as compared to regularities). For instance, research by Heintzelman et al. (2013) found
that viewing unreliable patterns (photographs of trees randomly ordered) and incoherent
stimuli (incoherent linguistic triads) leads individuals to temporarily report lower meaning
in life (as compared to when viewing expected regularities, that is, trees ordered in
accordance with the seasons and coherent linguistic triads). Additionally, actions that are
common (compared to uncommon) are generally judged as more moral, that is, “good” and
“right” (the common is moral heuristic; Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018).
Finally, a comparative dislike of irregularities over regularities is exhibited by people’s
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tendency to conform: People are hesitant to go against majority opinions, even when these
opinions are very obviously wrong (Asch, 1952).
From a more cognitive perspective, research on prototypes also supports that people
generally feel averse to deviancy. People generally evaluate typical stimuli (stimuli that
represent a prototype) positively, and evaluate atypical stimuli (stimuli that deviate from a
prototype) negatively (see Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 2012 for one a very brief
overview). People prefer prototypical paintings and furniture (Farkas, 2002; Whitfield &
Slatter, 1979), dogs, fish, automobiles, and watches (Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2000, 2003),
as well as prototypical faces (Rhodes, 2006; Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Further, some
researchers looking at category representations have noted that prototypes (the most typical
example of a category) are the best example of a category and therefore illustrate goodness
(Murphy, 2003, pg. 28). Collectively, these findings—that people like highly prototypical
stimuli and dislike prototype deviations—has been referred to as the beauty-in-averageness
effect (e.g., Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). Finally, researchers
have argued that people are motivated to and actually do avoid the absence of regularities
or patterns (Gilovich, 1991; Shermer, 2008). And in line with this prediction, Whitson and
Galinsky (2008) found that people perceive regularities and patterns after experiencing a
loss of control even if these regularities do not actually exist, for instance seeing illusory
patterns in the stock market.
Collectively, the above research indicates that people generally feel aversion
towards deviancy—perceived violations of regularities or patterns. The results I present
below, in Chapter 2 through 4, directly align with this claim—I find that people dislike
23

deviancy across various domains, both in terms of low-level deviancy (e.g., deviancy in
patterns of geometric shapes) and higher-order deviancy (e.g., social outliers, nonnormative actions). It remains unclear, however, whether people’s aversion towards
deviancy in the many different domains noted above overlap. That is, does people’s
aversion towards low-level deviancy (e.g., broken geometric patterns) predict their
aversion towards higher-order deviancy (e.g., social outliers)? This broader
conceptualization of people’s responding to deviancy is exactly what I examine here.
1.2.3 Prior Support for the Domain-Generality of Deviancy
Some past work supports the proposed conceptualization of deviancy sensitivity as
a domain-general phenomenon. For one, on a theoretical level, several foundational
theories in psychology indirectly speak to examining deviancy from a domain-general
perspective. For instance, work by William James, Fritz Heider, and Kurt Lewin on
consistency motives and habits suggests that people strive to maintain consistency in their
surroundings across varying domains. As such, the proposed research aligns with a
presupposition of several major figures in psychology and builds on their theorizing
(James, 1890; Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1946).
Empirical research also supports the potential existence of a domain-general
deviancy system. A body of work, for instance, has documented that constructs that are
seemingly independent (but semantically or conceptually related) are actually driven by
domain-general processes. For instance, physical and social pain have been shown to
overlap (e.g., taking pain killers reduces emotional pain after a breakup; Eisenberger,
Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006), as have physical and social warmth (e.g., people
24

feel physically warmer when thinking of loved ones; Williams & Bargh, 2008; Inagaki &
Eisenberger, 2013). Notably, these nonsocial-social overlaps are paralleled in neural
circuitry (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). Additionally,
research in embodied cognition has also shown that abstract concepts can be founded in
low-level physical experiences, such as movement or physical sensation (e.g., Casasanto
& Bottini, 2014; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). Importantly, while these literatures do
not directly examine deviancy, they do illustrate that domain-general processes may
underlie complex judgments and behaviors, and as such, provide a foundation on which to
build the proposed research.
A linguistic overlap further supports the proposed overlap—people use similar
terms to refer to deviancy across varying domains. The terms ‘weird’ and ‘strange’ are
applied to both nonsocial stimuli (e.g., weird art) and to social stimuli (e.g., a weird person).
Additionally, certain expressions about social deviancy allude to nonsocial deviancy in
terms of nonsocial deviations from regularities and patterns (e.g., social outliers, staying
in-line, and being a misfit). Empirically documenting these linguistic overlaps, children,
while not comprehending mental illness per se, apply labels used to refer to deviant objects
such as ‘weird’ and ‘strange’ when describing adults who manifest psychiatric symptoms
(Spitzer & Cameron, 1995).
Two additional empirical phenomena support the domain-generality of people’s
responses to deviancy. First, and perhaps most directly, judgments about deviant geometric
shapes have been linked to certain social judgments. For instance, individuals who report
greater differentiation between perfect and imperfect shapes are more politically
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conservative and exhibit decreased support for marginalized groups (Okimoto & Gromet,
2016). Second, a largely overlooked study (in Gestalt research) from 1951 observed that
individuals who are more sensitive to social deviancy (i.e., exhibit greater prejudice), four
weeks after viewing an image of a truncated pyramid (where one side was askew), were
more likely to draw the pyramid from memory as having been symmetrical (Fisher, 1951).
This study suggests that negative responses to social deviancy are associated with a lower
tolerance for deviancy in simple geometric shapes.
Research in other areas of psychology also supports the proposed domaingenerality of people’s sensitivity to deviancy. Cognitive psychologists, for instance, have
found that prediction errors induce responses of aversive arousal and this holds true across
various domains, including “lower-level” domains (e.g., word mismatches/Stroop task
color) and “higher-order” domains (attitudinal dissonance; Proulx, et al., 2012). And in
developmental psychology, researchers have argued that a sensitivity to deviant objects,
misplaced, flawed, or broken objects, may be part of a greater “deviancy” system that
contributes to the development of morality (what is “right” versus “wrong” and “good”
versus “bad”; Kagan, 1984; Kochanska, Casey, Fukumoto, 1995). Finally, work on the
effects of visual primes of disorder (e.g., inconsistent patterns in natural and human-made
scenes) has shown that such nonsocial disorder primes can influence anti-social actions;
for instance, Kotabe, Kardan, & Berman (2016) found that participants who viewed
disordered pixelated scenes were more likely to cheat afterwards on a performance task.
Collectively, these past studies all suggest that a domain-general sensitivity to deviancy—
a sensitivity to distortions in regularities and redundancies—spans across various domains.
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That is, individuals’ aversive responses to deviancy, say in terms of nonsocial stimuli (e.g.,
distorted patterns of geometric shapes, inherent linguistic triads), social outliers (e.g.,
someone with a physical disability), anti-social actions (e.g., theft), norm-violations (e.g.,
dressing atypically), appearance (e.g., someone with a scar), and beliefs (e.g., innovative
ideas) may all be informed by the same deviancy-system and thus overlap substantially.
1.2.4 Conceptual Boundaries
Importantly, deviancy is not the same as ambiguity, and subsequently, an aversion
to deviancy is not the same thing as an aversion to ambiguity (e.g., Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994; Budner, 1962). Simply put, deviancy is rarely ambiguous; deviancy, as
defined here, entails an evident irregularity rather than the potential of an irregularity
occurring. Indeed, in the numerous studies I conducted, I have only found weak-tomoderate correlations between people’s aversion towards low-level deviancy (e.g., in the
form of broken geometric patterns) and variables associated with disliking ambiguity and
uncertainty (e.g., intolerance for ambiguity, need for closure). Moreover, I also have
observed links between nonsocial deviancy aversion and social phenomena independent
of such ambiguity related third-variables (Gollwitzer et al., 2017; Gollwitzer, Marshall, &
Bargh, 2019; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019).
Deviancy aversion should also not be confused with a general sensitivity to
negative stimuli. That is, because deviancy is often perceived as negative, measures of
deviancy aversion may also pick up on variance in terms of people’s sensitivity to
negative stimuli more generally. To account for this possibility, a number of different
measures of such negativity aversion are included in the studies presented here (as well as
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in other studies, see Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). These include, for instance, measures of
neuroticism—people’s tendency to respond negatively to threatening stimuli, and more
direct measures of negativity aversion, such as people’s aversion towards non-deviant but
still negative stimuli (e.g., images of poor weather, such as grey skies or rainy scenes).
Finally, deviancy is not the same as novelty, and subsequently, deviancy aversion
is not the same as novelty aversion. Stimuli that are novel are not necessarily deviant. For
instance, consider a grove of many novel fruits. In this scenario the fruits are novel but
not deviant; in the grove, the pattern or regularity is the novel fruits—a common fruit
would actually be deviant in this scenario. Similarly, a stranger—someone you have
never met before—is likely perceived as novel but not as deviant (since meeting new
people does not necessarily deviate from people’s regular experiences). Indeed, though
deviancy aversion and novelty aversion correlate (both assessed in terms of nonsocial
stimuli, for instance, broken patterns of geometric shapes versus Chinese ideographs),
this correlation is not particularly strong (rs < -.04 < .29, depending on the study;
Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). Further, multiple studies, some of which I report here, find
nonsocial deviancy aversion to relate to social phenomena (e.g., anxious attachment,
prejudice) independently of people’s nonsocial aversion towards novelty (Gollwitzer et
al. 2019; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019).
1.2.5 Overview of Chapters 2 Through 5
This dissertation involves three concrete claims, all of which entail examining the
domain-generality of peoples’ responses to deviancy and the consequences of these
reactions.
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Claim 1: People’s domain-general sensitivity to deviancy—their evaluative and
affective responses to perceived regularities or patterns being broken or distorted—is
largely negative, early-emerging, and cross-cultural.
Claim 2: In support of deviancy being a domain-general phenomenon, people’s
sensitivity to lower-level deviancy overlaps with their sensitivity to higher-order deviancy.
For instance, people’s aversion towards deviancy in the form of distorted geometric
patterns predicts their degree of aversion towards social deviancy (e.g., prejudice against
social outliers, condemnation of moral violations).
Claim 3: People’s sensitivity to deviancy informs an interactionist perspective
regarding human psychology—people’s attitudes and behavior are context-dependent.
Particularly, I propose that individuals’ domain-general aversion to deviancy (at the
individual level) interacts with the regularities of a specific environment (at the situation
level) to predict those individuals’ attitudes and behaviors in that environment.
While covering these three core claims, and in support of the domain-generality of
deviancy, I will place a special emphasis on how people’s sensitivity to deviancy emerges
at a young age (a developmental perspective), exists across varying societies (a crosscultural perspective), and appears across implicit and explicit cognition (an automaticity
perspective). Additionally, I briefly cover how affective (instead of deliberative) processes
may underlie the observed overlap between people’s sensitivity to deviancy in different
domains (an affective or intuitionist pathway). And finally, I cover how the observed
findings can be used to intervene on people’s aversion to deviancy to reduce deleterious
psychological phenomena, such as prejudice (an interventionist perspective). Taken
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together, the proposed project re-conceptualizes the scientific understanding of deviancy,
leverages this new understanding to shed fresh light on social phenomena and our social
psychology, and finally, provides the groundwork for future research to create autonomous
interventions that people can potentially use to heighten beneficial phenomena (e.g.,
cooperation) and reduce harmful ones (e.g., prejudice).
In this dissertation, three chapters collectively support the proposed domaingenerality of deviancy outlined above. Chapter 2 (Gollwitzer, Marshall, Wang, & Bargh,
2017; Nature Human Behaviour) examined whether people’s responses to low-level
deviancy overlap with their responses to higher-order deviancy. Specifically, nine studies
(N = 994) and a meta-analysis demonstrate that people’s aversion towards nonsocial
deviancy (deviancy in everyday scenes, broken patterns of geometric shapes, and a written
vignette describing nonsocial deviancy) predicts their aversion towards social deviancy,
including prejudice against stigmatized individuals, social norm-breakers, statistically
negative and positive societal outliers, and even members of racial minorities—Black
individuals in the United States. Notably, these results were observed cross-culturally,
across explicit and implicit measures, and even in young children (~age 7). Collectively,
these findings provide initial support for deviancy sensitivity as a domain-general
phenomenon and suggest that people’s low-level sensitivity to deviancy may play an
important role in the social phenomena that are stigma and prejudice.
Building on Chapter 2, Chapter 3 (Gollwitzer, Marshall, & Bargh, 2019; Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General) examined a potential mechanism underlying the
observed overlap between nonsocial (lower-level) and social (higher-level) deviancy (in
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Chapter 2) as well as tested whether this overlap is causal. Specifically, Chapter 3
examined whether people’s degree of nonsocial deviancy aversion can causally impact
their prejudice (against social outliers) and whether this potential effect is partially driven
by inciting a dislike of statistical minorities. In line with this proposed mechanism,
statistical minorities (infrequent people in a population) may be perceived as deviant in
that they disrupt the statistical regularities of how people tend to look, think, and act and,
in turn, this perception of deviancy should incite others’ prejudice. Nine studies (N = 1,821)
observed the proposed mediation model: Increasing people’s aversion towards nonsocial
deviancy (e.g., aversion towards images of violated geometric patterns) heightened their
dislike of novel statistical minorities (minorities on an ‘alien’ planet), which in turn
heightened their prejudice towards social outliers (e.g., members of a racial minority,
individuals with a physical disability, individuals with atypical physical appearances,
individuals engaging in non-majority customs).
Building on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 (Gollwitzer, Martel, Bargh, & Chang, 2020;
Personality and Individual Differences) examined whether people’s domain-general
aversion to deviancy impacts social phenomena aside from prejudice. Given the
prominence and rapid growth of the study of morality in psychology (see Haidt & Kesebir,
2010), Chapter 4 examined whether deviancy aversion plays a role in moral judgment.
Specifically, because most moral violations deviate from the behavioral regularities in a
society, I tested whether people’s degree of nonsocial deviancy aversion predicts their
degree of condemnation and punishment of moral violations. Supporting this possibility,
two studies (N = 404) found that participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion (e.g., aversion
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towards broken patterns of geometric shapes) predicted greater moral condemnation and
punishment of harm as well as purity violations. Notably, Chapter 4 also found that this
relationship was stronger for more intuitive as opposed to deliberative thinkers. These
results tentatively suggest that intuitive processes drive people’s sensitivity to deviancy—
individuals automatically experience negative affect in response to deviancy which then
impacts their attitudes and behaviors outside of awareness (i.e., an intuitionist pathway; see
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010).
Importantly, in line with past theorizing on the context-dependency of deviancy (e.g.,
Durkheim, 1985), Chapters 3 and 4 also empirically examined whether people’s sensitivity
to deviancy has context-dependent outcomes. In Chapter 3, participants’ aversion to
nonsocial deviancy predicted context-dependent prejudice. Specifically, participants’ high
in nonsocial deviancy aversion actually exhibited decreased prejudice against real-world
minority groups when these minorities were presented as the majority in an alternate
society. Relatedly, in Chapter 4, nonsocial deviancy aversion predicted context-dependent
moral judgment. Participants high in deviancy aversion exhibited a greater shift towards
tolerating moral violations when these violations were described as normative behaviors
(regular and common actions) in an alternate society. Taken together, these findings may
help explain why prejudice and morality often appear to change depending on the
surrounding contexts and vary across historical time-periods (e.g., who is perceived as
deviant, and in turn prejudiced against, depends on the specific situation and time).
Finally, Chapter 5 will provide an overview of the findings of Chapters 2 through 4
and discuss theoretical and applied implications. Additionally, Chapter 5 will consider the
32

potential functionality of deviancy aversion (e.g., avoiding danger), and consider the
contexts that moderate the observed overlap between low-level and higher-order deviancy
(e.g., boredom, cognitive style, security and safety). Finally, Chapter 5 will lay out the
limitations of the presented findings (e.g., generalizability), and discuss how these
limitations can be addressed in future research.
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A Domain-General Sensitivity to Deviancy
Predicts Prejudice and Stigma
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2.1

Abstract
In this chapter, I present a collection of studies examining whether a domain-general

sensitivity to deviancy is linked to social prejudice. Across six studies, aversion towards
nonsocial deviancy, for instance, people’s aversion towards deviations in patterns of simple
geometric shapes, predicted substantial variance in prejudice against stigmatized
individuals, social norm-breakers, statistically negative and positive societal outliers (e.g.,
the very poor, the very rich), and racial minority group members (Black individuals). The
observed relationships between nonsocial and social deviancy emerged across explicit and
implicit measures, across cultures (United States and China), and was of a moderately large
magnitude (meta-analytic effect size: d = .68). Studies 7 and 8 examined developmental
differences—older children but not younger children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion
predicted their dislike of social-norm breakers. Although nonsocial deviancy and social
deviancy judgments may seem distinct given their differing domains, I find that aversion
towards nonsocial and social deviancy consistently overlap. These findings raise the
possibility that a domain-general sensitivity to deviancy may play an important role in the
social constructs of stigmatization and prejudice.
.
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2.2

Introduction
An image of a Muslim woman next to a drag queen in the New York City subway

went viral in March 2017. While some people felt little aversion to the scene, others reacted
with open hostility. These differential reactions raise psychological questions: What
underlies individual differences in people’s dislike of societal outliers, and further, why are
social outliers stigmatized and discriminated against in the first place?
Two overarching theories identify origins of people’s universal aversion towards
social deviancy: People are motivated to avoid danger (Stangor & Crandall, 2000) and to
uphold group functioning (Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000). Complementary to these
motivational and evolutionary origins, however, a basic and potentially more direct
explanation of why people feel uncomfortable towards social deviancy aversion may exist.
Negative affect in response to social deviancy may simply be predicted by a domaingeneral propensity to dislike stimuli that deviate from a given pattern or regularity, that is,
disliking violations of a repeated form or model irrespective of whether this violation is in
a social or nonsocial context. If true, even discomfort towards deviancy in simple nonsocial
stimuli (e.g., geometric shapes) should overlap with aversion towards social deviancy, such
as disliking physical deviancy (e.g., dwarfism), character deviancy (e.g., addiction), and
group-identity deviancy (e.g., minorities in the United States) (Goffman, 1963).
Importantly, considering that negative responses to social deviancy play a major role in
stigmatization, prejudice, and discrimination (e.g., Allport, 1979; Durkheim, 1985; Katz &
Hass, 1988; Major & O’Brien, 2005), an overlap between people’s nonsocial deviancy
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aversion and social deviancy aversion would raise the possibility that a domain-general
sensitivity to deviancy in part contributes to stigmatization, prejudice, and discrimination.
In support of the hypothesized overlap between sensitivity to nonsocial deviancy
and social deviancy, bodies of research have observed that nonsocial and social deviancy
are potentially linked core components of early development. With respect to nonsocial
deviancy, and in line with Gestalt-like principles, 6-month-olds dislike dissonance in
auditory stimuli (Trainor & Heinmiller, 1998), 12-month-olds prefer vertical symmetry
over asymmetry (Bornstein & Ferdinandsen, 1981), and newborns exhibit a preference for
congruent collections of geometric shapes as compared to non-congruent ones (Macchi
Cassia et al., 2008). With respect to social deviancy, children around 4-years-old exhibit
prejudice against social outliers (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Dunham, Baron, & Benaji, 2008),
dislike and punish social norm-violators (Hardecker, Schmidt, Roden, & Tomasello, 2016;
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), and hold a generalized bias against stigmatized individuals
(e.g., the obese, the mentally ill; Sigelman, Miller, & Whitworth, 1986, Weiss, 1986).
Importantly, tying these two research streams together, researchers studying the
development of morality—which is closely linked to the development of prejudice—have
argued that children’s morality may be informed by violations of regularities or standards.
They argue that a sensitivity to deviant objects—misplaced, flawed, or broken—may be
part of a greater “deviancy” system that contributes to which actions are perceived as
“right” versus “wrong” and which people are considered “good” versus “bad” (Kagan,
1984; Kochanska, Casey, Fukumoto, 1995).
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Research on people’s preference for prototypicality across nonsocial and social
domains additionally supports the proposed overlap between people’s responses to
nonsocial and social deviancy. For instance, people prefer prototypical paintings and
furniture (Farkas & Slatter, 1979; Whitfield & Slatter, 1979) as well as prototypical faces
(Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Rhodes, 2006). And additionally, prototype formation
processes—which are active even in infants—appear to inform both evaluations of
nonsocial stimuli (e.g., geometric shapes) (Bomba & Siqueland, 1983) as well as social
stimuli (e.g., faces) (Rubenstein, Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999).
A linguistic overlap further supports the proposed overlap—people use similar
terms to refer to both nonsocial and social deviancy. The terms ‘weird’ and ‘strange’ are
applied to both nonsocial stimuli (e.g., weird art) and to social stimuli (e.g., a weird person).
Additionally, certain expressions about social deviancy allude to nonsocial deviancy in
terms of nonsocial deviations from regularities and patterns (e.g., social outliers, staying
in-line, and being a misfit). Empirically documenting these linguistic overlaps, children,
while not comprehending mental illness per se, apply labels used to refer to deviant objects
such as ‘weird’ and ‘strange’ when describing adults who manifest psychiatric symptoms
(Spitzer & Cameron, 1995).
Two additional empirical phenomena support the hypothesized overlap between
people’s aversion towards nonsocial and social deviancy. First, and perhaps most directly,
judgments about deviant geometric shapes have been linked to certain social judgments.
For instance, individuals who report greater differentiation between perfect and imperfect
shapes (i.e., ambiguous shapes) are more politically conservative and exhibit decreased
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support for marginalized groups (Okimoto & Gromet, 2016). Second, a largely overlooked
study (in Gestalt research) from 1951 observed that individuals high in prejudice, four
weeks after viewing an image of a truncated pyramid (where one side was askew), were
more likely to draw the pyramid from memory as having been symmetrical compared to
individuals low in prejudice (Fisher, 1951). This study suggests that prejudice is associated
with a lower tolerance for deviancy in simple geometric shapes.
To begin to explore whether a low-level sensitivity towards deviancy plays a role
in people’s responses to social deviancy—and potentially, therefore, in prejudice and
stigmatization—I examined whether individuals’ aversion towards nonsocial deviancy and
social deviancy co-vary. To do so, I tested whether people’s discomfort towards nonsocial
deviations in geometric shapes (in the form of broken patterns of geometric shapes, for
instance, a row of triangles with one triangle out of line), predicts their degree of prejudice
against various types of social outliers. Importantly, in Chapter 1, I solely examined the
correlational relationship between nonsocial and social deviancy—causation was not yet
examined (see Chapter 2 for causation). Specifically, I conducted six studies examining
the potential overlap between people’s aversion towards nonsocial and social deviancy (N
= 815), one meta-analysis of these findings (including Supplementary Studies 3 and 4; k =
8; N = 1,114)1, and three developmental studies (Studies 7a, 7b, and 8) examining
children’s nonsocial and social deviancy judgments (N = 129).

1

For supplemental studies see the Supplements of Gollwitzer, Marshall, Wang, & Bargh, 2017).
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2.3

Results
Given the format of Nature Human Behavior, in which Chapter 1 was published,

the results of the eight conducted studies in Chapter 1 and the general discussion are
presented prior to a more detailed method section.
2.3.1 Study 1
Participants’ aversion towards nonsocial deviancy was assessed via their aversion
towards images taken from Buzzfeed.com articles depicting deviancy in nonsocial objects
(e.g., one article was titled “Things that will irritate you more than they should.”). For
example, one image depicted a cake cut at an unusual angle, ruining the circular symmetry
of the cake (see Figure 2.1 for an additional example).2 Participants reported how
uncomfortable, annoyed, and anxious they felt in response to these images and images of
socially deviant individuals (i.e., individuals stigmatized in society—someone with a skin
condition, someone wearing a bra on their back) (Goffman, 1963).

2

The included images, such as the incorrectly cut cake, arguably still had some social
connotations (e.g., the cake may have been cut incorrectly purposely). To address this
concern, the remaining studies used images of geometric shapes to depict nonsocial
deviancy.
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Figure 2.1. Example of the nonsocial deviancy images included in Study 1.

Study 1 also included theoretically relevant control variables. For instance, people’s
domain-general sensitivity towards deviancy may be associated with mental rigidity and a
strong desire for closure. For this reason, and because these variables have been linked to
discomfort towards social deviancy in past research (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), we included
a measure of individuals’ mental rigidity and need for closure (Webster & John, 1992). We
also assessed participants’ degree of neuroticism—people’s tendency to respond
negatively to threatening stimuli, because individuals may simply perceive deviancy
(across nonsocial and social stimuli) as threatening (McCrae & John, 1992). As expected,
we found significant but small correlations between individuals’ degree of aversion
towards nonsocial deviancy (measured using the Buzzfeed images) and their need for
closure, r = .17, p = .047, and neuroticism, r = .25, p = .004. Aversion towards nonsocial
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deviancy, however, did not relate to political orientation, p = .669 (this null finding was
replicated in the vast majority of studies reported here).
Demonstrating that individuals’ sensitivity to nonsocial deviancy relates to their
responses to social deviancy, a linear regression revealed that participants’ aversion
towards the nonsocial deviancy images predicted their aversion towards the images of
socially deviant individuals, β = .38, p < .001. Critically, the relationship between nonsocial
deviancy aversion and aversion towards social outliers (i.e., stigmatized individuals)
remained (and barely reduced) after controlling for neuroticism, need for closure, and
political conservatism, β = .33, p < .001 (see Table 2.1). As such, the observed link between
people’s sensitivity to nonsocial and social deviancy does not seems to occur via these
alternate psychological predictors of negative responding to social deviancy (Okimoto &
Gromet, 2016; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).
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Table 2.1. Summary of All Studies in Chapter 1.

Study

N

Link Between
Nonsocial and
Social Deviancy
β

Study 1°

Study 2°

Study 3°

134

Study 4°

140

Study 5°

197

Study 6°

Social Deviancy
Measure

Sample
type

p

.38
.33

< .001
Buzzfeed Images
< .001

Stigmatized
Individuals

Adults

.53

< .001

Geometric Shapes

Stigmatized
Individuals

Adults

.59

< .001

Written
Description

Stigmatized
Individuals

Adults

.33
.35

< .001
Geometric Shapes
< .001

Social NormBreakers

Adults

98

108

Nonsocial
Deviancy
Measure

.25
.21

.008
.025

Geometric Shapes

Positive Statistical
Outliers

Adults

.26
.24

.006
Geometric Shapes
.013

Negative
Statistical Outliers

Adults

.25

.003

IAT— Geometric
Shapes

IAT—Stigmatized
Individuals

Adults

.54

< .001

Geometric Shapes

Stigmatized
Individuals

Adults
(Chinese
)

.20

.021

Geometric Shapes

Implicit Racial
Prejudice

Adults

.18
.21

.032
.009

Geometric Shapes

Explicit Racial
Prejudice

Adults

138

Study 7a

40

–

–

Geometric Shapes
(FC)

–

Children

Study 7b

25

–

–

Geometric Shapes

–

Children

Study 8

64

.36

.009*

Geometric Shapes

Social NormBreakers

Children

Note. °denotes the study was included in the meta-analysis; *denotes the Age x Nonsocial
Deviancy interaction predicting attitudes about social norm-breakers; denotes a
correlation for which we controlled for other relevant measures; FC = forced choice.
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2.3.2 Study 2
In Study 2, we operationalized nonsocial deviancy via deviations in patterns of
static geometric shapes (e.g., circles, triangles)—static geometric shapes generally lack
social attributes (Okimoto & Gromet, 2016). Specifically, we created patterns of geometric
shapes and then distorted these patterns in some manner (e.g., moving a shape out of line,
changing the type of shape; see Figure 2.2). We then assessed participants’ aversion
towards each of these broken and unbroken pattern images. Participants’ aversion towards
nonsocial deviancy was calculated as their aversion towards the broken patterns minus their
aversion towards the unbroken patterns.3 Including aversion to the unbroken patterns in
this calculation allowed us to adjust for participants’ baseline aversion and to reduce
potential acquiescence bias (i.e., participant yay- or nay-saying). Validating our measure,
in a separate study, Supplementary Study 1, independent participants rated the broken
patterns as more deviant than the unbroken patterns (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al.,
2017 for details).

3

Calculating a difference score reduces statistical power. Outside of Chapter 1, participants’ aversion
towards broken patterns functioned as the measure of nonsocial deviancy aversion and aversion towards
unbroken patterns was included in our models as a continuous control variable.
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Figure 2.2. Examples of the matched pairs of unbroken and broken pattern images used
to measure nonsocial deviancy aversion in Studies 2–6. Each image was presented
individually to participants.
Social deviancy aversion, in Study 2, was measured in the same manner as in Study
1 (i.e., images of stigmatized individuals). In a separate study, Supplementary Study 2 (see
Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017), independent participants rated the images of
stigmatized individuals as more deviant than images of control individuals.
Crucially, participants’ aversion towards nonsocial deviancy—in the form of
aversion towards broken over unbroken patterns of geometric shapes—predicted their
aversion towards stigmatized individuals (e.g., an individual wearing a tail), r = .53, p <
.001. We verified that these results were not due to participants merely imbuing the
geometric shapes with social attributes (e.g., anthropomorphism, a mind-perception effect)
or from participants’ experiencing disgust in response to nonsocial and social deviancy (see
Supplementary Study 3 in the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017). Additionally, in
Study 2, nonsocial deviancy aversion also predicted social deviancy aversion when
nonsocial deviancy aversion was measured solely via mental-imagery. Participants
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reported their aversion towards the following vignette: “Imagine a collection of objects
where all the objects are very similar to one-another.... if one very different object is added
to the collection then I would feel...”, r = .59, p < .001.
2.3.3 Study 3
Apart from disliking stigmatized individuals, does people’s sensitivity to nonsocial
deviancy also predict disliking other forms of social deviancy? Because norm-breaking
constitutes one major form of social deviancy (Durkheim, 1985), in Study 3, we examined
whether people’s nonsocial deviancy aversion relates to their dislike of social normbreakers. Indeed, participants’ aversion towards nonsocial deviancy (assessed via our
geometric shapes patterns measure) predicted aversion towards someone in an imaginary
society who had violated a social norm, r = .33, p < .001. We also examined whether
nonsocial deviancy aversion predicts disliking individuals who are statistically ‘negatively’
and ‘positively’ deviant in society (e.g., someone very unintelligent, someone very
intelligent). Discomfort with nonsocial deviancy indeed predicted aversion towards
imagined meetings with people commonly perceived as negatively (e.g., very poor, very
unintelligent) and positively deviant (e.g., very rich, very intelligent) in society, r = .26, p
= .006 and r = .25, p = .008, respectively. These results did not change when controlling
for variables that have also been found to predict disliking social deviancy: Belief in a
dangerous world (Altemeyer, 1998), threat sensitivity (Carver & White, 1994), intolerance
of ambiguity (Budner, 1962), and political conservatism (Table 2.1). Finally, in support of
nonsocial deviancy aversion being distinct from simply disliking unpredictability and
ambiguity, our nonsocial deviancy aversion measure (the geometric shapes measure) did
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not relate to intolerance of ambiguity, r = .13, p = .178 (though, some other studies not
discussed here have found a significant but small relationship).
2.3.4 Study 4
Study 4 considered the relationship between individuals’ implicit attitudes towards
nonsocial and social deviancy (measured using implicit associations tests [IATs])
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). While the expression of explicit attitudes is
intentional and conscious, the expression of implicit attitudes is unintentional and occurs
outside of awareness (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Extending the generalized influence of
nonsocial deviancy to the domain of implicit judgments, participants’ implicit dislike of
deviations in nonsocial patterns (of geometric shapes) predicted their implicit dislike of
stigmatized individuals, r = .25, p = .003. These results indicate that the overlap between
individuals’ nonsocial and social deviancy aversion is not limited to explicit judgments and
diminish the possibility that the earlier studies were affected by experimental demand
effects.
2.3.5 Study 5
Considerable evidence indicates that people respond negatively to social deviancy
across cultures (i.e., this negative response may be universal) (4). As such, if a domaingeneral sensitivity to deviancy truly contributes to people’s negative responding to social
deviancy, then nonsocial and social deviancy should overlap in varying cultures. Study 5
examined whether nonsocial deviancy aversion (in the form of aversion towards broken
over unbroken geometric patterns) predicts aversion towards stigmatized individuals in a
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sample of Chinese individuals (i.e., Chinese people residing in China). We chose a Chinese
sample because United States and Chinese culture are distinct in numerous ways. For
example, while Americans tend to adhere to individualistic values and engage in analytic
thinking, Chinese tend to adhere to collectivistic values and engage in holistic thinking
(Triandis, 1988; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Replicating Studies 1 through
4, Chinese people’s nonsocial and social deviancy aversion strongly overlapped, r = .54, p
< .001.
2.3.6 Study 6
Because disliking social deviancy predicts prejudice and discrimination (Allport,
1979; Katz & Hass, 1988), people’s domain-general sensitivity to deviancy may also relate
to these processes. Researchers have pointed out that prejudice (against Black people in
the United States) may be based on perceiving minority groups as socially deviant (Katz
& Hass, 1988). As such, in Study 6, we hypothesized that people’s aversion towards
nonsocial deviancy may be associated with racial prejudice. Indeed, we found people’s
nonsocial deviancy aversion (again, in the form of aversion towards broken over unbroken
patterns of geometric shapes) to predict both implicit prejudice (measured using an IAT),
r = .20, p = .021, and explicit prejudice (symbolic racism) against Black people in the
United States, r = .18, p = .032. Additionally, this link remained when controlling for
participants’ self-reported tendency to discriminate against others, r = .21, p = .009.
Studies 1 through 6 consistently found people’s aversion towards nonsocial
deviancy (both in everyday scenes and patterns of geometric shapes) to predict their dislike
of social deviancy, including stigmatized individuals, social norm-breakers, statistically
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negative as well as positive societal outliers, and members of a racial minority (Black
people in the United States). The relationship between nonsocial and social deviancy
aversion emerged across explicit and implicit measurement methods as well as across
collectivistic (Chinese) and individualistic (United States) cultures.
2.3.7 Meta-Analysis
We conducted a meta-analysis of the findings of Studies 1 through 6 (plus
Supplementary Studies 3 and 4; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017). This metaanalysis indicated a medium-to-large relationship between people’s responses to nonsocial
and social deviancy (fixed-effect model: d = .65; random-effects model: d = .68). These
results are particularly noteworthy considering that in Studies 2 through 6 we assessed
nonsocial deviancy aversion via simple patterns of geometric shapes.
2.3.8 Studies 7 and 8
Even young children react negatively to social deviancy—children as young as 4years-old exhibit prejudice, dislike social norm-breaking, and dislike stigmatized
individuals (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Dunham et al., 2008; Hardecker et al., 2016; Sigelman
et al., 1986; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Weiss, 1986). Yet, the origins of young children’s
negative responses to social deviancy remain largely unexplored. As noted earlier, research
indicates that in addition to disliking social deviancy, young children dislike nonsocial
deviancy (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1981; Trainor & Heinmiller, 1998). Given the overlap we
observed between adults’ nonsocial and social deviancy responses, young children’s
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nonsocial and social deviancy aversion may relate as well. We conducted three studies
(Studies 7a, 7b, and 8) with children ages 4 through 9 to examine this question.
In Studies 7a and 7b, we investigated whether—parallel to adults (Table 2.2)—
children between 3- and 6-years-old exhibit an aversion to nonsocial deviancy (in the form
of disliking broken over unbroken patterns of geometric shapes; these results replicate past
work showing that even newborns prefer congruent over non-congruent collections of
geometric shapes; Macchi Cassia et al., 2008). In doing so we also attempted to verify that
the nonsocial deviancy stimuli utilized in Studies 2 through 6 (i.e., the broken patterns of
geometric shapes) can be used to measure children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion. In line
with the findings of Studies 2 through 6, and past research indicating that young children
dislike dissonant sounds and asymmetry (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1981; Trainor & Heinmiller,
1998), Studies 7a and 7b found that 3- to 6-year-olds dislike nonsocial deviancy in the form
of broken patterns of geometric shapes, p = .003, d = .50, and p = .035, d = .45, respectively
(see Table 2).

Table 2.2. Nonsocial Deviancy Aversion: Participants’ Dislike of Broken Over Unbroken
Patterns of Geometric Shapes.
Study

N

Sample type

Nonsocial Deviancy Aversion
t

CI

d

p

Study 1

134

Adult

--

--

--

--

Study 2

98

Adult

7.61

[.72, 1.23]

.77

< .001

Study 3

108

Adult

7.24

[.70, 1.24]

.70

< .001

Study 4

140

Adult

24.56

[.70, .82]

2.08

< .001

Study 5

197

Adult

17.75

[1.55, 1.94]

1.26

< .001
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Study 6

138

Adult

10.08

[1.01, 1.51]

.86

<.001

Study 7a

40

Children

3.16

[.06, .29]

.50

.003

Study 7b

25

Children

2.24

[.09, 2.19]

.45

.035

Study 8

64

Children

-0.24

[-.34, .44]

.03

.811

Building on these results, Study 8 examined whether children’s nonsocial and
social deviancy responses overlap. Observing this relationship in even 4-year-olds would
suggest that this overlap is early-emerging, likely does not require schooling, and
necessitates little explicit understanding of social deviancy. Alternatively, if only older
children exhibit an overlap, a more developed understanding of social deviancy may be
necessary for nonsocial and social deviancy judgments to relate. We assessed children’s
dislike of nonsocial deviancy in Study 8 using the broken and unbroken patterns of
geometric shapes validated in Studies 7a and 7b. We assessed children’s dislike of social
deviancy via their dislike of social norm-breakers. We operationalized social deviancy as
social norm-breaking because children as young as 3-years-old detect, understand, and
object to the breaking of social norms (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Hardecker et al., 2016;
Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016). Indeed, in our study, disliking social normbreakers did not vary as a function of age (p = .536).
We found that the relationship between children’s nonsocial and social deviancy
aversion altered depending on age. The nonsocial deviancy aversion of older, but not
younger children, predicted their dislike of social norm-breakers, β = .36, p = .009. In line
with adults in our previous studies, older children (approximately 7- through 9-year-olds)
who disliked (liked) the broken geometric patterns disliked (liked) social norm-breakers, β
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= .43, p = .007. This pattern of results was not true for younger children (4- through 6-yearolds), β = -.29, p = .165 (see Figure 2.2). These results were not due to younger children
failing to understand the instituted, situational social norm (see Supplementary Note in
Gollwitzer et al., 2017).

Figure 2.3. Study 8 interaction effect. The interaction between age and nonsocial
deviancy aversion predicting disliking social norm-breakers. Nonsocial deviancy
aversion predicted disliking social deviancy in older children (+1 SD = 8.56 years old),
but not in younger children (-1 SD = 5.5 years old).
It is possible that younger children’s nonsocial and social deviancy judgments did
not overlap because—though our findings and past research indicate that young children
dislike social norm-breaking (Hardecker et al., 2016, Tomasello & Vaish, 2013)—young
children may not categorize social norm-breaking actions or norm-breakers as socially
deviant (e.g., ‘weird,’ ‘strange’). Two findings support this possibility. First, children under
7, when asked to describe what they perceive as deviant behavior in their peers, are unlikely
to include social norm-breaking actions in their response while older children do so (Coie
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& Pennington, 1976). Second, younger children are less likely than older children to infer
dispositional attributes from the single action of another individual (Kalish, 2002; Ruble &
Dweck, 1995). Therefore, the younger children in our study, even if they did perceive the
social norm-breaking action as deviant, likely still did not consider the social normbreakers as deviant (we assessed children’s dislike of social norm-breakers). Given these
past findings, the observed interaction effect tentatively suggests that people’s nonsocial
and social deviancy judgments overlap as they begin to understand and categorize actions
and individuals as socially deviant. Future research should examine this possibility as well
as whether children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion predicts aversion towards other forms
of social deviancy than social-norm breaking (e.g., racial prejudice).
Lastly, regarding the presented developmental data, we note two limitations. First,
younger children may have struggled with the complexity of the paradigm—future
improved methods may be able to detect a relationship where our current methods could
not. Second, our study was not longitudinal. While our results indicate developmental
differences, they do not indicate a developmental trajectory or a developmental change.
2.4

Discussion
Taken together, the current findings demonstrate a consistent overlap between

individuals’ sensitivity towards nonsocial and social deviancy. Aversion towards nonsocial
deviancy in everyday scenes, broken patterns of geometric shapes, and a written vignette
describing nonsocial deviancy predicted participants’ negative responses to stigmatized
individuals, social norm-breakers, statistically negative and positive societal outliers, and
even against racial minorities (Black individuals in the U.S.). These results were observed
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across explicit and implicit judgments, across individualistic (United States) and
collectivistic (Chinese) cultures, and in children older than 6-years-old. Collectively, our
findings suggest that people’s sensitivity to deviancy is a domain-general phenomenon that
plays a substantial role in the complex social constructs of stigma and prejudice.
2.4.1 Potential Confounds
One may argue that aversion towards nonsocial and social deviancy overlap merely
because nonsocial deviancy overlaps with other predictors of social deviancy. Disgust (40),
sensitivity towards threat (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012), conservatism (e.g., right-wing
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation) (Okimoto & Gromet, 2016; Whitley,
1999), and disliking ambiguity and unpredictability (e.g., need for closure, need for
structure) (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) have all been shown
to predict negative responding towards social deviancy (e.g., racial prejudice). Importantly,
however, when statistically controlling for these variables, nonsocial deviancy aversion
remained an independent and moderate to large predictor of participants’ dislike of social
deviancy. Sensitivity towards nonsocial deviancy thus entails an additional pathway
towards stigmatization and prejudice beyond disgust, sensitivity towards threat, mental
rigidity, and dislike of ambiguity and uncertainty.4

4

The control variables we included were disgust, sensitivity towards threat, belief in a dangerous world,
neuroticism, political ideology, need for closure, intolerance of ambiguity, and disliking negative but not
deviant stimuli (e.g., bad weather) (see Supplementary Note of Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
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2.4.2 Nonsocial-Social Overlaps
The observed overlap between individuals’ responses to deviancy in the nonsocial
domain (i.e., broken patterns of geometric shapes) and in the social domain (i.e., social
outliers) is in harmony with a growing body of research observing nonsocial-social
overlaps. For example, individual differences in sensitivity to physical pain predict
sensitivity to social pain (in the form of social rejection) (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman,
& Naliboff, 2006), and increasing physical warmth heightens individuals’ perceived social
warmth (feeling connected to other people) and vice versa (Williams & Bargh, 2008;
Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013). Notably, these nonsocial-social overlaps are paralleled in
neural circuitry (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004),
tentatively indicating that a common neural basis for people’s experiences of nonsocial and
social deviancy may exist—that is, a common neural basis that represents people’s domaingeneral responding to deviancy.
2.4.3 Mechanisms
There are several potential mechanisms underlying the observed relationship
between nonsocial and social deviancy aversion. For instance, scaffolded mind processes,
cognitive fluency, and disliking expectancy violations come to mind. First, people’s
attitudes towards nonsocial deviancy may guide (i.e., serve as a ‘scaffold’ for; Williams,
Huang, & Bargh, 2009) their evaluation of social deviancy, resulting in an overlap between
people’s sensitivity to nonsocial and social deviancy. Second, processing fluency—the
ease with which information is processed (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998)—may
link nonsocial and social deviancy aversion because individuals who dislike disfluent (e.g.,
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non-prototypical) nonsocial stimuli (nonsocial deviancy) may also dislike disfluent social
stimuli (social deviancy). Third, a sensitivity to expectancy violations or prediction errors
(Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996) could qualify as a mechanism—the nonsocial deviancy
stimuli in our studies may have violated participants’ expectations, and certain types of
social deviancy may qualify as violations of expectations as well.
2.4.4 Limitations
The presented results are correlational. From them, one cannot draw inferences
regarding any causal relationships between nonsocial deviancy and social deviancy.
Indeed, a dispositional domain-general sensitivity towards deviancy may operate across
nonsocial and social domains without any causal link. If, however, future research were to
observe a causal effect of nonsocial deviancy on social deviancy, interventions might be
developed that reduce people’s levels of prejudice and discrimination by attenuating their
nonsocial deviancy aversion.
Though nonsocial deviancy aversion predicted unique variance in social deviancy
aversion, nonsocial deviancy aversion likely does not relate to all forms of stigmatization
and prejudice. For example, disliking nonsocial deviancy cannot explain the oppression of
majority groups by minority group (e.g., apartheid in South Africa where members of the
dominant group were the socially deviant ones, that is, the minority). Further, numerous
cognitive processes, societal processes, and intergroup motives irrespective of individuals’
sensitivity to nonsocial deviancy play a role in stigmatization and prejudice (e.g.,
stereotyping, intergroup competition; see Nelson, 2009). Consequently, we posit that while
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disliking nonsocial deviancy may be sufficient to incite social stigma and prejudice, it is
not necessary.
It is worth noting that the methodological paradigms of Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5 may
have exaggerated the obtained effect-sizes. These studies explicitly drew participants’
attention to deviancy by, for example, presenting participants with broken patterns and
making the social deviancy items highly explicit (e.g., participants in Study 3 were
reminded numerous times that the social norm-breaker had deviated from the norm).
Further, Studies 1 through 5 assessed nonsocial and social deviancy aversion using similar
methodologies (e.g., using the same items to measure aversion). Though Study 6 allayed
some of these concerns by utilizing different methodologies (i.e., a race IAT and a measure
of symbolic racism), future research should examine the generalizability of the observed
links regarding different methodologies, more real-world measures of prejudice, and
behavioral outcomes of stigmatization and prejudice (i.e., discrimination).
2.4.5 Conclusion
The correlational results presented here provide the basis for future research
examining whether a domain-general sensitivity to deviancy in part motivates people’s
prejudice, and stigma. For instance, a domain-general deviancy system could potentially
explain people’s prejudices against individuals who are perceived as deviant yet are
harmless (e.g., someone with dwarfism, someone who identifies with their non-biological
gender). People tend to rationalize such prejudice by claiming, for example, that negatively
perceived social outliers (e.g., the mentally ill) are dangerous (Corrigan et al., 2002), and
positively perceived social outliers (highly competent people) are cold and untrustworthy
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(Rammstedt & John, 2007). The research presented here, however, raises the possibility
that a basic aversion to deviancy (instead of such rationalizations) motivates people’s
prejudice against social outliers.
2.5

Method

2.5.1 Study 1
Participants. The relationship between nonsocial and social deviancy aversion would
be psychologically and ecologically relevant if it were of moderate effect-size (r = .30). A
power-analysis revealed that we needed 109 participants to have 90% power at a .05 alpha
level. We recruited 144 participants via Mechanical Turk (MTurk; 68 female). Participants
were living in the United States—the same is true of all remaining studies except Study 5
(age: M = 38.01, SD = 12.45). Ten participants were excluded for failing attention check
items. Study 1, and all the other reported studies, were approved by the Human Subjects
Committee of Yale University.
Need for closure. We included a validated short-version of the need for closure scale
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The scale consisted of 15 items (e.g., “I don’t like
situations that are uncertain”).
Neuroticism. We included a validated 2-item neuroticism scale: “I see myself as
someone who…is relaxed, handles stress well” (reverse-coded), and “I see myself as
someone who… gets nervous easily” (McCrae & John, 1992; Rammstedt & John, 2007).
Political orientation. Participants answered the following questions on a LikertScale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 9 (extremely conservative): “In terms of
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economic issues, how liberal or conservative are you?”, “In terms of social and cultural
issues, how liberal or conservative are you?” and “Where on the following scale of
political orientation would you place yourself?”
Nonsocial deviancy. We assessed participants’ aversion in response to five images
depicting nonsocial deviancy (see Figure 2.1; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017
for all images). These images were taken from three popular Buzzfeed.com articles—(1)
“Things that will irritate you more than they should,” (2) “19 Things that will drive your
OCD self insane,” and (3) “31 things that will make any neat freak’s eye twitch.”
Underneath each image a prompt read “The above image makes me…” followed by 3
questions assessing participants’ discomfort, anxiousness, and annoyance in response to
the image (“feel uncomfortable,” “feel anxious,” and “feel annoyed”). Likert-scale: 1 =
Not at all agree to 7 = Strongly agree. The images were presented in random order.
Social deviancy. Social deviancy aversion was measured in the same manner as
nonsocial deviancy aversion except that the images depicted deviant individuals. These
images were validated as depicting socially deviant individuals in Supplementary Study 2
(see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for images and the supplementary study).
Attention check items. We included a direct (“I was focused while filling out this
survey”) and an indirect attention check item (“People vary in the amount they pay
attention to these kinds of surveys... If you have read this question carefully, please write
the word yes in the blank box below labeled other.” See Supplementary Note of
Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for details. The same two attention check items were used as
exclusion criteria in Studies 2 through 6.
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Procedure. Before beginning the study participants gave their informed consent (the
same is true of all reported studies). Participants then completed the need for closure,
neuroticism, and political orientation measures in random order. Thereafter, they
completed the nonsocial and social deviancy measures in random order. Lastly,
participants completed the attention check items and demographics—the same is true of
Studies 2 through 6. No consistent demographic effects were found across the reported
studies (see Supplementary Note in Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for details).
2.5.2 Study 2
Participants. A power-analysis based on the findings of Study 1 (r = .38) revealed
that we needed to recruit 79 participants to have a 95% power. We recruited 106
participants via MTurk (44 female; age: M = 36.18, SD = 12.10). Eight participants were
excluded for failing attention check items.
Nonsocial deviancy. The five nonsocial deviancy images in Study 1 were replaced
with eight images depicting nonsocial deviancy in the form of broken patterns of
geometric shapes. We created these patterns in accordance with conceptualizations of
pattern-formation (based on repetition or rules) and pattern distortion (repetition or rule
violation) in research on pattern-recognition (Posner, 1973; Näätänen et al., 1993).
Specifically, after creating a pattern, we either distorted (i.e., transformed) a shape in the
pattern (e.g., type of shape, size, location) or did not alter the pattern. This methodology
resulted in four images of patterns that were unbroken (non-deviant; e.g., perfectly in-line
geometric shapes, a collection of identical shapes), and four identical images except that
the pattern was broken in some way (deviant; e.g., a shape was shifted, a different shape
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was inserted; see Figure 2.2). We assessed participants’ aversion in response to each of
the unbroken and broken pattern images. Independent participants rated the broken
pattern images as more deviant than the unbroken pattern images in a supplementary
study (Study S1; N = 42; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
We also measured participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion via a written vignette.
Participants reported their aversion towards the following situation: “Imagine a collection
of objects where all the objects are very similar to one-another.... if one very different
object is added to the collection then I would feel…”
2.5.3 Study 3
Participants. We recruited 116 participants via MTurk (78 female; mean age: M =
34.89, SD = 10.26) based on the power-analysis utilized in Study 2. Eight participants
were excluded for failing the attention check items.
Belief in a dangerous world. We included the 10-item Belief in a Dangerous World
Scale (e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are
pointing to it”) (Altemeyer, 1998).
Behavioral inhibition system. We measured individuals’ ability to regulate their
negative affect in response to threatening stimuli via the 7-item Behavioral Inhibition
System Scale (e.g., “Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience
fear or nervousness”) (Carver & White, 1994).
Tolerance of ambiguity. Ambiguity intolerance was measured using a standardized
13-item measure (e.g., “I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well”) (Budner, 1962).
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Nonsocial deviancy. The nonsocial deviancy measure in Study 3 was that of Study
2.
Social norm-breakers. We measured participants’ aversion towards fictional
individuals who broke versus followed a social norm. Participants were told to “imagine
a world inhabited by people known as Flurps. As long as anyone can remember, all the
Flurps have lived in Blue Houses. Living in a Blue house is an important part of Flurp
tradition and culture.” Thereafter, participants were told, “Imagine you come across a
Flurp living in a Green house. Remember, none of the other Flurps live in Green houses,
they all live in Blue houses” and “Imagine you come across a Flurp living in a Blue
house. Remember, all the Flurps live in Blue houses.” Participants then reported their
aversion towards the Flurp in each of these two scenarios: “This Flurp makes me feel
uncomfortable,” “This Flurp makes me feel annoyed,” and “This Flurp makes me
anxious” on a Likert-scale: 1—Not at all agree to 7—Strongly agree.
Statistically positive and negative societal outliers. We operationalized statistically
positive and negative social deviants as individuals holding attributes that most people
aspire to have (i.e., wealth, intelligence, a thin body) and not have (i.e., poverty,
unintelligence, being overweight). Specifically, we measured participants’ aversion
towards meeting someone either statistically above, at the exact level of, or below the
average IQ, income, and weight in the United States. For example, regarding IQ,
participants read the following information: “The average IQ in the United States ranges
from 90 to 100.” The presented values were the actual average IQ, income, and weight
(of women) in the United States in 2016. Thereafter, participants were told to imagine
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meeting a negatively deviant, average, and positively deviant individual: “Please imagine
you meet someone with an IQ of (50, 95, or 140, respectively) (remember the average IQ
in the United States is around 90 - 100).” Participants then reported their aversion in
response to each of these individuals (e.g., “This person makes me feel uncomfortable”).
See Supplementary Methods of Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for all materials.
Procedure. Participants completed the measures of ambiguity tolerance, belief in a
dangerous world, behavioral inhibition system, nonsocial deviancy aversion, and social
deviancy aversion in randomized order.
2.5.4 Study 4
Participants. A power-analysis revealed that we needed 86 participants to have a
95% power (r = .42; averaged effect sizes of Studies 1, 2, and 3). We recruited 194
participants via MTurk (114 female; mean age: M = 33.26, SD = 9.83) to account for
participants failing to complete the IAT measures. Twenty-five participants were
excluded for failing the attention check items. Twenty-nine additional participants were
excluded for not completing either or both IAT measures or for receiving a noncalculable score, as determined by the revised IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek,
& Banaji, 2003), on one or both of the IAT measures.
Implicit nonsocial deviancy. An IAT was used to measure how much stronger
participants implicitly associate broken patterns (IAT label: “Broken Pattern”) with
negative words (“Negative”) than unbroken patterns (“Unbroken Pattern”) with positive
words (“Positive”). The negative words were agony, terrible, horrible, nasty, evil, awful,
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and failure. The positive words were joy, love, peace, wonderful, pleasure, glorious, and
happiness. The broken and unbroken pattern images were those of Studies 2 and 3.
Implicit social deviancy. The social deviancy IAT was identical to the pattern
deviancy IAT except that the social deviancy labels were “Stigmatized People” and
“Nonstigmatized People.” The stigmatized people images were the five social deviancy
images included in Studies 1 and 2. The non-stigmatized people images were images of
five control individuals who, in a supplementary study (Study S2; N = 52), were
classified as less deviant than the deviant individuals (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et
al., 2017 for details and see Supplementary Figure 2 for an example image).
Procedure. Participants completed the two IAT measures in randomized order.
2.5.5 Study 5
Participants. A power-analysis revealed that we needed 86 participants to have 95%
power (r = .37; averaged effect-sizes, Studies 1 through 4). To accurately estimate the
effect-size of the relationship between nonsocial and social deviancy aversion in a
Chinese sample, however, we recruited 212 participants via Sojump, a Chinese data
collection program (107 female; age: M = 33.00, SD = 6.46). Participants were residing
in China. Regarding ethnicity, 98.5% identified as Han Chinese, and 1.5% identified as a
Chinese minority (non-Han). Fifteen participants were excluded for failing the attention
check items.
Nonsocial deviancy. The nonsocial deviancy measure was identical to Study 2
except it had been translated to Mandarin by a native speaker.
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Social deviancy. The social deviancy measure was identical to Study 2 except it had
been translated to Mandarin and also included the control faces used in Study 4 (see
Supplementary Figure 2 in the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
Procedure. Participants completed the nonsocial and social deviancy items in
random (preassigned) order. This random order was the same for all participants due to
the limitations of the Sojump software..
2.5.6 Study 6
Participants. A power-analysis revealed that we needed 90 participants to have 95%
power (r = .36; meta-analytic estimate calculated before the inclusion of this study in the
meta-analysis). We recruited 208 participants via MTurk (116 female; age: M = 34.71,
SD = 10.63) given the high exclusion rate in Study 4 (which also included an IAT
measure). Fifty-three participants were excluded for failing to complete the race IAT or
for receiving a non-calculable score (Henry & Sears, 2002). Seventeen additional
participants were excluded for failing the attention check items.
Nonsocial deviancy. We measured participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion by
assessing their responses towards 10 images depicting broken and unbroken patterns of
geometric shapes. Under each broken and unbroken pattern image was a prompt that
read, “The above image makes me…” followed by 4 questions (“feel anxious,” “feel
annoyed,” “feel secure,” “feel calm”) which participants answered on a Likert-scale: 1 =
Not at all agree to 7 = Strongly agree. We included the secure and calm questions to
include reverse coded items to reduce response bias. We also measured participants’
attitudes towards the pattern images. Participants responded to each image: “I like the
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above image,” and “I dislike the above image” and reported how much they liked and
disliked the specific geometric shape that was causing the pattern distortion in the broken
patterns (and the identical shape in the unbroken patterns). For example, participants
responded to the items: “I like the triangle that is three triangles from the right,” and “I
dislike the triangle that is three triangles from the right.” Given that these specific items
would have been difficult to create for the spiral and dots pattern images used in Studies
2 through 5, we replaced these images with ones similar to the row of triangles. All
images were presented in random order.
Implicit racial prejudice. Participants’ implicit negative associations towards Black
individuals was measured using an IAT. This IAT was the same as in Study 4 except that
it included images of Black and White individuals and that the IAT labels were changed
to “Black” and “White”.
Explicit racial prejudice. Participants’ explicit prejudice towards Black individuals
was measured using the symbolic racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002). The scale consists
of 8 items (e.g., “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” Likert-scale: 1 = Strongly
disagree to 4 = Strongly agree). Because individuals often self-regulate their explicit
racial prejudice, we also included an item measuring participants’ self-reported efforts to
not discriminate (“I am very careful not to discriminate against other people”). Likertscale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.
Procedure. Participants completed the symbolic racism scale, the nonsocial
deviancy measure, and then the race IAT (in that order).
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2.5.7 Meta-Analysis
Materials. Eight studies were included in the meta-analysis: Studies 1 through 6,
Supplementary Study 3, and Supplementary Study 4—a study that failed to observe a
relationship between nonsocial deviancy and social deviancy judgments. We included
this null finding in the meta-analysis to provide a more accurate effect-size estimate and
to reduce potential ‘file-drawer’ bias (i.e., the exclusion of null findings from published
manuscripts) (Rosenthal, 1979). See Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for details.
Meta-analytic approach. We conducted two meta-analyses: A fixed-effect model
and a random-effects model (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010). In doing
these analyses we followed meta-analytic methods recommended for ‘mini’ metaanalyses within a single manuscript (Goh, Hall, Rosenthal, 2016). See Supplementary
Note of Gollwitzer et al., 2017.
2.5.8 Study 7a
Participants. A stopping rule was used for data collection in Study 7a: The number
of 3- and 4-year-olds that visited a developmental psychology laboratory in a
northeastern university throughout the summer of 2016. The study included 40 3- and 4year-olds (20 female; age: M = 3.95, SD = 0.49).
Nonsocial deviancy. Two matched pairs of broken and unbroken geometric patterns
(triangle and circle pairs from Studies 2 through 5) were presented in randomized order
and shown to children in a vertical format on a sheet of paper (see Supplementary Figure
3 in Gollwitzer et al., 2017). Which image was located above the other was randomized.
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The experimenter read the following for each image: “Here’s a picture—which one do
you like more? This one or this one.”
2.5.9 Study 7b
Study 7b was analogous to Study 7a except that it included a continuous measure of
nonsocial deviancy aversion and was conducted with 4- to 6-year-olds.
Participants. The stopping rule in Study 7b was the number of children in Junior
Kindergarten and Kindergarten whose parents completed informed-consent at a private
school in New York City. Participants (N = 25; 12 female) were between 4- and 6-yearsold (M = 4.92, SD = 0.58).
Nonsocial deviancy. The nonsocial deviancy measure was that of Study 7a, except
for three changes. First, we replaced the unbroken and broken pattern images with those
of Studies 2 through 5 that were not used in Study 7a (see Supplementary Figure 4 in
Gollwitzer et al., 2017). Second, the images were presented individually rather than in a
forced choice format. Third, children’s nonsocial deviancy judgments were assessed
using a continuous measure. For each picture, the experimenter asked: “Do you like this
picture?” yes—no. Children were then asked on a 3-point scale (1 = A teeny tiny bit, 2 = A
little bit, 3 = A lot) about how much they liked (did not like) the picture (Supplementary
Figure 5 in Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
2.5.10 Study 8
Participants. A power-analysis revealed that we needed approximately 54
participants to have a 95% power. This power-analysis was based on an earlier, incorrect
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effect size estimation of the average effect size of Studies 1 through 5 (r = .45). However,
as this power-analysis was conducted a-priori, we report the original estimate here. We
recruited children ranging from 4- to 10-years-old as we wished to examine
developmental differences. Sixty-nine participants (32 female; age: M = 7.03, SD = 1.53)
were recruited in a New York City park and at a museum near a northeastern university.
Three participants were excluded when their birthdays revealed that they were actually
over 10-years-old. Two participants were excluded for failing the comprehension check
items (including these participants did not change the results).
Nonsocial deviancy. The nonsocial deviancy measure included the items of Study
7a. These items were presented in the format of Study 7b (i.e., continuous measure).
Social deviancy. The social deviancy measure assessed dislike of social normbreakers. We chose to assess dislike of social deviancy in this way because even young
children express an understanding of and spontaneously infer social norms (Tomasello &
Vaish, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2016). Specifically, we chose to examine gender social
norms. However, because children’s judgments about how boys and girls act differs with
age (Blakemore, 2003; Carter & Patterson, 1982; Weinraub et al., 1984), we chose to flip
what are considered typical gender norms (e.g., children were told that boys in a school
wear pink bows and dance ballet). This manipulation allowed us to measure dislike of
situational deviancy (an act labeled as deviant in a specific situation) rather than, as
measured in Studies 1 through 6, societal deviance (deviance widely perceived by
society) (Falk, 2001). To create the instituted, situational social norm, we relied on a rulebased manipulation—young children follow rule manipulations in social and moral norm
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tasks (Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). Our manipulation was successful: Children disliked boys
and girls who broke the instituted social norm, that is, they disliked boys who wore blue
baseball caps and played football and girls who wore pink bows and danced ballet.
Children were told about an imaginary school: The Tam School. At this school, the
teacher—Mrs. Taylor—made the rules and all of the students liked Mrs. Taylor. Mrs.
Taylor said that boys should wear pink bows in their hair and do ballet, whereas girls
should wear blue baseball caps and play football. We also informed participants that the
boys and girls at the Tam School were very happy and that most children followed Mrs.
Taylor’s rule.
To ensure that all participants understood the flipped gender social norm we
included comprehension checks: The experimenter asked children two questions after
hearing the story: (1) who at the Tam School plays football and wears blue baseball caps
(girls—boys), and (2) who dances ballet and wears pink bows (girls—boys). These two
questions were randomized.
Thereafter, participants were told about four children who go to the Tam School.
Two of these children, a girl and a boy, followed the social norm. Two other children,
however, again a girl and a boy, did not follow the social norm. Participants were asked
whether they liked each of these children (Yes!—No!). If they responded yes (no), they
were then asked how much they liked (did not like) the child (1 = A teeny tiny bit, 2 = A
little bit, 3 = A lot; Supplementary Figure 6 in Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
Procedure. Children completed the nonsocial deviancy measure and then the social
deviancy measure.
70


A Domain-General Sensitivity to Deviancy
Predicts Prejudice via a Dislike of Statistical
Minorities
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3.1

Abstract
Chapter 2 revealed that people’s aversion towards nonsocial deviancy predicts their

degree of prejudice against individuals who are perceived as societal outliers, for instance,
people with a physical disability or members of a racial minority. It is unknown whether
these links are causal, however, as well as which processes underlie these associations. In
Chapter 3, I examined whether manipulating people’s degree of nonsocial deviancy
aversion causally impacts their prejudice and whether this potential effect occurs in part by
inciting a dislike of statistical minorities. Infrequent people in a population may be
perceived as deviant in that they disrupt the statistical regularities of how people tend to
look, think, and act in society, and this deviancy should incite others’ prejudice. Nine
studies (N = 1,821) supported this mediation model. In Studies 1.1 and 1.2, adults’ and
young children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion related to disliking novel statistical
minorities, and this dislike predicted prejudice against members of a real-world racial
minority (Black individuals in the U.S.). Studies 1.3 and 1.4 replicated this mediation when
experimentally manipulating participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion, though, we did not
observe a direct causal effect of nonsocial deviancy aversion on racial prejudice. Study-set
2 replicated the observed mediation in terms of prejudice against other commonly
stigmatized individuals (e.g., someone with a physical disability). Importantly, we also
found nonsocial deviancy aversion to causally affect such prejudice. Finally, Study-set 3
provided additional support for the mediation model. Nonsocial deviancy aversion
predicted context-dependent prejudice as a function of group-size, for instance, greater
racial prejudice when Black people are the statistical minority, but decreased racial
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prejudice when Black people are the statistical majority. Taken together, these findings
indicate that people’s aversion towards nonsocial deviancy motivates prejudice, and that
this influence is in part driven by heightening people’s dislike of statistical minorities in
society.
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3.2

Introduction
From early in the field of psychology (Allport, 1958; Bogardus, 1925; Katz & Braly,

1933) to more recently (see Nelson, 2009), psychologists have attempted to understand
prejudice—unfavorable attitudes towards a group or members of a group (Allport, 1958;
Duckitt, 1992; Nelson, 2009; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). And for good reason.
Prejudice, whether implicit or explicit, has detrimental outcomes for societies and the
individuals inhabiting them. From Rohingya Muslims in Burma (Myanmar) to Yazidis in
parts of the Arab World to Black people in the United States, people are persecuted and
disadvantaged, resulting in psychological and physiological harm (e.g., Okazaki, 2009;
Pascoe & Smart Richman 2009). As such, it is paramount to discover the factors and
processes that underlie prejudice.
In terms of ultimate factors, prejudice may have developed to aid survival.
Prejudice can help individuals avoid danger (Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Stangor &
Crandall, 2000), and can help ingroups uphold cohesion and functioning (Neuberg,
Smith, & Asher, 2000). Proximate factors contribute to prejudice as well, either to aid
survival or as a byproduct. For instance, on the societal level, competition for resources
(Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955; Sherif, Harvey, Hoyt, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), a
preference for unequal social structures and hierarchies (e.g., Whitley, 1999; Sidanius &
Pratto, 2001), and threat towards the self and ‘group threat’ (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005, Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995, 1996) are just three examples of
social factors that incite prejudice. And, on the cognitive level, people’s use of simplistic,
fast, and efficient decision-making heuristics (stereotypes) contributes to prejudice (e.g.,
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Bodenhausen, 1990; Nelson, 2009). Finally, on the emotional level, disgust plays an
important role in inciting prejudice (e.g., Hodson & Costello, 2007; Taylor, 2007).
In addition to these causes, researchers have recently proposed that people’s
domain-general sensitivity towards deviancy may in part contribute to prejudice (see
Chapter 1). Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017) documented that people’s aversion
towards nonsocial deviancy (for instance, aversion towards broken pattern of geometric
shapes) predicts a substantial portion of variance in people’s degree of prejudice against
social outliers (d = .68). These findings indicate that people’s aversion to deviancy—the
experience of negative affect in response to a perceived regularity or pattern being
broken, disrupted, or distorted—spans across nonsocial and social domains and in turn
may contribute to prejudice (Gollwitzer et al., 2017; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019;
Gollwitzer, Martel, Bargh, & Chang, 2020; Gollwitzer, Martel, & Bargh, 2021).
3.2.1 Deviancy Aversion as a Domain-General Phenomenon
A number of psychological phenomena indirectly support the existence of people
holding a domain-general aversion towards deviancy. Most notably, people appear to
prefer regularities over irregularities across highly divergent domains. For instance,
people tend to resist change (Jost, 2015), dislike atypical objects (Palmer, Schloss, &
Sammartino, 2013), prefer familiar stimuli (Zajonc, 1968), imitate and mimic others (e.g.,
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and subscribe to habitual thinking and acting (e.g., James,
1890; Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006). Past research has also attempted to directly
demonstrate that people are deviancy averse by using stimuli that are largely devoid of
other connotations and previous associations (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2017; Heintzelman,
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Trent, & King, 2013). For instance, Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017) measured people’s
deviancy aversion using broken patterns of geometric shapes and found that people
across cultures (the United States and China) as well as children as young as 3 years old
exhibit a dislike of such deviancy.5
Importantly, deviancy aversion is not the same as a general dislike of ambiguity
(e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Budner, 1962). Simply put, deviancy is rarely
ambiguous; deviancy, as defined here, entails an evident irregularity rather than the
potential of an irregularity occurring. Indeed, past research has only found weak-tomoderate correlations between people’s aversion towards deviancy (in the form of broken
geometric patterns) and variables associated with disliking ambiguity and uncertainty
(e.g., intolerance for ambiguity, need for closure). Moreover, such nonsocial deviancy
aversion is linked to social phenomena independent of such third-variables (Gollwitzer et
al., 2017; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019; Gollwitzer et al., 2020; Gollwitzer et al., 2021).
Finally, deviancy is not the same as novelty. Stimuli that are novel are not
necessarily deviant. For instance, consider a grove of many novel, exotic fruits. In this
scenario the fruits are novel but not deviant; in the grove, the pattern or regularity is the
exotic, novel fruits—a common fruit would actually be deviant in this scenario.

5
Though people are averse towards broken patterns, researchers have found European Americans but not
Asian Americans (and Asians) to exhibit a comparative preference for the single object responsible for
distorting a pattern, when asked to rank all the shapes in a broken pattern (Kim & Markus, 2008). When
asked to judge the entire broken pattern in a non-ranked manner, however, European Americans exhibit a
clear aversion towards broken patterns (Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
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3.2.2 Deviancy Aversion and Prejudice
Researchers have found people’s nonsocial deviancy aversion to predict their
degree of prejudice (Gollwitzer et al., 2017). Across 7 studies, Gollwitzer and colleagues
(2017) found aversion towards nonsocial deviancy (e.g., aversion towards a row of
triangles with one triangle out of line) to predict substantial variance in individuals’
prejudice, ~15% to 20%. Prejudice in these studies was represented via participants’ dislike
of various types of stigmatized individuals (e.g., someone with a skin condition), socialnorm breakers, statistically negative and positive deviants (e.g., someone very poor,
someone very rich), and racial minority group-members (Black individuals). Nonsocial
deviancy aversion predicted prejudice against these groups across explicit and implicit
measures, across cultures (United States and Chinese), and in children as young as 8-yearsold. And, this overlap remained when controlling for theoretically relevant variables (e.g.,
political orientation, disgust, sensitivity towards threat, and disliking ambiguity and
unpredictability).
That a factor as basic as people’s aversion towards deviancy (in terms of regularities
and patterns) potentially contributes to prejudice aligns with the universality, earlyemergence, and domain-generality of prejudice (see Major & O’Brien, 2005; e.g., Dunham,
Baron, & Banaji, 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Sigelman, Miller, & Whitworth, 1986;
Weiss, 1986). And, the link between deviancy aversion and prejudice also aligns with the
targets of prejudice predominantly being individuals who are perceived as violating
physical or social regularities or patterns in society, that is, people who exhibit physical
deviancy (e.g., dwarfism), character deviancy (e.g., addiction), or group-identity deviancy
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(e.g., minorities in the United States; Goffman, 1963). Furthermore, this link aligns with
research indicating that prescriptive judgments (what ‘should’ be) are informed by
descriptive judgments (what ‘is’; e.g., Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2017). And finally, the
findings of Gollwitzer et al. (2017) may help explain why people are prejudiced against
individuals who are harmless yet perceived as deviant in society, for instance, individuals
with dwarfism or individuals who are transgender (e.g., Lombardi, Wilchins, Priesing, &
Malouf, 2002).
3.2.3 Goals of the Current Research
The research of Gollwitzer at al. (2017) is limited in several respects, however.
Most importantly, it remains unknown a) which mechanisms underlie the relationship
between nonsocial deviancy aversion and prejudice, and b) whether this relationship is
causal. Here, we primarily examine these two questions. Additionally, we c) exploratorily
consider the developmental trajectory of the proposed mechanism in a children’s sample.
And d) examine whether a domain-general aversion to deviancy can help explain the
context-dependency and flexibility of prejudice; that is, why the targets and strength of
prejudice fluctuates with time and context.
3.2.2.1 Mechanism: Proposed Mediation Model
Regarding a potential mechanism, we propose that the link between deviancy
aversion and prejudice may in part be mediated by a dislike of statistical minorities—
disliking people who are statistically infrequent in terms of appearance, beliefs, or actions.
Notably, by statistical minorities we mean people who are proportionally infrequent; that
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is, infrequent in comparison to a majority group. To explicate, deviancy aversion may
incite prejudice by heightening negative attitudes towards statistical minorities because
such individuals tend to distort the repeated model and form (the regularity or pattern) of
how people tend to feel, think, and act in a society or group.
Supporting a link between deviancy aversion and disliking statistical minorities
(path A of the proposed mediation; Figure 1), statistical minorities are perceived as
atypical. Statistical minorities are numerically anomalous and are thus perceived as
distinctive and uncharacteristic (Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2011; Mullen, 1991;
Mullen & Hu, 1989). Indeed, Moscovici (1985) noted that people who are infrequent and
uncommon may be perceived as deviant because they diverge from the way that people
‘tend to’ look and act in a society (the established pattern in society).
Research also supports the possibility that the statistical infrequency of individuals
incites prejudice (path B of the proposed mediation). For instance, research on the illusory
correlation bias finds that people dislike minorities because both negative behaviors and
infrequent people are distinctive (Chapman, 1967, Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Hamilton
& Gifford, 1976). And further, people may claim that negative evolutionary reasons
underlie the infrequency of a certain group or type of individual in society (akin to social
Darwinism; e.g., Crandall, 2000; pp. 134-135). Finally, mere exposure (people’s
preference for stimuli they have seen before; e.g., Zajonc, 1968) and cognitive fluency
(people’s preference for stimuli that are easily processed; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009)
may induce individuals to dislike minorities because minorities are less likely to be
encountered in everyday life (Lick & Johnson, 2015).
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Finally, in direct support of the entire proposed mediation model, research has
found that deviancy aversion predicts prejudice against stigmatized individuals, socialnorm breakers, and racial minorities (Gollwitzer et al., 2017)—all proportional minorities
in society (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Furthermore, Gollwitzer and colleagues
(2017) found people’s deviancy aversion to relate to prejudice against ‘positive’ statistical
minorities as well, individuals who are high in power but are infrequent in society (e.g.,
the very intelligent, the very rich).
In the current article, we test the proposed mediation model across 9 studies. To
ensure that our findings hold correlationally as well as experimentally, we included both
correlational as well as experimental studies. And, to ensure that the mediation model
conceptually replicates, we examined the model in terms of two different types of
prejudice, racial prejudice (against Black individuals) and prejudice against other
commonly stigmatized individuals in society (e.g., someone with a physical disability,
someone who is a Muslim).
3.2.2.2 Causality
Beyond investigating the proposed mediation model, we also examined whether the
relationship between deviancy aversion and prejudice is causal. A causal effect would
indicate that the link between deviancy aversion and prejudice is not restricted to individual
differences, would reduce the likelihood that this link arises via a confounding thirdvariable, and would potentially open the door for intervention possibilities. Thus, we tested
whether temporarily inducing deviancy aversion causally heightens prejudice (in the
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United States) against Black people and against other commonly stigmatized individuals
in society (e.g., someone with a physical disability).
3.2.2.3 Early-Emergence of Prejudice
One subordinate aim of the present research was to examine the proposed mediation
model from a developmental perspective. A particularly apt way to shed light on prejudice
is by examining the development of prejudice. Prejudice is early-emerging—children even
as young as four exhibit prejudice against Black people (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Dunham et al.,
2008; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Raabe and Beelmann, 2011), as well as against other
stigmatized individuals (e.g., people who are obese, people with mental illness; Sigelman
et al., 1986; Lerner & Gellert, 1969; Weiss, 1986; Westervelt & Turnbill, 1980). Notably,
while these targets of children’s prejudice are statistical minorities, how children think and
feel about people who are uncommon in a population is largely unknown (see Primi &
Agnoli, 2002 for one examination).
Potentially, one reason children come to adopt prejudice against stigmatized
individuals is because their deviancy aversion incites negative attitudes towards statistical
minorities. That is, deviancy aversion—which has been documented in children as young
as 3 (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2017)—may predict children’s negative evaluation of
infrequent individuals, and in turn their prejudice against stigmatized individuals (given
the infrequency of such individuals). We investigated this possibility by examining
whether the proposed mediation model also exists in children ranging from 4 to 7 years
old.
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3.2.2.4 Context-Dependent and Flexible Prejudice
A second subordinate aim of the current research is to shed light on why prejudice
is both stable and unstable (see Payne, Vuletich, & Lundberg, 2017; Garcia-Marques,
Santos, Mackie, Hagá, & Palma, 2017). While prejudice against certain groups has been
around for centuries (e.g., against Jewish individuals), prejudice against other groups
fluctuates with time and context. Deviancy aversion may contribute to the contextdependency of prejudice and its targets. What is deviant (that which breaks a regularity or
pattern) in one situation is not necessarily deviant in another, and thus, who is perceived as
deviant and therefore targeted should depend on the surrounding pattern.
With respect to the proposed mediation model, we suggest that deviancy aversion
predicts prejudice against whomever the minority might be in a specific context. For
instance, paradoxically, people high in deviancy aversion should, absent any other
information, exhibit prejudice against Black individuals when Black people are the
minority (e.g., in the United States), but exhibit reduced prejudice or even a preference for
Black people when Black people are the majority (e.g., in countries in Africa).
3.2.4 The Current Research
Across 9 studies (N = 1,821), we investigate whether deviancy aversion impacts
people’s prejudice against stigmatized individuals, and whether this effect occurs in part
via a general dislike of statistical minorities—disliking people who are infrequent in a
population (see Table 8 for overview of all studies).
Study-set 1 examined prejudice against Black individuals. Studies 1.1 and 1.2
tested the proposed mediation model in terms of racial prejudice in correlational studies
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with adults and children. We examined whether nonsocial deviancy aversion (assessed via
aversion towards broken patterns of geometric shapes, as in Gollwitzer et al., 2017) relates
to disliking novel statistical minorities—minority aliens on imaginary planets (A Path). We
also assessed whether disliking such novel statistical minorities relates to prejudice against
Black individuals (B Path), and whether nonsocial deviancy aversion relates to prejudice
against Black individuals (C Path; Figure 1). Finally, we examined whether the potential
link between nonsocial deviancy aversion and racial prejudice is accounted for by
participants’ dislike of statistical minorities (Indirect Effect). Studies 1.3 and 1.4 again
tested the proposed mediation but in a causal manner; we examined whether
experimentally manipulating nonsocial deviancy aversion influences explicit as well as
implicit prejudice against Black people, and whether this effect is mediated by a dislike of
novel statistical minorities.
In Study-set 2, we extended the proposed mediation model beyond racial prejudice
to prejudice against other individuals who are stigmatized in Western society (e.g.,
someone cross-dressing, someone wearing a Burka). Study 2.1 examined whether the
mediation exists in a longitudinal correlational design (nonsocial deviancy aversion
assessed at Time 1, disliking statistical minorities at Time 2, prejudice against stigmatized
individuals at Time 3). In Studies 2.2 and 2.3, we tested the mediation in a causal manner.
And, in line with a causal mediation model, in Study 2.3, we tested whether intervening on
the proposed mediator—disliking statistical minorities—eliminates the effect of nonsocial
deviancy aversion on prejudice.
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Finally, Study-set 3 tested whether deviancy aversion predicts prejudice that is
context-dependent in terms of group-size. We examined whether deviancy aversion
predicts greater prejudice against Black people (Study 3.1) and Muslims (Study 3.2) when
such people are presented as statistical minorities in society, but also predicts decreased
prejudice against Black people and Muslims when such people are presented as statistical
majorities in society. Such results would strongly align with our claim that one way that
nonsocial deviancy aversion is linked to prejudice is by inciting a dislike of statistical
minorities, and further, would theoretically extend our findings by demonstrating that
pattern deviancy aversion is linked to context-dependent, flexible prejudice.
One challenge we encountered was differentiating between minorities in terms of
infrequency in a population (Doms, 1984; Latané & Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984)
and low social status or power (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Moscovici, 1976;
Mugny 1982). As argued by Kruglanski and Mackie (1990), in the Western world,
statistical minorities are likely seen as underprivileged and disadvantaged.6 A potential link
between nonsocial deviancy aversion and disliking statistical minorities may thus be driven
by a dislike of low power individuals rather than a dislike of infrequent people in a
population. Indeed, deviancy aversion may predict disliking low status individuals because
such people are potentially associated with instability, disorder, and rebellion (Kruglanski
& Mackie, 1990). Therefore, we controlled for participants’ power ratings—the extent to

6

Though, see Cao & Banaji, 2017, who found that people (in the United States) perceive small groups as
more competent explicitly but not implicitly.
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which they judged statistical minorities and majorities as being in charge, in many of the
reported studies.7
A final challenge is the group membership of our participants. Researchers have
noted the importance of recognizing that participants’ racial identity may moderate
psychological findings, especially in terms of prejudice (Brown, 1995; Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017). To recognize this concern
and present inclusive findings, we examined whether our results differed depending on the
racial identity of participants.
3.3

Study-set 1: Racial Prejudice
Study-set 1 examined the proposed mediation model in terms of racial prejudice

(against Black individuals).
3.3.1 Study 1.1
In Study 1.1, we first tested this mediation in a correlational manner. As noted
earlier, because statistical minorities may be perceived as less powerful than majorities
(e.g., Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990), we controlled for the extent to which participants
judged novel statistical minorities and majorities as being in charge.
3.3.1.1 Method
Participants. A power-analysis based on Study S3 (a pilot study examining the
correlation between nonsocial deviancy aversion and racial prejudice; r = .15; see
7

Though we control for participants’ power judgments, we note that statistical minorities are not always
subordinate. Statistical minorities have held power in the past (e.g., feudal Europe), and in some cases are
currently the dominant group (e.g., White people in South Africa).
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Supplements of Gollwitzer, Marshall, & Bargh, 2019)8, revealed that we needed 346
participants to have 80% power. We aimed to recruit 375 adults on Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). We ended up recruiting 377 participants residing in the United States (193
female; Mage = 36.48, SDage = 11.29). Nine participants were excluded for failing an
attention check. Of the final participants, 35 identified as Asian/Asian American, 45 as
Black/African American, 19 as Latino/Hispanic, 262 as White/European American, 3 as
Other, and 4 as More than one race. See Supplements of Gollwitzer et al. (2019) for a link
to the verbatim methodology and data files of all the presented studies. All the presented
studies were conducted in compliance with APA ethical standards.
Nonsocial deviancy aversion. Deviancy aversion was assessed via three measures
(presented in random order). The first was an adapted version of the measure validated by
Gollwitzer et al. (2017; this identical measure was also used by Gollwitzer et al., 2020).
Participants evaluated five pairs of broken and unbroken patterns comprised of geometric
shapes: “How much do you like the above image?” (1 = Not at All to 7 = A Lot; reversecoded; see Figure 3.1).9 Each image was presented individually and in randomized order.
As noted by Gollwitzer et al. (2017), these stimuli were created in line with
conceptualizations of pattern distortion and repetition or rule violations in research on
pattern-recognition (Näätänen et al., 1993; Posner, 1973).

8

Before conducting Study 1.1, we conducted Studies S1, S2, and S3. Studies S1 (conducted with adults)
and S2 (conducted with children) were correlational studies that examined solely Path A of the proposed
mediation. Study S3 was a correlational study that examined the full mediation model but had a smaller
sample size than Study 1.1 (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al. 2019).
9
The items assessed liking and not disliking of the broken patterns of geometric shapes. However, we refer
to participants’ responses as deviancy aversion because participants reported liking the broken patterns less
than the unbroken patterns (see results section below). We also confirmed in the other studies reported here
that our findings replicate across item-valence.
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Figure 3.1. Study 1.1: The geometric shapes deviancy aversion measure. Example items
of the broken patterns (top row) and their matched unbroken counterparts (bottom row).
Each image was presented and evaluated individually.

The two other deviancy aversion measures were non-visual measures validated by
Gollwitzer et al. (2017), Gollwitzer & Clark (2019), Gollwitzer et al. (2020), and
Gollwitzer et al. (2021). The first assessed participants’ attitudes towards ‘explicit’
deviancy. Participants responded to the following: “People feel differently about things
that break a pattern, are out of line, and are disordered. How much do you agree with the
following statements? Things that break a pattern, are out of line, and are disordered make
me feel…” “Positive,” “Happy,” and “Content.” Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree to 7 =
Strongly agree (reverse-coded).
The second non-visual measure was one of mental imagery. Participants read:
“Imagine a collection of objects where all the objects are very similar to one-another… if
an object that is very different from the other objects is added to the collection that would
make me feel…” Again, participants responded to 3 items: “Positive,” “Happy,” and
“Content.” Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree to 7 = Strongly agree (reverse-coded).
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Disliking statistical minorities. Participants evaluated novel statistical minorities
and majorities on six different planets. The inhabitants of these planets were 50 red (blue)
people, and 7 blue (red) people (statistical minority: ~15%; color counter-balanced). We
then depicted the minority and the majority individually and assessed two response-items
each: Participants’ liking, “How much do you like these people?” (1 = Not at All to 7 = A
Lot), and desired identity judgments, “If you lived on this planet, would you want to be this
type of person” (1 = Not at All to 7 = Absolutely; Figure 3).
Power judgments. In response to the minority and in response to the majority
(individually presented; randomized), participants read, “How much do you think these
people are in charge on the planet” (1 = Not at All in Charge to 7 = Completely in Charge).
Within each planet, the order of the two disliking statistical minorities items and the power
item was randomized (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Example item of the disliking statistical minorities measure in Study 1.1. The
example item is of participants’ evaluation of the minority.
Distractor. Before assessing racial prejudice, we presented a distractor task—an
unrelated word search task. We did so because participants may feel compelled to match
their responses on the racial prejudice measure to their responses on the disliking statistical
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minorities measure (i.e., exhibit prejudice if they had previously exhibited a dislike of
minorities).
Racial prejudice. We presented 16 images each depicting either a White (8 images)
or a Black (8 images) individual. Half of the images were from a race Implicit Associations
Test (IAT) measure (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). These images have been
used in previous research linking nonsocial deviancy aversion to racial prejudice
(Gollwitzer et al., 2017), and have been validated in past research examining racial
prejudice (see Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002 and Xu, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2014).
The other half were from the NimStim2 faces dataset (Tottenham et al., 2009); these faces
have also been used in past research on racial prejudice (see Donders, Correll, &
Wittenbrink, 2008, and Sesko & Biernat, 2010). In response to each image, participants
read: “I like this person,” “I feel positively about this person,” “I would like to be friends
with this person” 1 (Not at all agree) to 7 (Strongly agree). We used positive items to
assess prejudice as recommended by past literature; floor effects are often found when
assessing prejudice in a negative manner because people do not want to admit being
prejudiced (see Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri, 2000).
Procedure. In line with the proposed mediation model, participants completed the
nonsocial deviancy aversion measure, then the disliking statistical minorities and power
measures (randomized), then the distractor task, and then the racial prejudice measure.
Attention check. Participants completed an indirect attention check (see
Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019). This attention check was in all reported studies
except Study 1.2 which was with children.
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3.3.1.2 Results
We calculated nonsocial deviancy aversion by reverse-coding participants’
responses and averaging across the three included measures, M = 4.72, SD = 1.29; the
three measures strongly loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue of 2.15; Principle Axis
Factor Analysis) and exhibited high reliability, ω = .81.10 Participants’ dislike of
statistical minorities was calculated by averaging their liking and desired identity
responses towards the majority and subtracting their liking and desired identity responses
to the minority, difference score: M = .69, SD = 1.70, ω = .94. Participants’ prejudice was
calculated by reverse-coding and averaging across the 3-liking-items in response to the
eight images of Black individuals, M = 4.13, SD = 1.24, ω = .98.
Participants exhibited nonsocial deviancy aversion—they preferred the unbroken
patterns over the broken patterns, p < .001, dz = 1.09. Participants also disliked statistical
minorities—they preferred novel statistical majorities over minorities, p < .001, dz = .41,
and judged the majorities as more in charge than the minorities, p < .001, dz = .89.
Finally, participants exhibited prejudice—they preferred White over Black individuals, p
= .005, dz = .15 (Table S4).
Importantly, as predicted, nonsocial deviancy aversion related to disliking novel
minorities, r(366) = .37, p < .001 (path A in the proposed mediation model; Figure 3.3).
And, disliking novel minorities related to racial prejudice, r(365) = .23, p < .001 (B path;
we controlled for prejudice against White individuals in this analysis via a partial

10

Participants’ dislike of unbroken patterns of geometric shapes was not included in our analyses as a
control variable because it correlated negatively with dislike of broken patterns, r(366) = -.15, p = .004.
Doing so did not change any of the results.
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correlation). Finally, replicating Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017), nonsocial deviancy
aversion related to racial prejudice, r(365) = .15, p = .003 (C path; we controlled for
prejudice against White individuals in this analysis via a partial correlation). The
relationship between nonsocial deviancy aversion and disliking statistical minorities
remained, r(365) = .28, p < .001, when controlling for power judgments—participants’
judgments of whether novel statistical minorities or majorities are in charge.

Figure 3.3. Correlations between key variables—pattern deviancy aversion, disliking
statistical minorities, and racial prejudice against Black individuals (when controlling for
prejudice against White individuals)—in Study 1.1; Error bands: ± 1 SE.
We conducted a mediation analysis using SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012).
Five thousand bootstrap samples were used to create 95% bias-corrected and accelerated
(BCa) confidence intervals to test the mediation. Our analysis supported the hypothesized
mediation model: The link between nonsocial deviancy aversion and prejudice
significantly reduced and was no longer significant after accounting for participants’
dislike of statistical minorities. Approximately 50% of the relationship between nonsocial
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deviancy aversion and racial prejudice was accounted for by a general dislike of
statistical minorities—dislike of people who are proportionally infrequent in a
population. As such, these results also indicate that mediators aside from disliking
statistical minorities likely exist given the 50% unexplained variance. Importantly, the
observed indirect relationship remained when controlling for participants’ power
judgments (Table 3.1). These results should be approached cautiously, however, given
the correlational nature of the study.
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Table 3.1. Mediation Analyses in Study 1.1 (Adults). The Relationship Between Pattern
Deviancy Aversion and Racial Prejudice was Mediated by Disliking Statistical
Minorities.

Study 1.1 (N = 368)

Predictor Variable

Mediator

Dependent Variable

Nonsocial
Deviancy Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Racial Prejudice

Total Effect

β = .098, SE = .033, t = 2.97, p = .003, 95% CI: [0.033, 0.163]*
β = .090, SE = .033, t = 2.73, p = .007, 95% CI: [0.025, 0.154]*,c

Direct Effect

β = .051, SE = .035, t = 1.45, p = .147 95% CI: [-0.018, 0.119]
β = .053, SE = .034, t = 1.56, p = .119, 95% CI: [-0.014, 0.119]c

Indirect Effect

β = .047, SE = .014, 95% CI: [0.022, 0.078]*
β = .037, SE = .012, 95% CI: [0.017, 0.062]*,c

Note. * = p < .05 c = controlling for participants’ power judgments. β = standardized estimate. SE =
Standard Error. CI = Confidence Interval.

Initially we had planned to examine whether the results in each of our studies are
moderated by participants’ racial identity. However, given the small number of minority
participants in Study 1.1 (and the subsequent studies), we collapsed across the presented
studies and report these analyses directly before the General Discussion of Chapter 3.
3.3.2 Study 1.2
Study 1.2 provided an exploratory and preliminary test of whether the observed
mediation in Study 1.1 holds true in children (4- through 7-year-olds). By doing so, we
tentatively examine whether deviancy aversion plays a role in the development of prejudice
(e.g., Dunham et al., 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Sigelman et al., 1986; Weiss, 1986).
Specifically, children in the United States may develop prejudice against Black individuals
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because their domain-general sensitivity towards deviancy incites them to dislike people
who are infrequent in a population.
We recruited children aged between 4 and 7. We chose this age range because
studies documenting prejudice in children have largely been conducted with children as
young as 4 but not younger (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1986; Dunham et al., 2008). Further, our
study materials are unlikely to have been suitable for children younger than 4 years old.
Regarding the upper age-range, we chose to recruit 7-year-olds but not older children
because Dunham and colleagues (2008) have documented that older children in the United
States begin to regulate their explicit prejudice against Black people (respond in a more
egalitarian manner).
3.3.2.1 Method
Design. The design was largely as in Study 1.1, but did not include the distractor
task.
Participants. Given the difficulty of collecting large samples of children, our power
analysis was based on the relationship between nonsocial deviancy aversion and disliking
statistical minorities (Study S3, r = .39; a similar correlation was found in Study 1.1, r =
.37). That is, we had 90% power to detect at least this relationship in children (though, we
had poor power, ~20%, to detect, for instance, the relationship between nonsocial deviancy
aversion and racial prejudice, r = .15; Study 1.1) 11. We recruited 67 children ranging from

11

We did not collect more children in this study because of resource constraints. We realize that 20%
power is problematic. However, this was solely the power to observe the link between pattern deviancy
aversion and racial prejudice. For instance, as noted earlier, we had around 90% power to observe the link

95

4- to 7-years-old; at least 15 per age group. Participants (37 female; Mage = 5.83, SDage =
1.18) were recruited at a laboratory (n = 29) and local museum (n = 38) in the Northeast of
the United States. The experimenters were the second author of the manuscript and two lab
research assistants. Experimenters read all the materials orally while the children
responded on a tablet. Four children were excluded because their ages later revealed that
they were 3-years-old. Five additional participants were excluded, three for failing an
attention check (described in the materials below), and two for not paying attention
(including these participants did not change the results; final N = 58). Of the final
participants, 1 was Asian/Asian American, 6 were Black/African American, 5 were
Latino/Hispanic, 45 were White/European American, and 1 was Other.
Nonsocial deviancy aversion. We utilized a binary version of the geometric shapes
deviancy aversion measure of Study 1.1 (young children may find it easier to respond to
these items on binary scales; see Study S2). Children were presented with the pairs of
broken and unbroken patterns of geometric shapes (randomized order; screen-side
randomized) and asked for each pair of images: “Which picture do you like more?”
Disliking statistical minorities. We utilized a binary version of the minority dislike
measure of Study 1.1. Again, the two response-items were, preference: “Who do you like
more—These people or these people” and group-identity: “If you lived on this planet,
which type of person would you want to be—These people or these people.” 0 = Minority,
1 = Majority.

between nonsocial deviancy aversion and disliking minorities (based on Study S2 and Study 1.1), and
indeed, we did observe this link (see results).
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Power judgments. We adapted the power item of Study 1.1 to measure children’s
power judgments: “Who do you think is in charge on the planet—These people or these
people.” 0 = Minority, 1 = Majority. This item has been validated in previous
developmental research (Gülgöz & Gelman, 2017).
Racial prejudice. We utilized a binary version of the racial prejudice measure of
Study 1.1. Eight items each depicting a pair of the White and Black individuals included
in Study 1.1 were presented (screen-side randomized). Participants read: “Which picture
do you like more?” 0 = Black individual, 1 = White individual.
Attention Check Items. We included an attention check that involved children
identifying one minority member, one majority member, and acknowledging that the
minority and majority looked different.
Procedure. The procedure was as in Study 1.1.
3.3.2.2 Results
Like adults in Study 1.1, children exhibited nonsocial deviancy aversion, p < .001,
dz = .49. In line with past research (e.g., Primi & Agnoli, 2002), children also disliked
statistical minorities—they preferred the novel majorities over minorities, p = .022, dz =
.31. Unlike adults, children did not judge majorities as more in charge than minorities, p
= .433, dz = 0.10. Finally, replicating past research (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Dunham et al.,
2008), children exhibited prejudice—they preferred White over Black individuals, p <
.001, dz = .49 (though, the internal reliability of the prejudice measure was low, α = .50,
see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al. 2019 for a discussion of this; Table S4).
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As predicted, children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion related to disliking novel
minorities, r(56) = .28, p = .035 (A path). And, children’s dislike of novel minorities
related to their racial prejudice, r(56) = .27, p = .038 (B path). Children’s nonsocial
deviancy aversion did not, however, relate to their racial prejudice, r(56) = -.12, p = .374
(C path). Perhaps, this null relationship was observed because of low statistical power;
indeed, based on the relationship between nonsocial deviancy aversion and racial
prejudice observed in Study 1.1 (r = .15), we had approximately 20% power to find this
relationship in Study 1.2. Alternatively, or additionally, we did not observe this
relationship because of the low internal-consistency of the prejudice measure in children
(which was high in adults). Unlike in adults (Study 1.1), the relationship between
nonsocial deviancy aversion and disliking statistical minorities in children did not remain
when controlling for power judgments, though, it remained in the predicted direction,
r(55) = .16, p = .236. None of the findings were moderated by age, .314 < ps < .970, .001
< ηp2 < .019 (age applied as a continuous variable), though, this null effect should be
approached with caution given the small sample size.
The predicted mediation was significant using a quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo
simulation, p = .03 (see Mediation package in R; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, &
Imai, 2014), and marginally significant when using bootstrapping, p = .06 (Table 3.2).12
To summarize, though we did not find a link between nonsocial deviancy aversion and

12
Originally, we had analyzed these data using SPSS (version ~18). When using this version of SPSS, we
found a significant mediation when using bootstrapping. However, after updating SPSS to SPSS 22-25
during the revision of this article, this identical mediation was only marginally significant. The mediation
was significant, however, when we applied Monte Carlo simulations in R. Potentially earlier versions of
SPSS Process used a slightly different analysis as compared to more recent version. We report both the
Bootstrapping results and the Monte Carlo results here to provide full transparency.
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racial prejudice, we did tentatively observe an indirect link between nonsocial deviancy
aversion and racial prejudice via disliking statistical minorities. Observing significant
mediations and nonsignificant total effects is not uncommon; total effects are typically
smaller (and thus require greater power to observe) than indirect effects (see Kenny &
Judd, 2014). Similarly, though still in the predicted direction, the mediation was no longer
significant when controlling for children’s power judgments (Table 2). Potentially, this
occurred because children did not reflect in a meaningful way on the difference between
the disliking minorities and power prompts.
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Table 3.2. Mediation Analyses in Study 1.2 (Children): The Relationship Between
Children’s Pattern Deviancy Aversion and Racial Prejudice is Tentatively Mediated by
Disliking Statistical Minorities.

Study 1.2
(Children; N = 58)

Predictor Variable

Mediator

Dependent Variable

Nonsocial Deviancy
Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Racial Prejudice

Total Effect

β = -.119, SE = .133, t = -0.90, p = .375, 95% CI: [-0.385, 0.147]
β = -.200, SE = .137, t = -1.46, p = .149, 95% CI: [-0.475, 0.074]c

Direct Effect

β = -.211, SE = .132, t = -1.60, p = .115, 95% CI: [-0.476, 0.053]
β = -.242, SE = .136, t = -1.79, p = .080, 95% CI: [-0.514, 0.030]c

Indirect Effect

β = .090, 95% CI: [0.002, 0.226]*,a
β = .092, 95% CI: [-0.005, 0.190]b
β = .040, 95% CI: [-0.026, 0.151]c

Note. * = p < .05 a = when using a quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the indirect effect
(1000 simulations). b = when using bootstrapping to calculate the indirect effect (5000 bootstraps). c =
Monte Carlo simulation while controlling for participants’ power judgments (1000 simulations). β =
standardized estimate. CI = Confidence Interval. SEs are not reported for the indirect effects because the
Mediation package in R does not provide them.

3.3.3 Discussion: Studies 1.1 & 1.2
In Studies 1.1 and 1.2, both adults’ and children’s nonsocial deviancy aversion
related to disliking novel statistical minorities—evaluating minorities as less positive than
majorities on imaginary alien planets (Path A). We also found that adults’ and children’s
dislike of novel statistical minorities related to prejudice against Black individuals—a
finding that, at least to our knowledge, is novel (Path B). Further, while a total effect of
nonsocial deviancy aversion on racial prejudice was observed in adults, this link was not
found in children (Path C). Finally, Studies 1.1 and 1.2 observed the hypothesized
mediation in adults and tentatively in children 4 to 7 years old, albeit, in a correlational
manner.
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Notably, the developmental findings (Study 1.2), are largely exploratory and
limited given the small sample size; the results should be considered with caution and are
predominantly reported here to encourage future research. Possibilities for future research
include examining how the exposure of children to the targets of prejudice being tested
moderates the potential link between pattern deviancy aversion and prejudice and, how this
link relates to other studied predictors of prejudice in children, such as essentialism.
3.3.4 Studies 1.3 and 1.4: Experimental Mediation Analyses—Racial Prejudice
Researchers have noted the risks of deriving process/mediation models based on
correlational data (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011).
Therefore, in Studies 1.3 and 1.4, we conducted causal experiments. Specifically, we
experimentally manipulated nonsocial deviancy aversion and examined the proposed
mediation model in terms of explicit (Study 1.3) and implicit (Study 1.4) racial prejudice.
3.3.4.1 Method
Design. Participants were prompted to generate either negative or positive aspects
of nonsocial deviancy (between-subjects: high versus low nonsocial deviancy aversion).
We then assessed participants’ dislike of novel statistical minorities (mediator), and
thereafter their prejudice against Black people (dependent variable).
Participants. A power-analysis (correlation between pattern deviancy aversion and
racial prejudice in Gollwitzer and colleagues [2017]; approximately r = .20) revealed that
we needed approximately 192 participants to achieve 80% power. We recruited 268
participants in Study 1.3, and 199 participants in Study 1.4. Of the total participants (Study
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1.3: 161 Female; Mage = 36.21, SDage = 12.41; Study 1.4: 120 Female; Mage = 37.30, SDage
= 11.78), 19 participants (Study 1.3) and 8 participants (Study 1.4) were excluded for
failing one or more of the attention check items. In Study 1.3, an additional response was
excluded because a participant took the experiment twice. Of the final participants in Study
1.3, 12 identified as Asian/Asian American, 12 as Black/African American, 12 as
Latino/Hispanic, 201 as White/European American, 3 as Other, and 8 as More than one
race. Of the final participants in Study 1.4, 9 identified as Asian/Asian American, 13 as
Black/African American, 7 as Latino/Hispanic, 157 as White/European American, 2 as
Other, and 3 as More than one race.
Deviancy manipulation. Participants were either assigned to generate and reflect on
negative (high deviancy aversion) or positive (low deviancy aversion) attributes of
nonsocial deviancy. Participants read and responded to the following prompt:
“Think of things/objects that break a pattern, are out of line, and create disorder.
What are three negative (positive) attributes of such things/objects? For instance,
what is something negative (positive) about a few objects that are different in a
collection of objects that are all the same? For example, what is something negative
(positive) about a few blueberries in a bowl of many strawberries, or what is
something negative (positive) about the images below?”
The images presented to participants depicted two of the broken patterns of
geometric shapes included in Studies 1.1 and 1.2 (see Figure S4). Participants thereafter
were prompted to imagine and reflect on the negative (positive) attributes of nonsocial
deviancy that they had come up with (depending on condition). In all of the studies,
participants were reminded of their response to the manipulation before they completed
each of the disliking statistical minorities, racial prejudice, and nonsocial deviancy
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manipulation check measures (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for complete
materials).13
Disliking statistical minorities and power judgments. Participants’ dislike of
statistical minorities and power judgments were assessed as in Study 1.1.
Racial prejudice. In Study 1.3, the racial prejudice measure was that of Study 1.1.14
In Study 1.4, racial prejudice was assessed via a race IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).
Participants’ IAT scores were reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated greater
prejudice (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for details).
Manipulation check: Nonsocial deviancy aversion. The nonsocial deviancy
aversion manipulation check in Studies 1.3 and 1.4 was a shortened version of the
geometric nonsocial deviancy aversion measure from Study 1.1.
Attention checks. Participants completed three attention checks (see Supplements
of Gollwitzer et al., 2019).
Procedure. In each study, participants were first randomly assigned to the high or
low nonsocial deviancy aversion condition. Participants then completed the dislike of
statistical minorities and power measures, thereafter the racial prejudice measure, and
finally, the nonsocial deviancy aversion manipulation check.

13
Repeatedly reminding participants of their response to the manipulation prompt may have heightened
demand effects. In Study-set 2, we dealt with this issue by removing these reminder prompts.
14
We also included a stereotype item in Study 1.3: “This person is unlikely to be a criminal” for
exploratory purposes. We found no effect of deviancy aversion on this item (see Supplements of Gollwitzer
et al., 2019).
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3.3.4.2 Results
In both studies, the deviancy aversion manipulation successfully altered
participants’ deviancy aversion, ps < .001. Further, in each study, participants in the high
(versus low) deviancy aversion condition reported greater dislike of novel statistical
minorities, ps < .001 (A path). This effect remained when controlling for participants’
power judgments, ps < .001 (Table 3). Additionally, in each study, disliking novel
statistical minorities related to racial prejudice (B path); Study 1.3: r(245) = .20, p = .002
(explicit racial prejudice); Study 1.4: r(184) = .20, p = .006 (implicit racial prejudice).
We did not, however, find a total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice
in either of the two studies (C path; Table 3.3). Given these inconclusive results, we
conducted an exploratory meta-analysis of the findings of Studies 1.3 and 1.4 (and two
supplemental studies, Studies S4 and S5, which also examined the effect of nonsocial
deviancy aversion on racial prejudice; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for
details). We did not observe a convincing total effect collapsed across these studies; our
meta-analysis indicated that if a total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice does
exist, this effect is exceedingly small (r ~ .06; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al.,
2019).
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Table 3.3. Studies 1.3 and 1.4. Effects of Deviancy Aversion Manipulation on Disliking
Novel Statistical Minorities and Racial Prejudice (Prejudice Against Black Individuals).

High
Deviancy
Aversion
(M and SD)
n = 129

Low
Deviancy
Aversion
(M and SD)
n = 119

2.91, 2.03

0.64, 1.89

F(1, 246) = 82.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .252

Disliking Statistical Minorities

0.65, 1.89

-0.53, 1.68

F(1, 246) = 27.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .100

Disliking Statistical Minorities c

0.57, 1.76

-0.45, 1.76

F(1, 245) = 20.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .076

4.11, 1.17

3.84, 1.21

F(1, 245) = 2.89, p = .090, ηp2 = .012

n = 102

n = 89

2.91, 1.95

0.27, 1.84

F(1, 189) = 92.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .328

Disliking Statistical Minorities

0.59, 1.87

-0.48, 1.49

F(1, 189) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .091

Disliking Statistical Minorities c

0.56, 1.67

-0.44, 1.68

F(1, 188) = 16.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .082

0.30, 0.36

0.32, 0.40

F(1, 184) = 0.16, p = .687, ηp2 = .001

Study 1.3

Significance Test

Manipulation check
Nonsocial Deviancy Aversion
Mechanism

Dependent Variable
Racial Prejudice (Continuous)
Study 1.4
Manipulation check
Nonsocial Deviancy Aversion
Mechanism

Dependent Variable
Racial Prejudice (Implicit)

Note. c = controlling for participants’ power judgments.

Hypothesized mediation model. Despite not observing a significant total effect,
the proposed mediation was found in both studies: The link between deviancy aversion
and racial prejudice was mediated by disliking novel statistical minorities. These
mediation analyses remained significant when controlling for participants’ power
judgments (Table 3.4), and further, a moderated mediation—with power judgments as
the moderator—was not found. In both studies, the mediation model was also not
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moderated by participants’ political orientation, age, or sex (see Supplements of
Gollwitzer et al., 2019).
Table 3.4. Mediation Effects in Studies 1.3 and 1.4: Deviancy Aversion’s Effect on
Racial Prejudice was Mediated by Disliking Statistical Minorities.

Study 1.3 (n = 248)

Predictor Variable

Mediator

Dependent Variable

Deviancy Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Racial Prejudice
(Explicit)

Total Effect

β = .118, SE = .070, t = 1.70, p = .090, 95% CI: [-0.019, 0.255]
β = .145, SE = .071, t = 2.06, p = .041, 95% CI: [0.006, 0.284]*,c

Direct Effect

β = .056, SE = .072, t = 0.77, p = .442, 95% CI: [-0.087, 0.198]
β = .079, SE = .072, t = 1.10, p = .271, 95% CI: [-0.062, 0.220]c

Indirect Effect

β = .063, SE = .026, 95% CI: [0.019, 0.119]*
β = .066, SE = .025, 95% CI: [0.024, 0.121]*,c

Study 1.4 (n = 186)

Deviancy Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Racial Prejudice
(Implicit)

Total Effect

β = -.060, SE = .147, t = -0.40, p = .687, 95% CI: [-0.350, 0.231]
β = -.031, SE = .148, t = -0.21, p = .835, 95% CI: [-0.323, 0.261]c

Direct Effect

β = -.200, SE = .151, t = -1.32, p = .189, 95% CI: [-0.498, 0.099]
β = -.178, SE = .150, t = -1.18, p = .238, 95% CI: [-0.474, 0.119]c

Indirect Effect

β = .140, SE = .053, 95% CI: [0.043, 0.247]*
β = .147, SE = .052, 95% CI: [0.053, 0.256]*,c

Note. * = p < .05 c = controlling for participants’ power judgments. β = standardized estimate. SE =
Standard Error. CI = Confidence Interval.

3.3.5 Discussion: Studies 1.3 & 1.4
Studies 1.3 and 1.4 provide experimental evidence for the proposed mediation model.
Participants induced with high deviancy aversion compared to those induced with low
deviancy aversion exhibited a greater dislike of novel statistical minorities, and this
dislike predicted their degree of racial prejudice. This mediation was found across
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explicit (Study 1.3) and implicit (Study 1.4) measures of racial prejudice. And, the
mediation remained when controlling for participants’ power judgments—participants’
judgments of who was likely to be in charge in a population (novel minorities versus
novel majorities). Furthermore, the mediation was not moderated by participants’ power
judgments, political orientation, age, or biological sex in either of the presented studies.
And, a supplemental study confirmed that the observed mediation holds across binary
and continuous measures of racial prejudice (Study S4; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et
al., 2019).
Though we observed the proposed mediation model in Studies 1.3 and 1.4, and
observed a significant correlation between deviancy aversion and racial prejudice in
Study 1.1, we did not find a total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice.
Observing significant mediations and nonsignificant total effects is not uncommon; total
effects are typically smaller (and thus require greater power to observe) than indirect
effects (Kenny & Judd, 2014). These results indicate that while deviancy aversion is
indirectly linked to racial prejudice, temporarily manipulating deviancy aversion (in a
nonsocial manner) does not seem to meaningfully impact racial prejudice.
Possibly, a total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice was not observed
because this causal link develops over time and is difficult to induce in a state manner.
Alternatively, or additionally, this total effect was not observed because of the societal
and historical complexity of prejudice against Black individuals in the United States.
That is, other social and societal variables may take precedence. Variables such as groupthreat, dominance motives, institutional factors, resource competition, histories of
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oppression, dehumanization, systemic oppression, and egalitarianism (see Nelson, 2009)
may eliminate or suppress any effects of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice. We
discuss this possibility in greater depth in the general discussion.
Finally, we note some limitations of Studies 1.3 and 1.4. First, the studies did not
include a no-treatment control (the same is true of all the experimental studies reported
here). As such, it remains unclear whether increasing deviancy aversion heightens
prejudice or decreasing deviancy aversion reduces prejudice. Second, Studies 1.3 and 1.4
only examined prejudice against Black individuals; these studies did not examine
prejudice against other target groups. We address this issue in Study-set 2.
3.4

Study-set 2: Prejudice Against Stigmatized Individuals
Given the results of Study-set 1, Study-set 2 (k = 3; N = 602) had three main

goals. First, we wished to examine whether the mediation model observed in Study-set 1
extends beyond prejudice against Black individuals; does the observed mediation hold
true for other groups of stigmatized people in Western society (e.g., someone with
dwarfism, someone wearing a Burka; someone with a skin condition)? To examine this
possibility, Study 2.1 tested the proposed mediation model in terms of prejudice against
various groups of stigmatized individuals in a longitudinal, correlational manner, and
Studies 2.2 and 2.3 tested this mediation model in an experimental manner.
Second, we examined whether deviancy aversion, while it largely did not directly
affect prejudice towards Black people in Studies 1.3 and 1.4, does have an effect on
prejudice against other types of stigmatized individuals (Studies 2.2 and 2.3). Supporting
this possibility, deviancy aversion has been found to correlate more strongly with
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prejudice towards various types of stigmatized individuals than with specifically
prejudice towards Black individuals (Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
Third, we sought to establish a causal pathway in terms of the proposed
mediation. Study 2.3 examined whether intervening at the level of the mediator, disliking
statistical minorities, reduces or eliminates the effect of deviancy aversion on prejudice.
Such an effect would support a causal pathway (e.g., Kendler & Campbell, 2009;
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) from deviancy aversion to prejudice via a dislike of
statistical minorities.
3.4.1 Study 2.1
Study 2.1 was a longitudinal, correlational study. Deviancy aversion was assessed
at Time 1, disliking novel statistical minorities at Time 2 (2 days later), and prejudice
against stigmatized individuals at Time 3 (6 days later). This design was adopted for two
reasons. First, we sought to reduce the possibility that demand bias drives our findings;
the earlier studies were all conducted in a single setting and the measures all shared
connotations of ‘deviancy.’ Second, mediation models suggest a time-course in terms of
longitudinal progression. If the proposed mediation model is valid, then the mediation
should be observed even when the variables of interest are assessed in a longitudinal
manner.15 In Study 2.1, we also assessed participants’ aversion towards novel stimuli

15

Of course, the longitudinal design reported here is not the classic way to test a mediation model
longitudinally, which would include measuring each of the relevant variables at each time point. We did
not do so because our main goal was to reduce demand/response bias and presenting the three relevant
variables at each time point would have defeated this purpose.

109

(their novelty aversion) to exclude the possibility that our findings are simply driven by a
dislike of novelty.

3.4.1.1 Method
Design. The design of Study 2.1 was correlational and longitudinal. We assessed
nonsocial deviancy aversion at Time 1, dislike of novel statistical minorities at Time 2 (2
days after Time 1), and prejudice against stigmatized individuals at Time 3 (6 days after
Time 1). We also assessed participants’ novelty aversion—their aversion towards
nonsocial examples of novelty (Time 1).
Participants. A power-analysis based on the findings of Gollwitzer et al. (2017; r
= .32) revealed that we needed 98 participants to have 90% power. However, we aimed to
collect 400 participants to account for participants dropping out after Time 1 and Time 2,
and to account for smaller effect sizes given the longitudinal nature of the study. The
number of recruited participants was 404 (MTurk; 213 female; Mage = 38.99, SDage =
12.67). Of the 404 participants, 140 were excluded because they did not complete all three
parts of the survey. Six additional participants were excluded for failing an attention check.
Of the final participants (N = 258), 21 identified as Asian/Asian American, 22 as
Black/African American, 12 as Latino/Hispanic, 197 as White/European American, 2 as
other, and 4 as more than one race.
Time 1: Deviancy aversion. We assessed the three measures of nonsocial pattern
deviancy aversion from Study 1.1.
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Time 1: Novelty aversion. We assessed participants’ dislike of novelty via a facevalid 3-item measure (see Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). Participants read: “People feel
differently about things that are new, novel, and original. How uncomfortable do the
following things make you feel?” and responded to three items: “New Things,” “Novel
Things,” and “Original Things” 1 = Not at all uncomfortable to 7 = Extremely
uncomfortable.
Time 2: Disliking statistical minorities. We assessed disliking statistical minorities
using the measure of Studies 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. We also added a second, face-valid minority
dislike measure to increase the generalizability of our findings, and to ensure that our
findings are not constrained to visual measures. Participants read: “How do you feel about
statistical minorities in society, that is, how do you feel about individuals who are
statistically anomalous in society in terms of their appearance, actions, and attitudes…”
and then responded to three items: “I want to be friends with such people,” “I like such
people,” and “I feel warmly towards such people” 1 = Not at all agree to 7 = Strongly agree
(responses were reverse-coded to represent dislike). We averaged across these two
measures to create a single disliking statistical minorities score for each participant.
Time 3: Prejudice against stigmatized individuals. Participants evaluated 20 images
each depicting a different person. Ten of these images depicted ‘normative’ individuals,
and the other 10 depicted individuals commonly stigmatized in society (e.g., someone with
a physical disability, someone with a skin condition, someone crossdressing, someone
wearing a Burka; randomized order; similar images were included in Gollwitzer et al.,
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2017). In response to each image, participants responded to: 1 = I do not like this person
to 7 = I like this person (see Verbatim Methodology files for images).
To extend the generalizability of our findings, we also assessed prejudice against
stigmatized individuals using a non-visual and arguably more standardized measure:
Participants’ general evaluation of varying types of people (see Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010). Participants reported how much they like someone
transgender, a highly committed Muslim, someone with mental illness, and someone
homeless, 1 = I do not like this person to 7 = I like this person (reverse-coded; randomized;
see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019). Again, we used positive response items
because floor effects are often found when assessing prejudice in a negative manner (due
to egalitarian concerns; Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri, 2000). We averaged across the visual
and non-visual prejudice measures to create a single prejudice score for each participant.
Prejudice against women. Participants reported how much they like someone who
is a woman, 1 = I do not like this person to 7 = I like this person (reverse-coded). Notably,
deviancy aversion should not necessarily relate to prejudice against women given that
women are not a statistical minority in society (at least generally) and are largely not
perceived as socially deviant.
Procedure. At Time 1, participants completed the nonsocial deviancy and novelty
aversion measures in random order. These measures were separated by a distractor task to
reduce demand bias (the distractor task of Study 1.1) At Time 2, participants completed
the two minority dislike measures (random order). At Time 3, participants completed the
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two prejudice measures (random order). Demographics and an attention check (see Study
1.1) were assessed at Time 1.16
3.4.1.2 Results
As predicted, deviancy aversion (Time 1) related to disliking novel minorities
(Time 2), r(256) = .27, p < .001 (Path A; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for
descriptive statistics). And, disliking novel minorities (Time 2) related to prejudice (Time
3), r(256) = .48, p < .001 (B path). Finally, deviancy aversion (Time 1) related to
prejudice (Time 3), r(256) = .24, p < .001 (C path; Figure 3.4). These relationships all
remained when controlling for participants’ aversion towards novelty, rs > .22, ps <
.001.17,18 Deviancy aversion also significantly predicted the individual disliking statistical
minorities and prejudice measures, ps < .002; for instance, deviancy aversion predicted
prejudice on both the visual prejudice measure, r(256) = .20, p = .001, and the face-valid
non-visual measure, r(256) = .21, p = .001. Finally, in line with our hypotheses, while
deviancy aversion predicted prejudice against stigmatized individuals who are
statistically infrequent in society, it did not predict prejudice against women, r(256) = .10, p = .108.19

16

Three items related to a different line of research were included at the end of Time 2 and the end of Time
3. The results of these items are not reported as they are not relevant to the presented results.
17
Nonsocial deviancy and novelty aversion correlated marginally, r(256) = .12, p = .063
18
As in Study 1.1, we did not control for participants’ aversion towards the unbroken patterns because such
aversion correlated negatively with aversion towards broken patterns, r(256) = -.23, p < .001.
19
We also assessed deviancy aversion at Time 3 (at the very end of the study) and examined the temporal
stability of such aversion. Participants’ deviancy aversion at Time 1 strongly related to their deviancy
aversion at Time 3, r(256) = .71, p < .001.
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The proposed mediation was observed. As was the case for racial prejudice, the
relationship between deviancy aversion and prejudice reduced when accounting for
participants’ dislike of statistical minorities. Nearly identically to Study 1.1,
approximately 50% of the relationship between deviancy aversion and prejudice was
accounted for by participants’ dislike of statistical minorities. Again, these results also
indicate that mediators aside from disliking statistical minorities likely exist—indeed, in
Study 2.1, the direct effect, though reduced, remained significant after accounting for
disliking statistical minorities. Importantly, the observed indirect relationship remained
when controlling for participants’ novelty aversion (see Table 3.5).

Figure 3.4. Study 2.1: Correlations between key variables—deviancy aversion, disliking
statistical minorities, and prejudice against stigmatized individuals. Study 2.1 was
longitudinal. Error bands: ± 1 SE.
Table 3.5. Mediation Effects in Study 2.1: The Link Between Deviancy Aversion and
Prejudice Against Stigmatized Individuals was Mediated by Disliking Statistical
Minorities.
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Note. * = p < .05 β = standardized coefficients. SE = Standard Error. CI = Confidence Interval.

3.4.2 Study 2.2
Study 2.2 causally tested the mediation observed in Study 2.1. We also tested
whether deviancy aversion—though it only indirectly affected racial prejudice in Studies
1.3 and 1.4—does have a total effect on prejudice against various other groups of
stigmatized individuals.
3.4.2.1 Method
Participants. The power-analysis for Study 2.2 was as in Studies 1.3 and 1.4. We
recruited 217 participants in Study 2.2 (107 female; Mage = 34.14, SDage = 9.84). Of the
total participants, 95 were excluded for failing one or more attention check items or taking
the study more than once.20 Of the final participants, 13 identified as Asian/Asian
American, 5 as Black/African American, 8 as Latino/Hispanic, 93 as White/European
American, 1 as other, and 2 as more than one race.
Deviancy manipulation. Unlike Studies 1.3 and 1.4, in which we manipulated
Correlation:

Predictor Variable
Time 1

Mediator
Time 2

Outcome Variable
Time 3

Study 2.1 (N = 258)

Deviancy Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Prejudice
(Stigmatized)

Total Effect

β = .243, SE = .061, t = 4.00, p < .001, 95% CI: [0.123, 0.362]*

Direct Effect

β = .121, SE = .057, t = 2.13, p = .034, 95% CI: [0.009, 0.232]*

Indirect Effect

β = .122, SE = .032, 95% CI: [0.062, 0.190]*

deviancy aversion in a descriptive manner, in Study 2.1, we manipulated deviancy aversion

20

The higher exclusion rate compared to Studies 1.3 and 1.4 was likely due to the additional attention
check items and due to a decrease in the quality of MTurk responses documented in the Summer of 2018.
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in a motivational manner.21 Specifically, for participants in the high deviancy aversion
condition, we induced participants with the goal to evaluate deviancy as negative and a
lack of deviancy as positive. In contrast, for participants in the low deviancy aversion
condition, we induced participants with the goal to evaluate deviancy as positive and a lack
of deviancy as negative (the specific manipulation prompts are presented below).
Importantly, while these goals were active—before goal-attainment had occurred—
participants completed the disliking statistical minorities and racial prejudice measures.
Goals generally remain active and intrude on current tasks and judgments until goalattainment is achieved (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Förster, Liberman, &
Higgins, 2005; Klinger, 1975; Martin & Tesser, 1989; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011).
High deviancy aversion. Participants in the high deviancy aversion condition read
and responded to the following prompt:
“This survey includes a task or 'game' in which you have to come up
with negative attributes about things/objects that break a pattern, are out of line, and create
disorder, and positive attributes about things/objects that follow a pattern, are in line, and
create order. Later in this survey you will have to report what you have come up with. If
you come up with 75% more negative aspects of things that break a pattern, are out of line,
and create disorder, and positive aspects of things that follow a pattern, are in line, and
create order than the other participants in this survey you will be entered into a raffle to
win a prize.”

21

Given the shift from a descriptive manipulation to a motivational manipulation between Study-set 2 and
3, we conducted Study S5. In Study S5, we tested racial prejudice using the motivational manipulation
utilized in Studies 2.2 and 2.3. This study did not find the shift in manipulation to impact the results.
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Low deviancy aversion. Participants in the low deviancy aversion condition read
the identical prompts as those in the high deviancy aversion condition except the word
‘positive’ was replaced with the word ‘negative’ and the word ‘negative’ was replaced with
the word ‘positive.’
Attention check and motivation items. Before continuing, all participants completed
two attention check items (see Study S5 in the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for
details), and a self-report motivational item, depending on condition: “I feel motivated to
come up with negative (positive) attributes about things that break a pattern, and positive
(negative) attributes about things that follow a pattern” Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree
to 7 = Strongly agree. Finally, participants were told that they would have to report the
attributes they came up with directly after answering 3 question-sets and thus, should come
up with these attributes while completing the 3 question-sets. Before beginning these 3
question-sets, participants were told, depending on condition, to “start thinking of negative
(positive) words that are associated with things that break a pattern (e.g., disruptive
[exciting]), and positive (negative) words that are associated with things that follow a
pattern (e.g., organized [boring]).” For all prompts and detailed materials, see Study S5
and the Supplements of Studies 2.2 and 2.3 in the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019.
Disliking statistical minorities. We adapted the disliking statistical minority
measure of Study-set 1 to a binary format. Participants saw three planets and the minority
and majority inhabitants on these planets and were asked: “Which people do you consider
more negative” 0 = Majority, 1 = Minority. Unlike Study-set 1, we assessed participants’
negative evaluation to ensure that our findings replicate across valence.
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Prejudice against stigmatized individuals. Prejudice was assessed as in the visual
measure in Study 2.1 and as in Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017). Participants evaluated
images of commonly stigmatized people versus images of ‘normal’ people.
Procedure. The procedure was as in Studies 1.3 and 1.4.
3.4.2.2 Results
The manipulation successfully altered participants’ deviancy aversion—
participants in the high (versus low) deviancy aversion condition exhibited greater
nonsocial deviancy aversion on the manipulation check items, p < .001. Additionally, and
replicating Studies 1.3 and 1.4, participants in the high (versus low) deviancy aversion
condition exhibited an increased dislike of novel statistical minorities, p = .013 (Path A;
see Table 3.6 and Figure S5). Disliking novel minorities also related to prejudice against
stigmatized individuals—disliking stigmatized individuals as compared to ‘normative’
individuals, r(120) = .30, p = .001 (Path B). Finally, an effect of deviancy aversion on
prejudice against stigmatized individuals was found, p = .030 (Path C; see Table 6 and
Figure S6).
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Table 3.6. Study-set 2: Studies 2.2 and 2.3. Effects of the Deviancy Aversion
Manipulation on Disliking Statistical Minorities and Prejudice Against Stigmatized
Individuals.

Study 2.2
Manipulation check:
Nonsocial Deviancy
Aversion
Mechanism:
Disliking Statistical
Minorities
Dependent Variable:
Prejudice
(Stigmatized)
Study 2.3

High
Deviancy
Aversion
(M and SD)

Low
Deviancy
Aversion
(M and SD)

High DA +
Mediator
Intervention
(M and SD)

n = 67

n = 55

2.68, 1.74

0.15, 3.03

-

F(1, 120) = 33.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .219

0.73, 0.39

0.53, 0.46

-

F(1, 120) = 6.30, p = .013, ηp2 = .050

1.70, 1.74

1.02, 1.68

-

F(1, 120) = 4.80, p = .030, ηp2 = .038

n = 71

n = 70

n = 61

2.38, 1.92

0.46, 2.70

2.41, 1.60





Significance Test

Manipulation check:

Nonsocial Deviancy
Aversion

F(2, 199) = 18.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .157
t(139) = 5.30, p < .001, d = .90



t(130) = 0.07, p = .940, d = .01





t(129) = 5.18, p < .001, d = .91

0.76, 0.38

0.57, 0.43

0.61, 0.45

F(2, 199) = 3.99, p = .020, ηp2 = .039







Mechanism:

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

t(139) = 2.66, p = .008, d = .45


t(130) = 2.08, p = .037, d = .36





t(129) = 0.47, p = .634, d = .08

1.67, 1.40

0.95, 1.48

1.25, 1.24

F(2, 199) = 4.80, p = .009, ηp2 = .046







Dependent Variable:

Prejudice
(Stigmatized)




t(140) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .52


t(131) = 1.73, p = .084, d = .30



t(130) = 1.24, p = .217, d = .22

Note.  signifies inclusion in a pairwise comparison. DA = Deviancy aversion.

Conceptually replicating the findings of Studies 1.3 and 1.4, we observed the
hypothesized mediation model in Studies 2.2 and 2.3: The effect of deviancy aversion on
prejudice against stigmatized individuals was mediated by disliking statistical minorities
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(Table 3.7). More specifically, the effect of deviancy aversion on prejudice decreased by
approximately 30% when accounting for participants’ dislike of statistical minorities.
Finally, the observed mediation was not moderated by participants’ political orientation,
age, or biological sex (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019).
Table 3.7. Mediation Effects in Studies 2.2 and 2.3: The Link Between Deviancy
Aversion and Prejudice Against Stigmatized Individuals was Mediated by Disliking
Statistical Minorities.
Experiments:
Study 2.2 (N = 122)

Independent
Variable
Deviancy
Aversion

Mediator
Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Dependent
Variable
Prejudice
(Stigmatized)

Total Effect

β = .393, SE = .179, t = 2.19, p = .030, 95% CI: [0.038, 0.747]*

Direct Effect

β = .274, SE = .178, t = 1.54, p = .126, 95% CI: [-0.078, 0.627]

Indirect Effect

B = .118, SE = .062, 95% CI: [0.014, 0.257]*

Study 2.3 (N = 202)

Deviancy
Aversion

Disliking Statistical
Minorities

Prejudice
(Stigmatized)

Relative Effect: High (coded: 1) Versus Low Deviancy Aversion (coded: 0)
Total Effect

β = .510, SE = .165, t = 3.08, p = .002, 95% CI: [0.184, 0.836]*

Direct Effect

β = .378, SE = .161, t = 2.35, p = .020, 95% CI: [0.060, 0.695]*

Indirect Effect

β = .133, SE = .059, 95% CI: [0.031, 0.263]*

Relative Effect: High (coded: 1) Versus High DA Plus Mediator Intervention (coded: 0)
Total Effect

β = .297, SE = .171, t = 1.73, p = .084, 95% CI: [-0.041, 0.635]

Direct Effect

β = .189, SE = .166, t = 1.14, p = .255, 95% CI: [-0.137, 0.516]

Indirect Effect

β = .108, SE = .057, 95% CI: [0.007, 0.231]*

Relative Effect: Low (coded: 1) Versus High DA Plus Mediator Intervention (coded: 0)
Total Effect

β = -.213, SE = .172, t = -1.24, p = .217, 95% CI: [-0.552, 0.126]

Direct Effect

β = -.188, SE = .165, t = -1.14, p = .254, 95% CI: [-0.513, 0.136]

Indirect Effect

β = -.025, SE = .056, 95% CI: [-.139, 0.085]

Note. * = p < .05 β = standardized coefficients. SE = Standard Error. CI = Confidence Interval.
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3.4.3 Study 2.3
Study 2.3 was identical to Study 2.2, except, we sought to establish a causal
pathway in terms of the proposed mediation. We examined whether intervening at the
level of the mediator reduces or eliminates the effect of deviancy aversion on prejudice.
Such an effect would support a causal pathway (e.g., Kendler & Campbell, 2009;
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) from deviancy aversion to prejudice via a dislike of
statistical minorities.
3.4.3.1 Method
Participants. The power-analysis was based on the findings of Study 2.2 (total
effect: f = .20). We needed 237 participants to have 80% power. Given the high exclusion
rate in Study 2.2, we recruited 353 participants (193 female; Mage = 34.63, SDage = 9.98).
151 participants were excluded for failing one or more attention check items or taking the
study more than once. Of the final participants, 16 identified as Asian/Asian American, 11
as Black/African American, 13 as Latino/Hispanic, 157 as White/European American, 1 as
other, and 4 as more than one race. The materials and design of Study 2.3 were identical to
Study 2.2, except for the additional mediator-intervention condition.
Deviancy manipulation. We added a third between-subjects condition in which we
intervened on the proposed mediator (high DA plus intervention condition). In this new
condition, we induced deviancy aversion as in the high deviancy aversion condition, and
thereafter, prompted participants to reflect and report on the positive aspects of minorities
(before the disliking novel minorities and prejudice measures):
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“Important: Before you continue, please imagine the positive aspects of minority
groups. That is, please think about the positive attributes of small groups of people
that deviate from the majority in a society (e.g., unique, special, exciting). Really
try to think of the positive attributes of minority groups and their members and how
you feel warmly towards such groups and their members.”
3.4.3.2 Results
The manipulation successfully altered participants’ deviancy aversion, p < .001.
Replicating Study 2.2, a main effect of deviancy aversion on disliking novel statistical
minorities was observed, p = .020 (Path A; Figure S7), and participants’ dislike of statistical
minorities predicted their prejudice against stigmatized individuals, r(202) = .33, p < .001
(Path B). Finally, deviancy aversion again influenced prejudice against stigmatized
individuals, p = .009 (Path C; see Table 3.6 and Figure S8).
We examined pairwise comparisons. Suggesting a successful intervention at the
level of the mediator, participants in the high deviancy aversion condition exhibited greater
dislike of novel statistical minorities compared to participants in the low deviancy aversion
and high DA plus intervention conditions. Participants in the high deviancy aversion
condition also exhibited higher prejudice than those in the low deviancy aversion condition,
and marginally higher prejudice than those in the high DA plus intervention condition.
Finally, participants in the low deviancy aversion condition did not differ from those in the
high DA plus intervention condition in terms of disliking statistical minorities and
prejudice (Table 3.6).
Notably, despite participants in the high deviancy aversion condition exhibiting a
greater dislike of minorities and marginally greater prejudice than those in the high DA
plus intervention condition, the two conditions did not differ in terms of deviancy aversion
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(Table 3.6). That is, intervening at the mediator did not eliminate the effect of the
manipulation on pattern deviancy aversion. This finding supports the directionality of the
proposed mediation model.
Mediation. The results of Study 2.3 supported a successful intervention at the level
of the mediator. First, the effect of the high deviancy aversion condition versus the low
deviancy aversion on prejudice was mediated by disliking statistical minorities; the effect
of deviancy aversion on prejudice decreased by approximately 25% when accounting for
participants’ dislike of statistical minorities. Second, the effect of the high deviancy
aversion condition versus the high DA plus intervention condition was also mediated by
disliking statistical minorities; the effect of deviancy aversion on prejudice decreased by
approximately 35% when accounting for participants’ dislike of statistical minorities.
Third, a mediation was not found when comparing the low deviancy aversion condition to
the high DA plus intervention condition (Table 3.7). Again, none of the calculated indirect
effects were moderated by participants’ political orientation, age, or biological sex (see
Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019).
Finally, in Studies 2.2 and 2.3, participants’ self-reported motivation to generate
positive (negative) aspects of deviancy and negative (positive) aspects of a lack of deviancy
(i.e., unbroken patterns/regularities) within each of the conditions neither related to
participants’ dislike of novel statistical minorities nor their level of prejudice, ps > .134.
These findings reduce the likelihood that our findings are driven by demand effects.
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3.4.4 Discussion: Study-Set 2
In Study-set 2, we replicated and extended the mediation model observed in Studyset 1. We observed a link between deviancy aversion and prejudice against various groups
of stigmatized individuals, and found this link to be mediated by participants’ dislike of
novel statistical minorities. In Study 2.1, we observed the proposed mediation model in a
longitudinal correlational study. These are the first results indicating that deviancy aversion
relates to prejudice in a stable, long-term manner. In Studies 2.2 and 2.3, we documented
this mediation experimentally, and further, found that manipulating deviancy aversion
causally impacts people’s prejudice against various commonly stigmatized individuals in
society (e.g., someone cross-dressing, someone wearing a Burka). These results are the
first to document that deviancy aversion has a causal effect on prejudice. Furthermore, in
Study 2.3, intervening at the level of the mediator—by prompting participants to directly
reflect on the positive attributes of minorities—eliminated the effect of deviancy aversion
on prejudice. These findings support the validity of the proposed mediation model in terms
of a causal-pathway.
3.5

Studies 3.1 and 3.2: Deviancy Aversion Predicts Group-Size Dependent
Prejudice
We have argued that deviancy aversion is in part linked to prejudice via a dislike of

statistically infrequent individuals in society. These results suggest that deviancy aversion
may no longer predict prejudice if individuals who are the targets of prejudice become
more populous in society. For instance, making Black people the statistical majority
(versus minority) should lead individuals high in deviancy aversion to exhibit less
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prejudice towards Black people. Put another way, deviancy aversion should relate to
comparatively lower prejudice towards Black people when Black people are the majority
as compared to when they are the minority.
Study-set 3 tested—as the proposed statistical deviancy line of argument would
suggest—whether deviancy aversion predicts such group-size dependent prejudice. We
examined this question in terms of prejudice against Black individuals (Study 3.1) and in
terms of prejudice against Muslims (Study 3.2). Specifically, we assessed whether the link
between deviancy aversion and prejudice against Black people and Muslims varies as a
function of whether these groups are statistical minorities versus majorities in a given
context.22
3.5.1 Study 3.1
In Study 3.1, we examined whether deviancy aversion predicts group-size
dependent prejudice against Black individuals.
3.5.1.1 Method
Participants and Design. A power-analysis based on the average of the
relationships observed in Study 1.1 (r = .25) indicated that we needed approximately 123
participants to have 80% power. We aimed to recruit 150 adults on MTurk. We ended up
recruiting 142 participants (78 female; age: M = 34.77, SD = 11.42). Four participants were
excluded because they failed the attention check items. Two further responses were

22

We chose Muslims as the stigmatized group in Study 3.2 because deviancy aversion
predicted and heightened prejudice against such individuals in Study-set 2.
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excluded because participants completed the survey twice (identified via IP address). One
further response was excluded for leaving more than half of the survey blank. Of the final
participants (N = 135), 12 identified as Asian/Asian American, 6 as Black/African
American, 9 as Latino/Hispanic, 106 as White/European American, and 3 as More than
one race.
Deviancy aversion. Nonsocial deviancy aversion was assessed as in Study 1.1 (the
geometric shapes measure, the face-valid measure, and the mental imagery measure),
except, the response items were changed to: “Uncomfortable,” “Annoyed,” and “Happy.”
This was done to replicate our findings across negatively valenced items (Study 1.1 only
included positively valenced items).
Group-size dependent racial prejudice. Participants were presented with images of
groups of people (approximately 50 individuals per group) in which the percentage of
Black and White individuals varied. In 3 of the images, Black people were the majority
and White people were the minority. In the three other images, Black people were the
minority and White people were the majority. The percentage of Black and White people
in these images were based on racial demographics of actual countries in the western world
(United States [12% Black], France [6% Black], Canada [2% Black]), and in Africa (South
Africa [10% White], Namibia [6% White], Botswana [3% White]). That the percentage of
Black and White people echoed those of real countries was not shared with participants.
The following prompt was above each image: “These are the people living in a country.”
In response to each minority and majority in each country, participants responded to two
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binary-choice items: “Which group do you like more?” and “If you lived in this
country, which group would you want to be a part of?” (see Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5. An example item from the group-size dependent racial prejudice measure in
Study 3.1. In this example, Black people are the majority group and White people are the
minority group.
Social desirability. The study included a measure of social desirability (Haghighat,
2007) to account for one form of response bias—participants’ tendency to engage in self-
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presentational/socially desirable responding (e.g., Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954; Fisher,
1993).
Attention Check. The study included two attention checks. The first was the
attention check in Study 1.1. The second was an attention check that asked how someone
whose name is Anton would respond to the following question: “What is your name?”
(“Anton,” “Ben,” or “Jasmine”).
Procedure. Participants completed the deviancy aversion measure, the group-size
dependent racial prejudice measure, the attention checks, demographics, and the social
desirability measure (in that order).
3.5.1.2 Results
Conceptually replicating Path A of the proposed mediation, nonsocial deviancy
aversion predicted participants’ dislike of minority groups across all the countries/races,
r(133) = .204, p = .017. This relationship remained when controlling for participants’
level of social desirability, r(132) = .173, p = .046. Importantly, as predicted, deviancy
aversion also predicted racial prejudice depending on group size. Deviancy aversion
related to greater racial prejudice against Black people when Black people were presented
as the minority, r(133) = .25, p = .004, but related to comparatively less racial prejudice
against Black people when Black people were presented as the majority, r(133) = -.12, p
= .186, interaction term: F(1, 133) = 5.76, p = .018, ηp2 = .042. Said another way,
participants high in deviancy aversion (+1.5 SD) exhibited greater prejudice when Black
people were presented as the minority, M = .80, SE = .060, and lower racial prejudice
when Black people were presented as the majority, M = .34, SE = .064, F(1, 133) =
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17.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .119. Importantly, this was not true of participants low in deviancy
aversion (-1.5 SD)—they evaluated Black people similarly irrespective of group-size,
minority: M = .51, SE = .060, majority: M = .48, SE = .064, p = .815 (Figure 3.6). For
additional descriptive statistics, see the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al. (2019).

Figure 3.6. Study 3.1: Deviancy aversion predicted group-size dependent racial
prejudice. Participants high in deviancy aversion (left bars; +1.5 SD) exhibited prejudice
against Black people when Black people were presented as the statistical minority. This
prejudice reduced (and even flipped to preference), however, when Black people were
presented as the statistical majority. The prejudice of participants low in deviancy
aversion, however, did not depend on group-size (right bars; -1.5 SD). Error bars: +/- 1
SE.
3.5.2 Study 3.2
Study 3.2 was largely identical to Study 3.1, except, instead of prejudice against
Black individuals we examined group-size prejudice against Muslims (represented in
Study 3.1 as people wearing Burkas; of course, not all Muslim women wear Burkas,
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however, Burkas qualified as a widely recognized cue of being a member of the Muslim
faith).23 We chose Muslims because deviancy aversion predicted and heightened prejudice
against Muslims in Study-set 2, and because of the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in the
United States (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 2014).
3.5.2.1 Method
Participants and Design. A power-analysis based on Study 3.1 (ηp2 = .042)
indicated that we needed approximately 190 participants to have 90% power. We aimed to
recruit 250 adults on MTurk. We ended up recruiting 250 participants (125 female; age: M
= 39.69, SD = 13.12). Four participants were excluded because they failed the attention
check items. Two further responses were excluded because participants completed the
survey twice (identified via IP address; final N = 244). Of the final participants, 29
identified as Asian/Asian American, 18 as Black/African American, 20 as Latino/Hispanic,
176 as White/European American, and 7 as More than one race. Study 3.2 was identical to
Study 3.1, except we assessed participants’ prejudice against people wearing Burkas as a
function of group-size instead of their prejudice against Black people as a function of
group-size. We also added a description of the minority/majority to ensure that participants
understood that the people depicted were wearing Burkas (see Figure 8).

23

It is unclear whether the findings of Study 3.2 extend to Muslims more generally, that is, extends above
and beyond Muslims who—at least given the cue of wearing a Burka—more strongly adhere to their faith.
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Figure 3.7. An example item from the group-size dependent prejudice measure in Study
3.2. In this example, people wearing Burkas are the majority group and people not
wearing Burkas are the minority group.
3.5.2.2 Results
Again, deviancy aversion predicted participants’ dislike of minority groups across
all the countries, r(242) = .25, p < .001, and this relationship remained when controlling
for participants’ level of social desirability, r(241) = .25, p < .001. Importantly, as in
Study 3.1, deviancy aversion predicted prejudice depending on group size. Deviancy
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aversion related to greater prejudice against people wearing Burkas when such people
were presented as the minority, r(242) = .24, p < .001, but related to comparatively less
prejudice against people wearing Burkas when such people were presented as the
majority, r(242) = -.10, p = .117, interaction term: F(1, 242) = 15.45, p < .001, ηp2 =
.060. Said another way, participants high in deviancy aversion (+1.5 SD) exhibited
greater prejudice when people wearing Burkas were presented as the minority, M = 0.96,
SE = .038, and comparatively lower prejudice when people wearing Burkas were
presented as the majority, M = .70, SE = .046, F(1, 242) = 22.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .086.
Participants low in deviancy aversion did not exhibit this trend—they evaluated people
wearing Burkas more similarly across presentation format: minority, M = .73, SE = .038,
and majority, M = .82, SE = .046, F(1, 242) = 3.14, p = .078, ηp2 = .013 (see Figure 9).
For additional descriptive statistics see the Supplements of Gollwitzer et al. (2019).
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Figure 3.8. Study 3.2: Deviancy aversion predicted group-size dependent prejudice
against stigmatized individuals. Participants high in deviancy aversion (left bars; +1.5
SD) exhibited prejudice against Muslims (people wearing Burkas) when such people
were presented as the statistical minority. This prejudice reduced, however, when
Muslims were presented as the statistical majority. No such effect was observed for
participants low in deviancy aversion (right bars; +1.5 SD). Error bars: +/- 1 SE.
3.5.3 Study 3.2
Study-set 3 found deviancy aversion to predict group-size dependent prejudice.
Participants high in deviancy aversion were more prejudiced against Black people and
Muslims (individuals wearing Burkas) in contexts in which Black people and Muslims
were the minority (e.g., countries in the Western world). However, they favored Black
people and indicated that they would want to be Black in contexts in which Black people
are the majority (Study 3.1). And, further, they exhibited reduced dislike of Muslims and
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were more likely to select to wear a Burka in contexts in which the majority of people wear
Burkas (Study 3.2). In contrast, the prejudice of participants low in deviancy aversion
largely did not depend on group-size. These findings support the proposed mediation model
by indicating that deviancy aversion is linked to prejudice against stigmatized people in
society in part because such people are numerically/statistically infrequent (at least in the
United States).
The findings of Study-set 3 also suggest that deviancy aversion promotes prejudice
that is attuned to the surrounding context/environment. That is, deviancy aversion may
contribute to the contextual and flexible nature of prejudice and its targets (see Payne et
al., 2017). Finally, we note that our findings align with the argument that race and stigma
categories are often inherently meaningless. For instance, it is not ‘Blackness’ that results
in prejudice against Black individuals, instead it is the superficial features associated with
Black people that incite prejudice (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933; Brown, 1995), including
potentially, at least in the United States, an aversion towards proportionally small groups.
3.6

Participants’ Racial Identity Across the Reported Studies
It is important to consider that participants’ racial identity may moderate

psychological findings, especially in terms of prejudice (Brown, 1995; Henrich et al.,
2010; Nielsen et al., 2017). Unfortunately, our individual studies only included a small
number of participants of minority racial identity (e.g., Black, Asian). Therefore, we
collapsed across the reported studies, including Studies S3, S4, and S5, but excluding
Study-set 3 (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019 for more details), and then
examined whether participants’ racial identity moderated any of the reported results.
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When collapsing across all the studies, we did not find participants’ minority
racial identity (participants who responded Asian, Black, Hispanic, other, or more than
one race; n = 478) versus majority racial identity (White; n = 1544) to moderate any of
the paths of our mediation model. Path A: p = .609, Path B: p = .642, Path C: p = .426.
We also did not find minority versus majority racial identity to impact specifically the
correlational (Studies 1.1, 2.1, and S3; minority [n = 199]; majority [n = 577]) or
experimental (Studies 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 2.3 S4, and S5; minority [n = 279]; majority [n =
967]) results, ps > .227. Or, to impact specifically the studies examining racial prejudice
(Study-set 1, Studies S3, S4, and S5; minority [n = 356]; majority [n = 1145]) or the
studies examining prejudice against various other groups of stigmatized individuals
(Study-set 2; minority [n = 122]; majority [n = 399]), ps > .453.
We recognize, however, that comparing racial minority to majority participants is
a heavy-handed approach to examining potential inter-racial differences. Therefore, we
re-conducted the analysis collapsed across all studies solely with Black participants
(including those of mixed race; n = 164) versus White participants (n = 1544). Again, we
found no effects of participants’ race for any of the three examined paths, ps > .082. This
.082 significance value pertained to the link between deviancy aversion and prejudice;
the data appeared to trend towards a greater link between deviancy aversion and
prejudice for Black participants as compared to White participants, rather than indicating
that Path C does not exist for Black participants.
Finally, we re-examined these analyses only for the studies that included racial
prejudice as the dependent variable (Study-set 1 and Studies S3, S4, and S5; Black
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participants, n = 122; White participants, n = 1145). Participants’ race (Black versus White)
did not moderate any of our findings, ps > .281. To examine the strength of these final null
findings—given the small sample-to-moderate sample size of Black participants—we
conducted Bayesian model comparisons using the JASP software (JASP Team, 2018). We
found that the best model (a model including solely main effects) was ~5.8 times (Path A),
~9.2 times (Path B), and ~4.3 times (Path C) more explanatory than a model including an
interaction of participants’ racial identity (Black versus White). Nonetheless, these
analyses should still be approached with caution given the small-to-moderate sample size
of Black participants, and because we were unable to examine the impact of participants’
racial identity in each of the individual studies.
3.7

General Discussion
In 9 studies (N = 1,821), we examined whether deviancy aversion causally impacts

prejudice, and whether this effect is partially driven by a general dislike of statistical
minorities—disliking people who are statistically infrequent in a population (see Table 3.8
for overview). Studies 1.1 and 1.2 tested the proposed mediation model in a correlational
manner. In these studies, adults’ and 4- to 7-year-olds’ deviancy aversion (assessed via
nonsocial stimuli, for instance, aversion towards broken patterns of geometric shapes)
related to their dislike of novel statistical minorities (compared to novel majorities; Path
A), their dislike of statistical minorities predicted their racial prejudice against Black
individuals (Path B), and deviancy aversion predicted such racial prejudice (in adults but
not in children; Path C). Finally, the proposed mediation was observed both in adults and
children.
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Table 3.8. Overview of All Presented Studies in Chapter 3.
Design

Sample
Type

N

Predictor

Mediator

Outcome

Path
A

Path
B

Path
C*

Indirect

Racial Prejudice









Racial Prejudice





×



Racial Prejudice
(Continuous)





×*



Racial Prejudice
(Implicit - IAT)





×



--



--

--

--

--



--

--

--

Racial Prejudice





×*



Racial Prejudice
(Binary)





×



Racial Prejudice
(Binary)





×





























--

--

--



--

--

--

Study-set 1
Study 1.1

Correlational

Adult

368

PDA

Study 1.2

Correlational

Children

58

PDA

Study 1.3

Experimental
(Descriptive)

Adult

248

PDA

Study 1.4

Experimental
(Descriptive)

Adult

186

PDA

Study S1

Correlational

Adult

81

PDA

Study S2

Correlational

Children

86

PDA

Study S3

Correlational

Adult

150

PDA

Study S4

Experimental
(Descriptive)

Adult

345

PDA

Study S5

Experimental
(Motivational)

Adult

199

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities
Study-set 2

Study 2.1

Correlational
(Longitudinal)

Adult

258

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities

Study 2.2

Experimental
(Motivational)

Adult

122

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities

Study 2.3

Experimental
(Motivational)

Adult

202

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities

Prejudice Against
Various
Stigmatized
Individuals
Prejudice Against
Various
Stigmatized
Individuals
Prejudice Against
Various
Stigmatized
Individuals

Study-set 3
Study 3.1

Correlational

Adult

135

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities

Study 3.2

Correlational

Adult

244

PDA

Dislike of
Statistical
Minorities

Group-Size
Dependent Racial
Prejudice
Group-Size
Dependent
Prejudice Against
Muslims

Note. DA = Deviancy aversion.  indicates p < .05. ×* indicates .05 < p < .10. × indicates p > .10. Path C*
= The total effect, not the direct effect.
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Studies 1.3 and 1.4 extended these findings causally. Participants prompted to come
up with negative (versus positive) aspects of nonsocial deviancy exhibited a greater dislike
of novel statistical minorities (compared to majorities; Path A), and this dislike predicted
their racial prejudice (Path B). Though we observed the proposed mediation (i.e., indirect
effect) across these studies, a total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice was not
found (Path C). A meta-analysis of Studies 1.3, 1.4, and two supplemental studies (Studies
S4 and S5; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019) did not indicate a meaningful total
effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice.
In Study-set 2, we extended the proposed mediation model beyond prejudice
against Black individuals to prejudice against other groups of stigmatized individuals in
Western society (e.g., someone crossdressing; someone wearing a Burka). In Study 2.1—
a longitudinal correlational study—nonsocial deviancy aversion (at Time 1) predicted
disliking statistical minorities (at Time 2; Path A), and this dislike predicted prejudice
against stigmatized individuals (at Time 3; Path B). A relationship between deviancy
aversion and prejudice against stigmatized individuals was also observed (Path C), and this
relationship was, as predicted, mediated by participants’ general dislike of novel statistical
minorities.
Importantly, Study 2.1 also provided an important constraint on the link between
deviancy aversion and prejudice; in line with the proposed mediation model, deviancy
aversion did not relate to prejudice against women, a group that suffers from prejudice
despite not being a statistical minority. These results demonstrate that deviancy aversion
does not predict bigotry per se; instead, it seems to specifically predict prejudice against
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groups or individuals that are perceived as deviant in society, for instance, people who are
perceived as deviant due to being statistical minorities.
Studies 2.2 and 2.3 built on these findings by experimentally manipulating
deviancy aversion and documenting the mediation observed in Study 2.1 in a causal
manner. Notably, unlike in Studies 1.3 and 1.4, in which deviancy aversion did not have a
meaningful total effect on prejudice against Black individuals, deviancy aversion did have
a moderately-sized total effect on prejudice against other types of stigmatized individuals.
Finally, in Study 2.3, we observed that intervening on the mediator—by having participants
reflect on the positive attributes of statistical minorities—eliminated the effect of deviancy
aversion on prejudice against stigmatized individuals. These results support the existence
of a causal pathway from deviancy aversion to prejudice via disliking statistical minorities
(e.g., Kendler & Campbell, 2009; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).
Finally, in Study-set 3, we collected further evidence supporting the proposed
mediation model, and zeroed in on the type of prejudice deviancy aversion influences. To
do so, we demonstrated that the link between deviancy aversion and prejudice depends on
the size of groups in the surrounding environment. In Study 3.1, participants’ deviancy
aversion predicted greater racial prejudice in contexts in which Black people were depicted
as the statistical minority, but reduced racial prejudice in contexts in which Black people
were depicted as the statistical majority. And, in Study 3.2, participants’ deviancy aversion
predicted greater prejudice against Muslims (people wearing Burkas) in contexts in which
such people were depicted as the statistical minority, but reduced prejudice against
Muslims in contexts in which such people were depicted as the statistical majority.
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Together, these findings provide strong support for the proposed mediation model, and
further, demonstrate that deviancy aversion predicts prejudice that is highly contextdependent on one’s surrounding social regularities.
The four most central contributions of our findings are: (1) A replication and
extension of the recent findings of Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017) by consistently
demonstrating that a dislike of statistical minorities in part drives the link between deviancy
aversion and prejudice. (2) The first demonstration that deviancy aversion can causally
impact prejudice (at least in terms of prejudice against stigmatized individuals other than
Black individuals). This finding indicates that the link between deviancy aversion and
prejudice is not restricted to individual differences, reduces the likelihood that the
relationship between deviancy aversion and prejudice arises via a confounding thirdvariable, and opens the door for intervention possibilities. (3) The elucidation of two
important boundary conditions on the influence of deviancy aversion on prejudice. First,
while deviancy aversion substantially influenced prejudice against various types of
stigmatized individuals, it did not meaningfully influence specifically prejudice against
Black individuals. Second, while deviancy aversion related to prejudice against groups that
are infrequent in society, it did not relate to generalized prejudice per se; for instance,
deviancy aversion did not relate to prejudice against women. (4) Finally, our findings help
elucidate which type of prejudice deviancy aversion specifically impacts: Deviancy
aversion predicts prejudice towards people who are perceived as socially deviant in a
specific context, for instance, towards individuals who are statistical infrequent in terms of
their current environment or surroundings.
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3.7.1 Early-Emergence
Beyond these four primary contributions, we also shed light on the development
of prejudice. Our findings not only replicate children’s explicit prejudice against Black
individuals (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Dunham et al., 2008), but also very tentatively suggest
one potential pathway via which children become prejudiced. Children’s deviancy
aversion may heighten their dislike of people who are infrequent in a population
(compared to those who are frequent), in turn, potentially increasing their racial prejudice
against Black individuals (at least in the United States where Black people are a
minority). Notably, however, our developmental findings were solely correlational and
the prejudice measure of Study 1.2 was arguably a poor measure of prejudice (“Which
picture do you like more?”). Further, given the small sample size of Study 1.2, our results
should be approached cautiously. Future research should consider this developmental
pathway with a larger sample size, in a causal manner, with an improved measure of
prejudice, and with respect to prejudice beyond racial prejudice.
The current findings also are among the first to directly address how children
think about people depending on their statistical frequency (e.g., Johnston & Jacobs,
2003; Primi & Agnoli, 2002). Empirically verifying the prediction of Bilger and Liben
(2006), children in our studies overall disfavored novel minorities over majorities (Study
1.2). And additionally, we found children’s dislike of novel minorities over majorities to
predict their level of prejudice against Black individuals (a statistical minority in the
United States). These latter findings raise the interesting possibility that the target of
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children’s prejudice is in part determined by the statistical infrequency of types of people
in a society (see Roberts et al., 2017).
3.7.2 Context-Dependency
The current findings also suggest that deviancy aversion may contribute to the
flexible and contextual nature of prejudice and its targets (Payne et al., 2017; GarciaMarques et al., 2017). In Study-set 3, deviancy aversion predicted greater prejudice
against Black people and Muslims (individuals wearing Burkas) when these groups were
depicted as statistical minorities as compared to when they were depicted as statistical
majorities. We conclude that deviancy aversion seems to predict prejudice that is strongly
attuned to the surrounding environment; these findings may help explain why the targets
of prejudice vary across time and context. For instance, on an applied level, these results
suggest that deviancy aversion may drive people to become less prejudiced against
minorities as these minorities become more populous. Research has indicated that
minorities (as a collective) will soon become the majority in terms of population in the
United States (see Craig & Richeson, 2014; Craig, Rucker, & Richeson, 2018);
potentially, people’s deviancy aversion may reduce people’s prejudice against these
groups when this change occurs (though, of course, other factors may outweigh any
impact of deviancy aversion, for instance, status threat).
3.7.3 Extension of Past Literature
The current results also extend previous research in demonstrating that the link
between deviancy aversion and prejudice observed by Gollwitzer et al. (2017) exists even
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when these variables are measured longitudinally. In Study 2.1, participants’ deviancy
aversion predicted their degree of prejudice assessed 6 days later. These findings indicate
a stable temporal link between people’s sensitivity to deviancy and their degree of
prejudice.
Our findings also indicate that people are unaware that their deviancy aversion
influences their dislike of novel minorities and prejudice against stigmatized individuals.
Though deviancy aversion influenced participants’ dislike of minorities and prejudice in
Studies 2.2 and 2.3 (and Study S5), participants’ self-reported motivation to generate
negative aspects of deviancy (e.g., disruptive) versus positive aspects of deviancy (e.g.,
exciting) neither related to their dislike of minorities nor their prejudice. These results
suggest that the effects of deviancy aversion on disliking minorities and prejudice occur
largely outside of awareness (see Bargh, 2007; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar,
& Trötschel, 2001; Bargh & Morsella, 2008). Indeed, prejudices can be activated nonconsciously (e.g., Banaji, 2001; Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
In line with this claim, researchers have found that people create ‘type-rationalizations’—
fallacious justifications for their prejudice (e.g., Jewish people are greedy, Gay
individuals threaten family values; LaPiere, 1936).
Finally, we tentatively found that participants’ racial identity does not influence
the link between deviancy aversion, disliking statistical minorities, and prejudice. This
finding, dishearteningly, suggests that racial minorities in the United States perceive
themselves as breaking the social regularities and assumed ‘patterns’ around them in
society (i.e., they perceive of themselves as socially ‘deviant’). If true, deviancy aversion
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may be one factor motivating internalized prejudice/racism—members of disadvantaged
groups holding prejudice against their own group (Pyke, 2010). Future research should
examine this possibility.
3.7.4 Types of Prejudice
As noted earlier, our findings reveal an important constraint on the effect of
deviancy aversion on prejudice. Deviancy aversion did not conclusively influence racial
prejudice against Black individuals, but did meaningfully impact prejudice against other
groups of stigmatized individuals. And, this difference was not driven by manipulating
deviancy aversion differently in Studies 1.3 and 1.4 versus Study-set 2 (in Study S5, we
manipulated deviancy aversion in a motivational manner but still did not observe a
significant total effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice). So, why does deviancy
aversion causally influence prejudice against various stigmatized individuals but not
against Black people? For one, numerous historical (e.g., segregation; Amir, 1969), social
(e.g., group-threat, dominance motives, group-position, resource competition; e.g., Sherif
et al., 1961), and large-scale societal and structural (e.g., Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972)
factors contribute to the force of racial prejudice against Black individuals in the United
States (see Quillian, 2006). These factors likely override or suppress any total effect of
deviancy aversion on racial prejudice.
Additionally, or alternatively, people may simply judge Black individuals as less
socially deviant than other groups of stigmatized individuals. Confirming this possibility,
in a supplemental study (Study S6; N = 92; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2019),
participants explicitly judged various stigmatized individuals (compared to ‘normative’
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individuals) as three times more deviant in society (“more likely to break a pattern and be
out of line”) than Black individuals (compared to White individuals). What explains
participants’ perception of Black individuals as less socially deviant than other groups of
stigmatized individuals, however? Potentially, the integration of Black people in mass
media and American culture (e.g., in music, in sports), and the increased awareness of the
contribution of Black people in American society (e.g., Black history month), may lead
people to perceive Black individuals as more normative. And this may be a recent
development; researchers in 1988 explicitly argued that Black people in the United States
are discriminated against because they are perceived as deviant in society (Katz & Hass,
1988).
Given these results, we posit that deviancy aversion particularly motivates
prejudice against groups and individuals who are perceived as socially deviant.
Supporting this claim, in Study 2.1, we observed that deviancy aversion does not relate to
prejudice against women, a group that is statistically normative; these results strongly
align with our proposed mediation model given that women are not a statistical minority
in the United States (examining this relationship in contexts where women are a minority
would be an interesting extension of the current work). And, in Study-set 3, deviancy
aversion predicted reduced prejudice against Black and Muslim people when such people
were presented as the non-deviant statistical majority in a society. We therefore propose
that deviancy aversion particularly predicts prejudice against individuals that break the
regularities in a specific context—deviancy aversion does not seem to be related to
generalized prejudice or bigotry per se.
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As such, prejudice driven by people’s sensitivity to deviancy seems to diverge
from prejudice driven by social factors, such as resource-competition (e.g., Sherif et al.,
1961), threat (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005, Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian,
1995, 1996), and social identity (Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel 1979). Prejudice
driven by deviancy aversion is directed specifically towards social deviancy, is unrelated
to conservatism (see Gollwitzer et al., 2017), is flexible and fluctuates with regard to the
specific context (see Study-set 3), and does not seem to be driven by ingroup biases (see
the racial identity results directly before the general discussion). Prejudice in the service
of social factors, on the other hand, is largely directed towards competitive or
disadvantaged outgroups, and is commonly driven by in-group bias (e.g., Riek, Mania, &
Gaertner, 2006). Future research should directly examine how deviancy aversion
differentially impacts prejudice compared to other causes of prejudice (e.g., threat;
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), especially in terms of the resulting targets of prejudice and
the processes involved.
3.7.5 Mediation Model: Methodological Considerations
Correlational mediation analyses and even experimental mediation analyses have
certain pitfalls (Bullock et al., 2010; Fiedler et al., 2011). For instance, significant
mediations can be driven by spurious mediators. To begin to combat this possibility, we
included one such possible third variable in our analyses: Participants’ judgments of
whether statistical minorities or majorities hold power. Controlling for these judgments
did not reduce the observed mediation effects (except in Study 1.2). Further, deviancy
aversion has been shown to predict prejudice independently of political orientation,
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disgust, need for closure, disliking ambiguity, negativity bias, threat sensitivity, social
dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, a self-reported desire to be
egalitarian, and a tendency to anthropomorphize (Gollwitzer et al., 2017; Gollwitzer &
Clark, 2019). These variables, thus, are unlikely to qualify as third-variables leading to
spurious mediation effects.
Further in support of a genuine mediation, we conceptually replicated the
mediation model numerous times (Bullock et al., 2010). We observed the model across
different manipulations of deviancy aversion (descriptive as well as motivational),
different measures of prejudice (binary and continuous; explicit and implicit), different
types of prejudice (racial prejudice, prejudice against stigmatized individuals), different
measurement items (e.g., liking and group-identity, positive and negative items), and
across time (when the variables were measured longitudinally).
As suggested by Bullock and colleagues (2010), we also tested whether the
observed mediation holds for different subgroups relevant to the theoretical model. We
did not find participants’ racial identity (minority versus majority; Black versus White),
power judgments, political orientation, age, or sex to moderate the observed mediation
effect. Importantly, we also successfully intervened on the proposed mediator—disliking
statistical minorities—in Study 2.3. This finding provides causal support for the B
pathway of the mediation model. That is, disliking statistical minorities causally impacts
prejudice. This causal-interventionist test supports a causal pathway model (e.g., Kendler
& Campbell, 2009; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).
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3.7.6 Limitations and Caveats
A number of limitations and caveats should be addressed. First, in the
experimental studies, we did not include a no-treatment control condition. Therefore, it is
unclear whether heightening deviancy aversion raises prejudice or reducing deviancy
aversion attenuates prejudice (or both). We thus cannot conclude that decreasing people’s
deviancy aversion reduces their prejudice, a finding which could have applied
interventionist value. Relatedly, we did not consider which factors may lead certain
individuals to be more responsive to our deviancy aversion induction and its potential
effect on prejudice. And, we did not examine whether mechanisms aside from disliking
statistical minorities exist; across the reported studies (in which we observed a significant
total effect) approximately 40% of the variance of the link between deviancy aversion
and prejudice was explained by disliking statistical minorities, suggesting the existence of
additional mechanisms. Future research should examine these questions.
Second, the reported studies did not examine real-world behavioral expressions of
prejudice (e.g., hiring practices). Therefore, the generalizability of the present research is
limited. Future research should examine whether inducing deviancy aversion leads
individuals to exhibit prejudice against social deviants in more real-world contexts.
Third, some conceptual clarifications are in order. Though we often use the term
disliking statistical minorities to represent the proposed mediator, such dislike was
operationalized as a comparative preference for statistical majorities over minorities
(Study-set 1 and Study 2.1), and a comparative dislike of statistical minorities over
majorities (Studies 2.2 and 2.3). Therefore, it is unclear whether participants’ responses
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truly communicated disliking minorities rather than a comparative preference for
majorities and a comparative dislike of minorities. Similarly, while we use the term
prejudice throughout the article, it is unclear whether participants’ responses entailed a
comparative liking for White people (Study-set 1) and ‘normative’ people (Study-set 2)
or a comparative dislike of Black people (Study-set 1) and stigmatized people (Study-set
2; see Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). These conceptual caveats should be kept in mind
when considering the observed findings.
Fourth, one might argue that demand effects account for our findings. A number
of points argue against demand, however. First, we found the predicted results in Study
1.1 despite including a distractor task. Second, Study 2.1 was a longitudinal study, and
we still observed the predicted results. Third, in Study-set 2, we removed the reminder
prompts included in Studies 1.3 and 1.4 (that kept the manipulation salient throughout the
studies) and still observed the hypothesized mediation. Fourth, Study 1.4 assessed
participants’ implicit racial prejudice and still observed the hypothesized mediation. Fifth,
in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 (and Study S5), participants’ self-reported motivation to come up
with positive (versus negative) attributes of deviancy neither impacted participants’
dislike of statistical minorities nor their prejudice. Past research indicates that demand
effects are highly unlikely when participants’ self-reported motivations to follow a
manipulation do not align with their responding on dependent variables (e.g., Gollwitzer,
Schwörer, Stern, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2017).
Fifth, aside from controlling for participants’ power judgments, we did not
consider factors related to functionality; the presented findings may be moderated by
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participants’ goals. Indeed, motivational causes of prejudice often override simple
cognitive determinants (e.g., see Blanchard, Adelman, & Cook, 1975). And further, in
line with the lack of a meaningful effect of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice (Studies
1.3 and 1.4), motivational factors underlying racial prejudice (e.g., dominance motives;
resource competition; institutional factors; Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972; Sherif et al.,
1961) may override the influence of deviancy aversion on racial prejudice.
Sixth, we did not consider a number of constructs conceptually related to
deviancy aversion in the present research. For instance, we did not consider whether
people’s response to expectation violations play a role in our findings, and similarly,
whether the literature on prediction error and conflict is relevant for the current results
(e.g., Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Relatedly, we did not examine whether
creativity plays a role in our findings—a liking for deviancy may relate to creative
thinking and reduced prejudice has been linked to creative ‘out of the box’ thinking
(Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013).
Seventh, we explicitly note some limitations of the individual studies and
analyses. First, Study 1.2 (the children’s sample), had a very small sample size (n = 58).
Therefore, the results of this individual study should be interpreted cautiously and future
research needs to be conducted before strong conclusions are drawn. Second, our analysis
of whether participants’ racial identity moderated our results is similarly limited. Only a
small number of Black participants were observed across our studies (total n = 164),
making it difficult to conclude whether participants’ race impacted the results of any of
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the individually reported studies. Future studies should continue to examine both these
questions.
Eight, the observed findings may extend to contexts apart from the societal or
population level. For instance, deviancy aversion may lead individuals to dislike
statistical minorities in specific contexts (e.g., band Geeks in a high school) aside from
disliking minorities in the general population. Building on Study-set 3, future research
should continue to examine whether deviancy aversion dynamically influences prejudice
depending on the frequency/infrequency of different types of people in a specific
environment.
Finally, assumably, there are varying subtypes of deviancy. For instance, pattern
deviancy, which entails deviations from a contextual regularity or pattern (Palmer,
Schloss, & Sammartino, 2013), may differ from prototype deviancy, which entails
deviations from people’s stable representations of a category. For instance, most leaves
on a tree are prototypically deviant in that they deviate from the prototype of a ‘perfect’
leaf; however, these leaves are not pattern deviant as they do not break a repetition or
redundancy (a pattern) in that specific context. Similarly, functional deviancy—deviancy
in terms diverging from an assumed functionality (i.e., a chair with 3 legs)—may differ
from prototype and pattern deviancy. Though we acknowledge that different subtypes of
deviancy may exist, we did not examine these different subtypes here (predominantly
because we do not see a clear reason why these subtypes would produce divergent
results). Future research should consider these potentially differing subtypes, however.
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3.7.7 Conclusion
Perhaps it is no coincidence that those who are the targets of prejudice in society
are described as “not fitting in.” We demonstrated a causal link between people’s
aversion towards deviancy—distortions of regularities or repeated forms and models—
and their degree of prejudice against stigmatized individuals. And further, it may be no
coincidence that the targets of prejudice tend to be statistical minorities in society. We
observed that deviancy aversion influences prejudice by contributing to people’s dislike
of statistical minorities—disliking people who are proportionally infrequent in a
population. Taken together, our results elucidate how a simple domain-general sensitivity
to deviancy may contribute to the complex social construct that is prejudice. In doing so,
our findings may help explain one pathway via which people become prejudiced against
individuals in society.
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Aversion Towards Domain-General Deviancy
Predicts Moral Judgment
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4.1

Abstract

Chapter 4 was largely motivated by two questions. (1) Does deviancy play a role in social
phenomena other than prejudice? And (2), to what extent can simple, domain-general
factors inform moral judgment? Given these questions, in Chapter 4, I examined whether
a domain-general sensitivity to deviancy is linked to people’s moral psychology. Given
that most moral transgressions break assumed regularities of behavior in society, deviancy
aversion may predict heightened moral sensitivity. Supporting this possibility, in Study 1,
participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion (e.g., aversion towards broken patterns of
geometric shapes) predicted greater moral condemnation of harm and purity violations.
This link was stronger for intuitive thinkers, suggesting that this link occurs via an intuitive
rather than analytical pathway. Extending these results, in Study 2, deviancy aversion
predicted greater punishment of harm and purity violations. Finally, in Study 3, in line with
deviancy aversion predicting context-dependent prejudice (Chapter 3) and predicting
moral condemnation because moral violations break the regularities of behavior in society,
deviancy aversion predicted context-dependent moral judgments. Participants higher in
deviancy aversion exhibited a greater shift towards tolerating moral violations when these
violations were described as the regular pattern of behavior in an alternate society.
Collectively, these results suggest that something as basic as people’s domain-general
sensitivity to deviancy is linked to moral judgment.
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4.2

Introduction
Numerous psychological phenomena suggest that people are averse to deviancy—

the distortion of regularities or repeated forms or models (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2017;
Gollwitzer et al., 2019). For instance, researchers have noted that people dislike atypical
stimuli (see Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 2013), resist change (Jost, 2015), prefer
familiar and fluent stimuli (Zajonc, 1968; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998), avoid
and attempt to reduce contradictions (Heidegger, 1953/1996; Heider, 1958), and
experience inconsistencies as threatening to their sense of meaning (Heine, Proulx, &
Vohs, 2006; Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013). Further, more directly, people are
motivated to see regularities, patterns, and order in the world (Gilovich, 1991; Shermer,
2008; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Foreshadowing much of this work, one of the founders
of modern social psychology, Kurt Lewin (1946), noted that cognitive and motivational
systems pressure the individual and society towards order and predictability, and away
from irregularities and inconsistencies.
That people are averse to deviancy is also suggested outside of the lab. Numerous
online media blogposts and articles reference people’s irritation towards images depicting
such deviancy, for instance, asymmetrical objects or distorted images (e.g., a cake cut at
an angle ruining the symmetry of the cake; e.g. Buzzfeed: “45 photos that will annoy you
more than they should”; Jewell, 2014). Moreover, people colloquially, although
inappropriately, use the expression “I’m so OCD” to refer to their tendency to embrace
order and dislike irregular, deviant stimuli.
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Though the above research and lay examples suggest that people are largely averse
to deviancy—the distortion of regularities or repeated forms or models—they do not
directly demonstrate this claim. To do so, Gollwitzer and colleagues (2017) created deviant
stimuli stripped down to their basic form. They created patterns of nonsocial geometric
shapes in line with redundancy (see Garner, 1970) and distorted these patterns in
accordance with research on regularities and pattern recognition and distortion (see
Näätänen et al., 1993; Posner, 1973; see Figure 4.1). American and Chinese adults, as well
as children as young as 3-years-old, exhibited a strong aversion towards such nonsocial
deviancy (Gollwitzer et al., 2017; Gollwitzer et al., 2019). These results, along with other
studies assessing attitudes towards nonsocial deviancy (e.g., in geometric shapes, linguistic
triads, basic objects), demonstrate that people are generally averse towards deviancy (e.g.,
Evers, Inbar, & Zeelenberg, 2014, Heintzelman et al., 2013; Okimoto & Gromet, 2016;
Winkielman et al., 2006).24,25 From an evolutionary standpoint, people may hold this
aversion in the service of survival. Deviations from regularities, redundancies, and
repetition may signal danger (Shermer, 2008) and inconsistent care (Gollwitzer & Clark,
2019). Further, deviancy aversion, as it has been linked to derogating deviant behaviors
(Gollwitzer et al., 2017), may encourage group survival by heightening group cohesion.

24

Though people are averse towards broken patterns of geometric shapes, researchers have found European
Americans (but not Asian Americans and Asians) to exhibit a comparative preference for the single object
responsible for distorting a pattern when asked to rank all the shapes in a broken pattern (Kim & Markus,
1999). When asked to judge the entire broken pattern in a non-ranked manner, however, European Americans
exhibit a clear aversion towards broken patterns (Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
25
Exceptions to this heuristic of course exist. For instance, people’s deliberative embracement of abstract
art or people’s desire for change in deleterious or boring contexts.
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Figure 4.1. Example images included in the nonsocial deviancy measure used by
Gollwitzer et al., 2017. Each image was presented separately.

Past research has linked people’s deviancy aversion to social psychological
phenomena. For instance, Gollwitzer and Clark (2019) found anxious attachment to relate
and lead to higher deviancy aversion. And Gollwitzer et al. (2017) and Gollwitzer et al.
(2019) found that deviancy aversion predicts greater prejudice against social deviancy,
including prejudice against stigmatized individuals, social-norm breakers, statistically
negative and positive deviants (e.g., someone very poor and someone very rich), and racial
minority group members. These findings may help explain why prejudice is largely
directed towards people in society who deviate from the social regularities around them,
whether it be in terms of physical appearance (e.g., dwarfism), character (e.g., addiction),
or group-identity (e.g., minorities in the United States; Goffman, 1963). Collectively, these
findings relating deviancy aversion to social phenomena suggest that a number of major
psychological phenomena may potentially be reframed in terms of regularities and
deviations from these regularities.
Before turning to the hypotheses of this article, we provide two clarifications. First,
by deviancy aversion, we do not mean individuals’ dislike of uncertainty and ambiguity
(e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Budner, 1962). Simply put, deviations from clear
regularities are not uncertain or ambiguous; they entail an evident irregularity rather than
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the potential of an irregularity occurring. Indeed, past research has found that deviancy
aversion and variables capturing a dislike of uncertainty and ambiguity only correlate
weakly to moderately (Gollwitzer et al., 2017).
Second, deviancy aversion is not the same as novelty aversion. For instance,
consider a grove of many novel, exotic fruits. In this scenario the fruits are novel but not
deviant or irregular; in the grove, the pattern or regularity is the exotic, novel fruits—a
common fruit would actually be deviant in this scenario. Indeed, though deviancy aversion
and novelty aversion (both assessed in terms of nonsocial stimuli—broken patterns of
geometric shapes versus Chinese ideographs) correlate, this correlation is not particularly
strong (rs < -.04 < .29, depending on the study; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). Further,
multiple studies have found nonsocial deviancy aversion to relate to social phenomena
(e.g., anxious attachment, prejudice) independently of people’s nonsocial aversion towards
novelty (Gollwitzer et al. 2019; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019).
4.2.1 Hypotheses
Here, I examine whether people’s deviancy aversion—people’s aversion towards a
perceived regularity or pattern being broken, disrupted, or distorted—plays a role in the
domain of morality. From an evolutionary account, morality exists to facilitate human
cooperation (Harms & Skyrms, 2008; Nowak, 2006), for instance, via direct and indirect
reciprocity (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), and punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). And,
certain proximate processes, perhaps in the service of such ultimate motivations, play a
role in morality. For example, moral judgment is informed by reason and deliberation
(careful reflection of what is wrong and right; e.g., Bloom, 2010; Kohlberg, 1971) as well
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as emotions (rapid automatic intuitions; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman,
Young, & Greene, 2010). Heightened threat-sensitivity has also been shown to inform
moral judgment (Wright & Baril, 2013), as has people’s empathic tendencies (Decety &
Cowell, 2014). Despite this past research, however, it remains largely unclear whether
simple, low-level domain-general factors predict our moral judgment.
We hypothesize that a simple cognitive-affective factor, people’s domain-general
sensitivity towards deviancy, predicts variance in people’s moral judgments. Specifically,
people’s aversion towards deviancy should predict judging moral violations as more wrong
(moral condemnation) and punishing these actions to a greater extent (punishment). This
is because immoral actions are generally abnormal and atypical behaviors in society. Such
actions are not only novel but—importantly for our hypothesis—they break the typical
pattern of behavior (e.g., Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013). For instance, moral
transgressions such as harm violations (e.g., physically harming someone) and purity
violations (e.g., sexual contact with a sibling) are behaviors that deviate from the
regularities of how humans should and do behave in society—these violations break
behavioral redundancies. Additionally, purity violations have been characterized as weird
and unusual (Gray & Keeney, 2015), and colloquially, people refer to immoral actions as
‘deviant’ and ‘out of line.’ Finally, developmental psychologists have noted that morality
(considerations of what is “wrong” and “right”) may in part emerge from a system
concerned with standards and deviations from those standards, including negative
responding towards flawed or out of place physical objects (Kagan, 1981, 1984, 1987;
Kochanska, Casey, Fukumoto, 1995). Notably, given the severity of moral violations and
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the stability of moral judgment (e.g., Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983), it would be remarkable
if people’s basic aversion towards domain-general deviancy predicts their moral judgment.
And, in terms of a theoretical contribution, elucidating that something as “low-level” as
people’s aversion towards deviancy relates to moral judgment would demonstrate that our
moral judgments are at least in part influenced by simple domain-general factors.
Several empirical findings support the proposed link. For one, deviancy aversion
and moral judgment both overlap with certain phenomena. For instance, aversion towards
deviancy (assessed via nonsocial examples of deviancy) relates to discomfort towards
social-norm violations (Gollwitzer et al, 2017), and such violations at least partially overlap
with moral violations (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Importantly though, given that
norm violations and moral violations differ in important ways (e.g., stability; Smetana,
1981), the current studies remain an important extension of this previous work.
Additionally, deviancy aversion has been shown to relate and lead to prejudice (Gollwitzer
et al., 2017; Gollwitzer et al., 2019), and the processes underlying the development of
prejudice and moral beliefs are linked (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). Finally,
deviancy aversion has been found to heighten people’s desire for society to have rigid
social-norms (Gollwitzer, Martel, & Bargh, 2021; see Gelfand, 2012; Pelto, 1968), and in
such communities, people are more likely to be morally righteous, including endorsing
greater punishment of wrongdoers (Gelfand et al., 2011).
In additional support of our hypothesis, people’s moral judgment is influenced by
the commonness of the behavior being judged. For instance, both altruistic and selfish
behaviors are judged as more moral and punished less when the behaviors are more
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common (the common is moral heuristic; Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018).
These findings indicate that uncommon actions—actions which tend to deviate from
behavioral regularities and patterns in society—are more likely to be evaluated as immoral.
As such, deviancy aversion may be one variable underlying the ‘common is moral’
heuristic: People may perceive altruistic and selfish behaviors as more moral when these
actions are common because common behaviors tend to follow behavioral regularities and
people value and prefer such “patterned” actions. Finally, in terms of face-validity,
consider that the term moralization comes from the Latin root moralis, meaning “proper
behavior of a person in society,” and researchers have observed that what is deemed proper
(what “should” be) is substantially influenced by what actually is, namely, the actual
regularities and pattern of behavior in society (i.e., descriptive regularities; e.g., Roberts,
Gelman, & Ho, 2017).
Finally, I propose that the potential link between deviancy aversion and moral
judgment occurs via intuitive rather than deliberative processes. As noted earlier, past
research has found moral judgment to be informed both by rapid automatic intuitions
(Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman et al., 2010), and deliberation and refection
(careful reflection of what is wrong and right; e.g., Bloom, 2010; Kohlberg, 1971). Because
deviancy aversion captures an affective response and is a basic domain-general factor, we
hypothesized that deviancy aversion and moral judgment are likely linked via intuitive
processes—trusting one’s gut feelings (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Haidt et al., 1993).
Specifically, people’s deviancy aversion should incite feelings of discomfort in response
to moral violations and in turn greater moral condemnation. If true, people who trust their
161

intuitions should exhibit a stronger link between their sensitivity towards deviancy and
their moral condemnation. Examining this question should inform research on the variables
driving the intuitionist-pathway to moral judgment; though researchers have noted that
rapid, intuitive processes inform morality (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001), it remains
unclear where these intuitions originate from.
4.2.2 Current Studies
Across three studies, we investigated whether people’s sensitivity to deviancy
predicts moral judgment. In Study 1, we examined whether deviancy aversion—assessed
via aversion towards nonsocial examples of deviancy, for instance, broken patterns of
geometric shapes—relates to judging harm and purity moral violations as more morally
wrong. Importantly, we also tested whether this link is stronger for more intuitive thinkers
than analytical ones (in line with an intuitionist-pathway to moral judgment). In Study 2,
we examined whether the potential link between deviancy aversion and moral judgment
extends to a more applied context by testing whether deviancy aversion relates to selfreported punishment of others’ moral transgressions. Finally, in Study 3, we examined
whether—in line with immoral actions breaking behavioral regularities in society—
deviancy aversion predicts a greater shift towards tolerating moral violations when these
violations are the pattern of behavior in an alternate society (when these violations are
described as common and accepted in an alternate society). Such findings would indicate
that deviancy aversion predicts context-dependent, flexible moral judgment. Collectively,
the three presented studies are theoretically important because they may (1) elucidate that
even a basic cognitive-affective factor can be associated with the stable and complex social
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judgments entailed in morality, (2) illuminate one potential factor underlying the
intuitionist-pathway to moral judgment (Haidt et al., 1993), and (3) help explain the
malleability of certain moral judgments, that is, why moral judgments depend on the
surrounding regularities (Bloom, 2010; Lindström et al., 2018).
4.3

Study 1: Moral Condemnation
We first examined whether deviancy aversion relates to judging harm and purity

violations as more morally wrong. In these studies, we considered both harm and purity
moral violations because these are potentially two distinct moral domains (Haidt &
Graham, 2007; though, other researchers argue that harm underlies both purity and harm,
Gray & Keeney, 2015). Additionally, in line with the proposed intuitionist pathway to
moral judgement, we examined whether the potential link between deviancy aversion and
moral judgment is stronger for intuitive thinkers than for deliberative thinkers. Critically,
we also controlled for alternate factors that past research has linked to types of moral
judgment (e.g., purity concerns), including disgust sensitivity (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009;
Rozin, 1999; Schnall et al., 2008) and conservatism (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;
Haidt & Graham, 2007). Additionally, we also controlled for variables capturing method
variance and demand bias—participants’ aversion towards a lack of deviancy (in the form
of aversion towards unbroken patterns of geometric shapes)26 and their degree of socially
desirable responding (e.g., Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954; Fisher, 1993).

26

We controlled for participants’ aversion towards a lack of deviancy (i.e., unbroken patterns) because such
aversion related positively to aversion towards deviancy (this was not the case in a number of past studies;
see Chapters 2 and 3). Importantly, controlling for aversion towards a lack of deviancy should account for
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4.3.1 Method
Participants. We applied a power analysis based on past findings relating deviancy
aversion to a social construct (prejudice; r = .30; Gollwitzer et al., 2017). This power
analysis revealed that we needed 138 participants to have 95% (1 - β) power (.05 alpha
level). However, to account for participant exclusion and potential differences in the size
of these relationships, we aimed to recruit 200 participants. We ended up recruiting 203
participants (119 Female; Mage = 35.64, SDage = 10.83) on Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Seven participants were excluded (see Supplements of Gollwitzer, Martel, Bargh, &
Chang, 2020). The datasets, analyses, and verbatim materials of the presented studies are
available open-access (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2020: Data Availability).
Deviancy aversion. We included three measures of nonsocial deviancy aversion.
The first measure, validated by Gollwitzer et al. (2017), included five images of broken
patterns comprised of geometric shapes (and their unbroken counterparts as control items).
For each image, participants responded to: “How much do you like the above image?”
Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all to 7 = A lot (Figure 4.1). We used positively-valenced
dependent variables to reduce response-bias in the form of yea and nay-saying. That is,
negatively valenced items could lead to a superficial correlation between nonsocial
deviancy aversion and moral judgment by participants responding on the left or right side
of both scales (the morality measures, see below, had the following scale endpoints: 1 =
not at all wrong, 5 = extremely wrong).

participant response bias in the form of yea- or nay-saying as well as participants’ general tendency to endorse
items measuring aversion (e.g., discomfort, annoyance).
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The second measure was a nonvisual, face-valid deviancy measure validated by
Gollwitzer et al. (2019). Participants read: “People feel differently about things that break
a pattern, are out of line, and are disordered. How much do you agree with the following
statements? Things that break a pattern, are out of line, and are disordered make me feel…”
and responded to 3 items: “‘Positive,’ ‘Happy,’ and ‘Content.’ Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all
agree to 7 = Strongly agree.
The third measure validated by Gollwitzer et al. (2017, 2019) was a mental imagery
deviancy measure. Participants read: “Imagine a collection of objects where all the objects
are very similar to one-another… if an object that is very different from the other objects
is added to the collection that would make me feel…” ‘Positive,’ ‘Happy,’ and ‘Content.’
Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree to 7 = Strongly agree.
Moral judgment. We assessed moral condemnation of two different types of moral
violations—harm and purity violations—via 3 validated measures: The MFVQ (Clifford,
Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015), and two moral violations vignettes
measures (see Chakroff, Russell, Piazza, & Young, 2017 and Dungan, Chakroff, & Young,
2017). Participants judged the moral wrongness of different harm (e.g., “You see a man
deprive a boy of food for 2 days”) and purity (e.g., “You see a boy pour urine on his lap”)
violations (“How morally wrong is this behavior?”). Likert-scale: 1 = not at all wrong, 2 =
not too wrong, 3 = somewhat wrong, 4 = very wrong, 5 = extremely wrong.
Intuitive thinking. To assess participants’ tendency to engage in intuitive versus
deliberative thinking we assessed their performance on the cognitive reflection test
(CRT)—lower scores indicate greater intuitive thinking and higher scores greater
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deliberative, analytical thinking (Frederick, 2005; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al.,
2020). 27
Alternate predictors of moral judgment. We assessed two variables previously
associated with moral judgment as control variables: Disgust propensity and sensitivity
(van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006), and political orientation (see
Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2020 for details).
Attention check item. We indirectly assessed participants’ attention via the
following item: “People vary in the amount they pay attention to these kinds of surveys.
Some take them seriously and read each question, whereas others go very quickly and barely
read the questions at all. If you have read this question carefully, please write the word yes
in the blank box below labeled other. There is no need for you to respond to the scale
below.” Participants who failed to write “yes” were excluded from the analyses.
Demographics. Participants reported their biological sex, age, race, and level of
education.
Social desirability. To account for demand effects, we included a scale assessing
participants’ tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner (Haghighat, 2007).
Procedure. Participants completed the nonsocial deviancy aversion, moral
condemnation, and cognitive reflection measures in random order. Thereafter, they

27

We also assessed participants’ self-reported—rather than behavioral—reliance on intuitive thinking.
Analyses testing whether these responses moderated the relationship between nonsocial deviancy aversion
and moral judgment revealed inconclusive results. These analyses can be found in the Supplements of
Gollwitzer et al. (2020).
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completed the disgust, attention check, political orientation, demographics, and social
desirability measures (in that order).
4.3.2 Results
We averaged across the three deviancy aversion measures because they strongly
loaded onto a single factor (Eigenvalue of 2.03; Principal Axis Factor Analysis with
Promax as the rotation method) and exhibited high inter-measure reliability, α = .86. Raw
correlations between the individual measures: Geometric shapes and face-valid measures,
r = .69, geometric shapes and mental imagery measures, r = .62, face-valid and mental
imagery measures, r = .71. These results indicate that a latent construct—deviancy
aversion—underlies these three measures, and further, that measuring deviancy aversion
more or less explicitly does not seem to greatly alter participants’ responses.
We averaged across the three moral judgment measures in terms of harm and purity
violations, respectively, as they exhibited high inter-measure reliability (harm: α = .86 and
purity: α = .88; see Table S1 for descriptive statistics).
As hypothesized, deviancy aversion predicted greater moral condemnation of harm,
r(194) = .22, p = .002, 95% CI[.08, .35], and purity violations, r(194) = .20, p = .005, 95%
CI[.06, .33] (Figure 4.2). These results remained, r(190) = .24, p = .001, and r(190) = .25,
p = .001, when controlling for participants’ disgust sensitivity, political orientation,
aversion towards a lack of deviancy (i.e., unbroken geometric patterns), and social
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desirability.

Figure 4.2. Study 1: Participants’ deviancy aversion predicted their degree of moral
condemnation of harm and purity violations.
To test unique predictive validity, we entered participants’ deviancy aversion,
disgust, and political orientation into multivariate regressions predicting moral
condemnation of harm and purity violations, respectively. Only deviancy aversion
predicted judging both harm and purity violations as wrong, harm: β = .21, p = .003, and
purity: β = .21, p = .002. Disgust and political orientation predicted judging purity
violations as wrong, β = .14, p = .031, and β = .34, p < .001, respectively, but did not predict
judging harm violations as wrong, β = .08, p = .263, and β = .00, p = .956, respectively.
These relationships indicate that deviancy aversion is associated with both moral judgment
types even when accounting for other predictors of moral judgment, and further, has similar
predictive power in terms of predicting moral impurity judgments (β = .21) as one’s disgust
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sensitivity (β = .14), a major theoretical predictor of impurity violation concerns (Schnall
et al., 2008).
We next examined participants’ reliance on intuitive versus deliberative thinking.
First, a link between deviancy aversion and CRT performance was not found, r(194) = .04,
p = .589. And, replicating past research (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang,
2014; Royzman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014), lower CRT scores predicted judging purity
violations as more wrong, r(194) = -.20, p = .006, but not harm violations, r(194) = -.08, p
= .256.
Importantly, in line with our prediction, participants’ reliance on intuitive thinking
moderated the relationship between deviancy aversion and moral condemnation: The
interactions between deviancy aversion and CRT performance predicting condemnation of
harm and purity violations were observed, harm, p = .052 (marginal) and purity, p = .028
(Table 1). Further analyses (simple effects) elucidated that, as predicted, participants who
performed worse on the CRT (-1 SD) exhibited a stronger link between their deviancy
aversion and condemnation of harm and purity violations, ps < .001, than those who had
higher scores on the CRT (+1 SD), ps > .502 (see Table 2). These findings tentatively
suggest that the link between deviancy aversion and moral judgment occurs via intuitive,
heuristic based responding rather than via deliberative processes.
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Table 4.1. Participants with a Greater Tendency to Engage in Intuitive Thinking
Exhibited a Stronger Link Between Deviancy Aversion and Moral Condemnation of
Harm and Purity Violations in Study 1.
Links Between
Deviancy Aversion
and Moral Condemnation
of Harm and Purity
Violations

Interaction Term

Reliance on Intuitive Thinking
High Cognitive Reflection (+1 SD)
(Low reliance on intuitive thinking)

β = .07, p = .502h
β = .05, p = .533p

β = -.14, t(188) = -1.96, p =
.052h

Low Cognitive Reflection (-1 SD)
(High reliance on intuitive thinking)

β = .36, p < .001h

β = -.14, t(188) = -2.22, p =
.028p

β = .36, p < .001p

Note. h = harm violations. p = purity violations. Participants’ conservatism, disgust, aversion towards a lack
of deviancy (unbroken geometric patterns), and social desirability were controlled for in these analyses.

Finally, it might seem surprising that deviancy aversion predicted condemning
harm and purity violations similarly in terms of effect size (r = .24 and r = .25) given that
past research has found purity violations to be judged as ‘weirder’ than harm violations
(see Gray & Keeney, 2015). To address this claim, we had participants judge the
weirdness of the included harm violations and purity violations in a supplemental study
(between-participants design [harm, purity]; Study S1; N = 94; see Supplements of
Gollwitzer et al., 2020). In line with the similarly sized observed correlations, participants
did not judge the purity violations as weirder than the harm violations collapsed across
the included morality measures, though, they did do so specifically on the MFVQ.
Moreover, in line with this finding, specifically on the MFVQ, the relationship between
deviancy aversion and moral condemnation was stronger for the purity items than the
harm items, as expected (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2020 for details).
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4.3.3 Discussion
Study 1 indicated that people’s sensitivity towards deviancy is linked to their moral
judgment. Nonsocial deviancy aversion—assessed, for instance, via participants’ aversion
towards broken patterns of geometric shapes—was associated with greater moral
condemnation of both harm and purity transgressions. Notably, deviancy aversion
remained a significant predictor of moral judgment even when controlling for various
factors previously linked to moral judgment, such as disgust propensity and sensitivity, and
political orientation. Importantly, Study 1 also found that people with a greater tendency
to rely on intuitive thinking (i.e., have difficulty overriding intuitive responding) exhibit a
stronger relationship between deviancy aversion and moral condemnation. These results
raise the possibility that deviancy aversion predicts moral judgment via an intuitionist
pathway (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010).
4.4

Study 2: Punishment
Study 2 took an applied perspective. Does deviancy aversion also predict greater

punishment of moral violations? In Study 1, participants higher in deviancy aversion
judged moral transgressions as more wrong. Given that such moral condemnation predicts
punitive behavior (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), deviancy aversion may also predict
assigning harsher punishment to harm and purity transgressions. Study 2 tested this
possibility.
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4.4.1 Method
Participants. A power-analysis based on the relationship between deviancy
aversion and moral condemnation in Study 1 (r = .25) revealed that we needed 202
participants (95% power). We aimed to recruit 215 participants. The final number of
recruited participants was 214 participants (MTurk; 130 Female; Mage = 35.40, SDage
=11.95). Four responses were excluded for failing the attention check, and two were
excluded because a participant completed the study twice.
Deviancy aversion. We assessed deviancy aversion as in Study 1
Punishment. Participants were first told to imagine being a courtroom judge. They
then reported how harshly they would punish several impurity and harm violations taken
from the moral harm and purity vignettes included in Study 1 (from the Dungan et al., 2017
and Chakroff et al., 2017 measures). Likert-scale: 1 = No punishment, 2 = $10 Fine, 3 =
$50 Fine, 4 = $250 Fine, 5 = 1 Day Jail Time, 6 = 1 Week Jail Time, 7 = 1 Month Jail
Time. Similar scales have been used in past research (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, Robinson,
2002). For more details regarding the punishment measure, see Supplements of Gollwitzer
et al. (2020).
Other variables. Again, we assessed participants’ conservatism and tendency to
engage in socially desirable responding. To reduce the length of the study, we did not assess
participants’ disgust sensitivity and propensity.
Procedure. Participants completed the three deviancy aversion measures (clustered
together) and the punishment measure in random order. They then completed the attention
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check item, demographic (including political orientation), and social desirability measures
(as in Study 1).
4.4.2 Results
Nonsocial deviancy aversion (collapsed across the three measures as in Study 1; α
= .79) related to harsher punishment of harm violators, r(206) = .17, p = .016, 95% CI[.03,
.30] (see Figure 4.3; see Table S1 for descriptive statistics). This relationship remained,
r(203) = .19, p = .007, when controlling for political orientation, aversion towards a lack
of deviancy (unbroken patterns), and social desirability. In contrast to harm violations,
deviancy aversion did not predict punishing purity violations, r(206) = -.02, p = .749, 95%
CI[-.16, .12].

Figure 4.3. In Study 2 (left two graphs), participants’ deviancy aversion predicted greater
endorsement of punishing moral violations in terms of harm violations but not in terms of
purity violations. In Study S2 (far right graph), however, participants’ deviancy aversion
did predict greater punishment of purity violations when using a more appropriate scale
of punishment.

In hindsight, it is possible this null relationship arose because the scale we used to
assess punishment was inappropriate for purity violations. For instance, it is odd to
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punish someone with a monetary fine or jail time for ‘pouring urine on themselves’ or
‘smearing cat poop on themselves.’ We thus conducted a supplemental study largely
similar to Study 2 in which the response-scale was altered to “How strongly do you think
the following actions should be punished” 1 = Not at all Punished to 7 = Punished a Lot
(Study S2; N = 282; see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2020). This revised scale
leaves open the possibility of punishment without monetary fine or imprisonment, but
perhaps via verbal condemnation or another form of emotional expression (e.g., Xiao &
Houser, 2005). In this supplemental study, we observed the predicted relationship
between deviancy aversion and punishing purity violations, r(280) = .30, p < .001, 95%
CI[.19, .40] (Figure 3.3, rightmost graph).
4.4.3 Discussion
Study 2 expanded upon Study 1 by demonstrating that deviancy aversion not only
predicts greater condemnation of moral transgressions, but also predicts greater
punishment of moral transgressions. This relationship at first did not hold for purity
transgressions. We believe this link did not originally appear because we assessed
punishment via fine or jail time, and these forms of punishment were inappropriate for
punishing purity violations. Indeed, when using a revised scale in Study S2, we found the
predicted relationship between deviancy aversion and greater punishment of purity
violations. Taken together, our findings extend the findings of Study 1 to an applied moral
domain (punishment), and suggest that people’s deviancy aversion may even be linked to
moral behavior.
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4.5

Study 3: Context-Dependent Moral Judgment
Collectively, the findings of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that deviancy aversion

predicts harsher moral judgment towards harm and purity violations. Yet, it remains
unclear why this relationship exists. In the introduction, we proposed that people’s
sensitivity to deviancy should predict such moral judgment because immoral actions
(including harm and purity violations) overwhelmingly deviate from the assumed
regularities and pattern of behavior in society. That is, people’s aversion towards deviancy
should incite negative affect towards immoral actions because these actions break repeated
and regular behaviors, and this in turn should heighten individuals’ moral condemnation
and punishment of these actions.
If this reasoning is true, then deviancy aversion should predict a greater shift
towards tolerating immoral actions when immoral actions do not break the regularities or
pattern of behavior. We tested this possibility in Study 3 using an “alternate world”
paradigm. Specifically, we examined whether deviancy aversion predicts a greater
decrease in individuals’ condemnation of moral violations from baseline (in one’s own
society) to when these violations are described as common and accepted (in an alternate
society). Such findings would strongly support our claim that deviancy aversion and moral
judgment are linked (Studies 1 and 2) because immoral actions in society (at baseline)
deviate from behavioral regularities. Additionally, these findings would indicate that
deviancy aversion predicts context-dependent moral judgments—moral judgments that are
attuned to the surrounding behavioral regularities (moral flexibility, Bartels, 2008; moral
relativism; e.g., Shaw & Wainryb, 1999). Furthermore, these findings would raise the
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possibility of deviancy aversion as one factor underlying the common-is-moral heuristic—
that common actions are generally judged as more moral (Lindström et al., 2018). And
finally, these findings may help explain why moral judgments can vary over contexts, time,
and communities—actions that are deviant in one context (given specific behavioral
regularities) may not be deviant in a different context (Bartels, 2008; Bloom, 2010).
4.5.1 Method
Participants. We applied the power-analysis from Study 2. We aimed to recruit 215
participants, and ended up with 215 participants (122 Female; Mage = 35.61, SDage = 11.92)
on MTurk. Ten responses were excluded. For detailed methods see Supplements of
Gollwitzer et al. (2020).
Deviancy aversion. Nonsocial deviancy aversion was assessed as in Studies 1 and
2 except the valence of some of the items were reversed to ensure that our results remain
consistent across oppositely valenced items (see Supplements of Gollwitzer et al., 2020).
Context-dependent moral judgment: Baseline. Participants’ baseline moral
judgment (i.e., in their own culture) was evaluated by having participants respond to three
of the harm violations and three of the purity violations from the Chakroff et al. (2017) and
Dungan et al. (2017) measures. Participants were presented with the three harm (“John cuts
his brother with a sharp knife.”; “John intentionally pours a cup of boiling hot water on his
brother’s lap.”; “John calls his brother worthless and insults him.”) and the three purity
violations (“John kisses his brother on the mouth.”; “John strokes his brother’s bare inner
thigh.”; “John changes his phone background to a picture of a man having sex with a
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horse.”), and asked “How morally wrong is this behavior?” Likert-scale: 1 = not at all
wrong, 2 = not too wrong, 3 = somewhat wrong, 4 = very wrong, 5 = extremely wrong.
Context-dependent moral judgment: Alternate society. Participants’ moral
condemnation was measured identically to the baseline measure except that participants
were told that the moral violations occurred in a society in which such actions were
behavioral regularities—accepted as well as common behaviors: (e.g. “John is in a society
where it is completely acceptable for siblings to cut each other with sharp knives. All
siblings typically cut each other with sharp knives, and it is common practice to do this.
John cuts his brother with a sharp knife.” “How morally wrong is this behavior?” Likertscale: 1 = not at all wrong, 2 = not too wrong, 3 = somewhat wrong, 4 = very wrong, 5 =
extremely wrong.
Context-dependent moral judgment (explicit). Four items explicitly assessed
participants’ endorsement of context-dependent, flexible moral judgment. The items were:
“Morals are flexible—what is immoral in one culture is not necessarily immoral in another
culture,” “When it comes to figuring out what is moral and what is immoral I tend to look
at the actions of those around me,” “To figure out what is immoral you have to look at the
actions of those around you,” and “Morals are absolute—what is immoral in one culture is
also immoral in another culture” (reverse-coded). Likert-scale: 1 = Not at all agree to 7 =
Strongly agree.28
28
One of the four items exhibited poor inter-item reliability (“Morals are absolute—what is immoral in one
culture is also immoral in another culture”). Therefore, we did not include this item when calculating
participants’ explicit context-dependent, flexible moral judgment (including the item did not change the
results).
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Procedure. Participants completed the nonsocial deviancy aversion measures
(randomized; clustered together) and the context-dependent moral judgment measures
(baseline and alternate society) in random order. They then completed the explicit contextdependent moral judgment, attention check, demographics, and social desirability
measures in that order.
4.5.2 Results
In line with past research on moral relativism (e.g., Shaw & Wainryb, 1999),
participants rated moral violations as less immoral when these violations were described
as common and accepted in an alternate society, harm: t(204) = 9.54, p < .001, d = .75,
impurity: t(204) = 13.22, p < .001, d = 1.16 (see Supplemental Table S1 of Gollwitzer et
al., 2020 for descriptive statistics). Importantly, as predicted, deviancy aversion moderated
this effect for both harm and purity violations. A repeated measures GLM with deviancy
aversion as a continuous predictor, moral violation (baseline vs. alternate society) as a
within-participants variable, and moral condemnation as the dependent variable found that
participants’ deviancy aversion predicted a greater change in moral judgment from baseline
to when moral violations were described as common and accepted in an alternate society,
harm: p = .004, and purity: p = .042, respectively (Table 4.2; Figure 4.4). More
specifically, in line with our hypotheses, participants higher in deviancy aversion were
more likely to judge moral violations as less wrong, compared to baseline, when these
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violations were described as common and accepted in an alternate society (see Table 2 for
simple effects).29

Table 4.2. Study 3: Deviancy Aversion Predicts Context-Dependent, Flexible Moral
Judgment

High
Deviancy
Aversion
(+1 SD)
Low
Deviancy
Aversion
(-1 SD)

Moral
Judgment:
Baseline

Moral
Judgment:
Alternate
Society

M, SD

M, SD

4.43, 1.16harm

3.34, 1.90harm

3.97, 1.15purity

2.79, 1.76purity

4.36, 1.16harm

3.78, 1.90harm

3.72, 1.15purity

2.85, 1.76purity

Simple Effect

Interaction Term:
Deviancy Aversion *
Moral Judgment
(Baseline Vs. Alternate
Society)

F(1, 203) = 80.12,
p < .001, ηp2 = .283harm
F(1, 203) = 117.92,
p < .001, ηp2 = .367purity

F(1, 203) = 8.69, p = .004,
ηp2 = .041harm

F(1, 203) = 22.82,
p < .001, ηp2 = .101harm

F(1, 203) = 4.18, p = .042,
ηp2 = .020purity

F(1, 203) = 63.42,
p < .001, ηp2 = .238purity

Note. harm = harm violations. purity = purity violations.

29

Regarding these simple effects, participants’ responses to the common and accepted purity violations did
not greatly differ depending on deviancy aversion (M = 2.76 vs M = 2.88). However, importantly for our
hypothesis, the interaction was significant. That is, the change from baseline to alternate society in moral
impurity judgments was larger for participants higher in deviancy aversion (see also the difference scores
analyses in the next paragraph). We are specifically interested in this change as it represents the construct we
wished to assess—the moral flexibility of participants (i.e., the tendency for their moral judgments to shift
depending on the surrounding context).
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Figure 4.4. Study 3: Deviancy aversion predicted context-dependent, flexible harm and
purity moral judgments. Deviancy aversion positively related to judging moral violations
as less egregious when these violations were described as common and accepted in an
alternate society as compared to baseline (in one's own society). Flexible moral judgment
was calculated via difference scores (see the results section of Study 3) for the purposes
of this figure.
To provide additional support for these results, we re-analyzed these findings when
calculating context-dependent, flexible moral judgment via change-scores. That is, when
calculating difference-scores between participants’ moral judgments at baseline and when
the same moral violations were described as common and accepted in the alternate society
(rather than using a repeated measures design as above). Consistent with the earlier
findings, deviancy aversion predicted a larger decrease in moral condemnation from
baseline to when moral violations were described as common and accepted, harm: r(203)
= .203, p = .004, and impurity: r(203) = .14, p = .042 (see Figure 4).
Crucially, the observed interactions did not significantly differ depending on the
type of moral violation (harm versus purity violations); that is, a three-way interaction
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including moral violation type was not found, p = .501. Additionally, these findings did
not substantially change when controlling for political orientation, aversion to a lack of
deviancy (unbroken patterns), and social desirability: harm violations, p = .005, and purity
violations, p = .085. Furthermore, the order in which participants completed the baseline
and alternate society moral items did not impact the results; interactions between measure
order (baseline versus alternate society moral items presented first) and deviancy aversion
were not significant, harm: p = .854, and purity: p = .400. Finally, aligning with these
findings, deviancy aversion also marginally predicted participants’ explicit endorsement of
context-dependent, flexible moral judgment, r(203) = .13, p = .059. We conclude that a
domain-general aversion to deviancy may encourage people to align their moral judgment
to the regular patterns of behavior in their environment.
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4.5.3 Discussion
In Study 3, participants’ deviancy aversion predicted context-dependent, flexible
moral judgment. Individuals high (versus low) in deviancy aversion were more likely to
evaluate moral transgressions as less egregious when these transgressions were described
as common and accepted in society as compared to baseline (when judging the moral
transgressions in their own culture). These results tentatively indicate that a low-level
sensitivity to deviancy may help explain why moral judgments can vary over contexts,
time, and communities (Bartels, 2008; Bloom, 2010)—actions that break behavioral
regularities in one context do not necessarily break those regularities in another context.
4.6

General Discussion
Across three studies, we demonstrated that people’s deviancy aversion—their

negative affect in response to a perceived regularity or pattern being broken, disrupted, or
distorted—predicts their moral judgment. In Studies 1 and 2, participants’ dislike of simple
examples of nonsocial deviancy, for instance, socially-irrelevant broken patterns of
geometric shapes, predicted their moral condemnation and punishment of harm and purity
violations. And, in Study 1, suggesting that this link occurs via an intuitionist pathway to
moral judgment (Haidt et al., 1993), this link was stronger for more intuitive thinkers than
deliberative, analytical thinkers. Finally, in line with people’s aversion to deviancy
predicting greater moral condemnation (Studies 1 and 2) because immoral actions break
behavioral regularities in society, deviancy aversion in Study 3 predicted contextdependent moral judgment—judging moral violations as less immoral when these
violations were described as common and accepted in an alternate society compared to at
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baseline. Collectively, these three studies demonstrate that a cognitive-affective factor as
simple as people’s aversion towards low-level deviancy is linked to moral judgment.
4.7

Confounding Variables
Notably, our findings remained when controlling for alternate factors predicting

moral judgment, including disgust (Schnall et al., 2008; Study 1), political orientation
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and social desirability (e.g., Fisher, 1993;
Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954). Moreover, past research has demonstrated that people’s
sensitivity to deviancy is unrelated or only weakly related to other potential third-variables
(e.g., need for closure; disliking novel stimuli; Gollwitzer et al., 2017). Response bias also
does not seem to explain our results; differently valenced response items were utilized
across the studies, and further, participants’ socially desirable responding did not account
for our results. Finally, in Study 1, we observed hypothesis concordant results when
assessing participants’ reliance on intuitive thinking using the cognitive reflection test—a
behavioral performance measure that is unlikely to be influenced by response or demand
bias (Frederick, 2005).30
4.8

Comparative Predictive Power
Our findings contribute to research on moral judgment by introducing a basic

domain-general, cognitive-affective factor—people’s sensitivity to deviancy—as one
predictor of the variation observed in people’s moral judgments (e.g., Bloom, 2010;

30

Our findings are unlikely to arise via anthropomorphism (i.e., that participants personified the geometric
shapes); Gollwitzer et al. (2017) found participants’ tendency to anthropomorphize not to moderate the link
between deviancy aversion and prejudice, and, the deviancy aversion measures included in the studies
presented here included nonvisual measures, explicit measures (which one cannot anthropomorphize).
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Kohlberg, 1971; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010).
Notably, of the predictors of moral judgment included in our studies (disgust sensitivity
and political orientation), only deviancy aversion predicted moral condemnation of
divergent types of moral violations—both harm and purity violations. Additionally,
deviancy aversion predicted moral condemnation of purity violations to a similar extent as
disgust propensity and sensitivity, a major theoretical predictor of moral purity concerns
(e.g., Schnall et al., 2008). Taken together, our findings suggest that people’s aversion
towards low-level deviancy may motivate greater moral sensitivity which, importantly, can
facilitate human cooperation and cohesion (Harms & Skyrms, 2008; Nowak, 2006).
4.9

Intuitionist Pathway to Moral Judgment
Though researchers have noted that intuitive processes inform morality (Greene &

Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001), it remains unclear where such “gut” responding originates from.
Potentially, deviancy is one factor that informs this intuitionist pathway to moral judgment.
That is, a negative response to deviancy may heighten negative affect towards moral
violations (given their irregularity), which in turn induces harsher moral judgments. In line
with this possibility, in Study 1, the relationship between deviancy aversion and moral
judgment was stronger for more intuitive thinkers; indeed, analytical, reflective thinkers
were able to attenuate or even eliminate the predictive power of their deviancy aversion on
their moral judgment. Nonetheless, interpreting the results of Study 1 in terms of the
intuitionist pathway to moral judgment should be approached cautiously. For one, we did
not directly test the intuitionist pathway—we did not test whether causally heightening
deviancy aversion increases negative affect towards moral violations and in turn induces
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harsher moral responding. Second, we did not control for participants’ numerical ability, a
factor commonly controlled for in studies involving the CRT (see Pennycook & Ross,
2016). Future research should more directly examine whether deviancy aversion qualifies
as an antecedent of the intuitionist pathway to moral judgment (Haidt et al., 1993).
4.10 Interactionist Perspective on Morality
Our findings encourage the adoption of an interactionist perspective when studying
morality—psychological phenomena emerge from an interaction between the individual
and the environment (Lewin, 1946). In Study 3, participants’ deviancy aversion interacted
with behavioral regularities in a society to predict their moral judgment; deviancy aversion
predicted a greater shift (from baseline) towards judging moral violations as less wrong
when these violations were described as common and accepted in an alternate society. The
findings of Study 3 also indicate that deviancy aversion may in part underlie or at least
moderate the common is moral heuristic—selfish as well as altruistic acts are evaluated as
more moral when they are more common (Lindström et al., 2018). And finally, the findings
of Study 3 and Study 1, considered collectively, suggest that people’s aversion to deviancy
is an intuitive, automatic factor potentially contributing to moral relativism—previous
research has only identified reflective, deliberative causes (e.g., reasoning that a moral
violation accepted in an alternate society must be beneficial and consensual in that society;
Shaw & Wainryb, 1999).
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4.11 Common Immoral Actions
Our findings may also help elucidate why immoral actions such as lying and
cheating are judged as less morally wrong than other moral violations (DePaulo, Kashy,
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; McCabe & Trevino, 1993)—these immoral actions do
not deviate from behavioral regularities in society per se. Deviancy aversion may also help
explain antisocial punishment—punishment of people exhibiting extreme pro-sociality
(Herrmann, Thöni, Gächter, 2008; Du & Chang, 2015; Lindström et al., 2018). That is,
extremely pro-social actions, similarly to anti-social actions, break the behavioral
regularities in a society, and thus, people’s low-level aversion to deviancy should drive
them to disapprove of and punish such actions. Supporting this possibility, Irwin and Horne
(2013) explicitly created descriptive behavioral regularities in an economic game paradigm
(i.e., set amounts that players contributed to other players) and found that participants
willingly punished players who altruistically broke these regularities.
4.12 Limitations
The current research is limited in certain ways. First, we did not examine whether
potential subtypes of deviancy differentially relate to moral judgment. For instance,
prototype deviancy, deviations from people’s perceived ‘perfect’ mental representation of
a category (Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 2013), may differentially relate to moral
judgments as compared to how we assessed deviancy here—deviations from contextual
regularities (more akin to “pattern” deviancy). Though we see no reason that such subtypes
of deviancy would reveal significantly different results, future research should still
examine this possibility. Second, the current findings are largely restricted to self-report
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measures, and thus, the generalizability of the current findings regarding actual behavior
(e.g., actual judges’ sentencing; Study 2) should be approached cautiously. Third, the
scenario presented to participants in Study 3 (that immoral actions are accepted and
common in an alternate society) was largely artificial—that is, we did not actually change
the moral environments of participants; rather, we asked participants to imagine these
changes. Fourth, we examined the link between deviancy aversion and moral judgment
solely in a correlational manner. Future research should examine the potential causality of
this link.
Finally, a few points deserve to be emphasized. First, numerous factors aside from
people’s aversion to deviancy underlie variance in moral judgment (e.g., rational thought,
religious beliefs). These different factors may override and interact with deviancy aversion
in predicting certain moral judgments. Second, we do not claim that moral judgments are
‘scaffolded’ off of deviancy aversion. That is, deviancy aversion does not need to arise
earlier in development or be more ‘rudimentary’ than people’s moral judgment for such
aversion to inform moral judgment. Third, we do not claim that the predictive power of
deviancy aversion is specific to moral judgments or the moral domain. That is, deviancy
aversion may also predict judging non-moral norm violations as wrong and punishing these
violations. Such results would support our argument that deviancy aversion predicts
harsher moral judgment because moral violations break the normative pattern of behavior
in society—similarly to moral violations, norm violations break the descriptive regularities
of societal behavior.
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4.13 Conclusions
Across three studies, we demonstrated that people’s sensitivity to deviancy predicts
individual differences in moral judgment (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, we found that
this sensitivity plays a role in the context-dependency and flexibility of people’s moral
judgment (Study 3). Taken together, the current results endorse the notion that, though
seemingly unrelated, simple cognitive-affective factors—such as people’s aversion to lowlevel deviancy—may inform morality.
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Summary, Limitations, and Future Directions
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5.1

Summary
The present dissertation aimed to broaden our conceptualization of deviancy to one

not limited to irregular social actions. Specifically, I proposed that we should reconceptualize people’s responses to deviancy as a domain-general affective-cognitive
phenomenon, an aspect of the human experience that manifests across distinct domains and
has a meaningful impact on social phenomena. Three chapters and 21 studies supported
this broad re-conceptualization of deviancy. Participants’ responses to deviancy—the
violation or distortion of regularities and patterns—overlapped across numerous divergent
domains (e.g., nonsocial and social, visual and nonvisual, explicit and implicit). More
specifically, participants appeared to respond similarly to deviancy regardless of whether
such deviancy involved social stimuli (e.g., someone violating moral norms, members of a
statistical minority in society), nonsocial stimuli (e.g., descriptions of objects violating a
homogenous collection), visual stimuli (e.g., images of distorted patterns of geometric
shapes), or nonvisual stimuli (e.g., reported attitudes towards positive and negative social
outliers), among other domains. Moreover, and in line with past work examining deviancy,
people’s domain-general responses towards deviancy were largely negative in affect
(across domains) and were observed at a young age and cross-culturally. Additionally, I
found people’s nonsocial deviancy aversion to even causally contribute to a complex social
phenomenon, specifically, people’s degree of prejudice (against social outliers).
Collectively, these findings highlight the potential of adopting a broad domain-general
conceptual understanding of deviancy to gain new traction on fundamental questions asked
in social and cognitive psychology.
190

5.1.1 Summary of Chapter 2
In line with a domain-general perspective on deviancy, Chapter 2 found people’s
responses to ‘low’-level deviancy to overlap with their responses to ‘higher’-order
deviancy. Specifically, nine studies (N = 994) and a meta-analysis demonstrated that
people’s aversion towards nonsocial deviancy (deviancy in everyday scenes of objects,
broken patterns of geometric shapes, and a written vignette describing nonsocial deviancy)
predicted their aversion towards social deviancy (i.e., prejudice against stigmatized
individuals, social norm-breakers, statistically negative and positive societal outliers, and
even members of a racial minority—Black individuals in the United States). Importantly,
this overlap was quite robust, it remained consistent: (1) across cultures (in the United
States and in China), (2) across explicit as well as implicit measures (i.e., at the
nonconscious level), (3) with regards to “positive” social deviancy (i.e., experiencing
aversion towards social outliers who are generally judged positively in society, such as the
very rich), (4) when accounting for numerous potential third-variables (e.g., need for
closure, neuroticism, political orientation), and (5) across adults as well as children (though
starting only at around age 7 and not in younger children). Furthermore, the reported
studies also documented—in line with the previous research (discussed in section 1.1.2
People Generally Experience an Aversion Towards Deviancy)—that people generally
experience aversion (as opposed to a preference) in response to deviancy. Taken together,
the findings of Chapter 2 provide initial support for deviancy sensitivity as a domaingeneral phenomenon and suggest that people’s sensitivity to deviancy may play an
important role in the complex social phenomena of stigma and prejudice.
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5.1.2 Summary of Chapter 3
Building on Chapter 2, Chapter 3 examined a potential mechanism underlying the
observed overlap between nonsocial deviancy (i.e., lower-level deviancy) and social
deviancy (i.e., higher-level deviancy), as well as tested whether this overlap is causal.
Specifically, Chapter 3 examined whether manipulating people’s degree of nonsocial
deviancy aversion causally impacts their prejudice (against social outliers), and whether
this potential effect occurs in part by inciting a dislike of statistical minorities. Indeed,
disliking statistical minorities may function as one mechanism underlying the observed
link in that infrequent people in a population are likely to be perceived as deviant as they
disrupt the statistical regularities of how people tend to look, think, and act in society, and
this deviancy should incite others’ prejudice.
Nine studies (N = 1,821) observed the proposed mediation model. Manipulating
people’s aversion towards nonsocial deviancy (e.g., aversion towards images of violated
geometric patterns) heightened their dislike of novel statistical minorities (minorities on an
‘alien’ planet) which in turn heightened their prejudice towards individual social outliers
(e.g., members of a racial minority, individuals with a physical disability, individuals with
atypical physical appearances, individuals engaging in non-majority customs).
Documenting the robustness of this mediation model, the pathway model remained
consistent: (1) in correlational as well as experimental studies, (2) when using descriptive
as well as motivational manipulations of nonsocial deviancy aversion, (3) when measuring
prejudice via explicit as well as implicit measures, (4) when controlling for numerous
potential third-variables (e.g., novelty aversion, perceiving novel statistical minorities as
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in power, political orientation), (5) when assessing the three variables included in the
mediation in a longitudinal manner, and (6) across adult as well as child samples.
Moreover, the proposed mediation was supported in that (1) intervening on the proposed
mediator—people’s dislike of novel statistical minorities—eliminated the effect of
nonsocial deviancy aversion on prejudice, and (2) the proposed pathway model was not
found when assessing prejudice against a group that is discriminated against in society but
that is not a statistical minority, that is, prejudice against women.
Notably, in line with past theorizing on the context-dependency of deviancy in
terms of anti-social actions (e.g., Durkheim, 1985), Chapter 3 also provided initial support
for the context-dependency of the broad conceptualization of deviancy proposed here.
Specifically, in Chapter 3, participants’ aversion to nonsocial deviancy actually predicted
decreased prejudice against real-world minority group members (Black and Muslim
individuals) when such individuals were presented as the majority in an alternate society.
Strikingly, participants higher in nonsocial deviancy aversion even reported that they
would prefer to be a Black person and a Muslim person in majority Black and majority
Muslim contexts (as compared to minority Black and Muslim contexts).
Chapter 3 also had a number of secondary contributions. For one, Chapter 3
elucidated boundary conditions on the causal impact of nonsocial deviancy aversion on
prejudice. For instance, while deviancy aversion substantially influenced prejudice
against various types of stigmatized individuals (e.g., individuals with a physical
disability), it did not meaningfully influence racial prejudice (in terms of prejudice
against Black individuals). Reasons for this divergence are discussed in detail in Chapter
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3 (see 3.7.4 Types of Prejudice). Second, in Chapter 3, participants’ racial identity did not
moderate the observed findings (see Brown, 1995; Henrich et al., 2010; Nielsen et al.,
2017). That is, I did not find any parts of the observed mediation pathway to be
moderated by participants’ racial identity (see 3.6 Participants’ Racial Identity Across the
Reported Studies). These results demonstrate the robustness of the presented findings
and, troublingly, suggest that societies’ perception of Black individuals as social outliers
may be pervasive enough to extend even to participants who themselves identify as
Black.
5.1.3 Summary of Chapter 4
Building on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 examined whether people’s domaingeneral aversion to deviancy impacts a psychological phenomenon aside from prejudice.
Given the prominence and rapid growth of the study of morality in psychology (see Haidt
& Kesebir, 2010), I examined whether deviancy aversion plays a role in moral judgment.
Specifically, because most moral violations deviate from assumed behavioral regularities
in society, I tested whether people’s degree of nonsocial deviancy aversion predicts their
degree of condemnation and punishment of moral violations. Supporting this possibility,
two studies (N = 404) found that nonsocial deviancy aversion (e.g., aversion towards
broken patterns of geometric shapes) predicts greater moral condemnation and punishment
of harm and purity violations. Supporting the robustness of this link, the observed
relationship remained consistent: (1) across various measures of nonsocial deviancy
aversion (e.g., a visual measure, a face-valid measure, a mental imagery measure), (2)
across different types of moral violations (harm and purity violations), (3) across different
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types of moral responding (moral condemnation and punishment), and (4) when controlling
for numerous potential third-variables (e.g., disgust, political orientation, social
desirability). Moreover, people’s nonsocial deviancy aversion predicted harsher moral
condemnation of purity violations to a similar extent as people’s disgust propensity and
sensitivity, a major theoretical predictor of moral purity concerns (e.g., Schnall et al.,
2008). Taken together, these findings indicate that something as basic as people’s domaingeneral sensitivity to deviancy overlaps substantially with people’s sense of morality.
Chapter 4 also had a number of secondary contributions. First, in line with the
observed context-dependency of domain-general deviancy aversion in Chapter 3,
participants’ nonsocial deviancy aversion predicted context-dependent moral judgment
(see Study 3, N = 205, in Chapter 4). Participants higher in deviancy aversion exhibited a
greater shift towards tolerating moral violations when these violations were described as
the regular pattern of behavior in an alternate society. Second, Chapter 4 indicated that the
link between nonsocial and social deviancy aversion occurs via an affective rather than
deliberative pathway (i.e., an intuitionist rather than reasoning pathway; see Greene &
Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010). Specifically, the observed
relationship between nonsocial deviancy aversion and moral judgment was found to be
stronger for more intuitive thinkers than deliberative thinkers; indeed, analytical, reflective
thinkers were able to attenuate or even eliminate the predictive power of their nonsocial
deviancy aversion on their moral judgment. Importantly, these results (1) indicate that the
domain-generality of people’s sensitivity to deviancy may be driven by intuitive, automatic
processing, (2) suggest that conscious deliberation can override the domain-generality of
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people’s responses to deviancy, and (3) shed light on the intuitive pathway to morality
(Greene & Haidt, 2002) by revealing a potential source of the negative affect that informs
people’s moral judgments.
5.2

Theoretical and Applied Implications
On a general level, previous scientific research has predominantly discussed

deviancy in terms of actions (usually but not always antisocial actions) that break
established norms (e.g., Bicchieri, 2005; Durkheim, 1985). While this research greatly
informs our understanding of rule breaking and antisocial behavior, it has shed little light
on deviancy as a more domain-general construct. Specifically, deviancy need not be limited
to only social behavior; instead, it can be thought of as simple, nonsocial distortion, for
instance, the distortion of simple statistical regularities or assumed prototypes. For
example, any row of stimuli with one varying stimulus (a row of triangles with one triangle
out of line or a row of people with one person looking physically different) qualifies as
deviancy. Importantly, thinking of deviancy in this domain-general way bridges divergent
aspects of our psychology by showing that people’s responses to irregularities span across
varying domains—social and non-social, visual and non-visual, concrete and abstract,
belief and behavior.
From a historical and broad theoretical perspective, the domain-general
conceptualization of deviancy documented here compliments the theorizing of early
pioneers of modern psychology. For instance, William James (1890), Fritz Heider (1958),
and Kurt Lewin (1946), all argued that human attitudes and behavior are motivated by
‘consistency’ motives—the drive to experience balance, regularities, and constancy in
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terms of the self, beliefs, and behaviors. By assessing people’s sensitivity towards deviancy
in low-level stimuli (e.g., in geometric shapes) the present work arguably was able to
quantify such a ‘consistency’ motive at the lower-order individual level, and in turn, as
theorized by these seminal psychologists, demonstrate that this motive plays a significant
role in social judgment and behavior.
More concretely, the re-conceptualization of people’s responses to deviancy as
domain-general should impact a number of influential research areas. This includes, for
instance, many of the constructs and findings covered in the introduction section of this
dissertation (see sections 1.2.2. People Generally Experience an Aversion Towards
Deviancy and 1.23 Prior Support for the Domain-Generality of Deviancy). For instance,
though not directly examined here, the present findings suggest that people’s domaingeneral aversion to deviancy may help explain societies’ general acceptance and
adherence to social norms (Sherif, 1936), individuals’ arbitrary preference for stimuli
they have seen before (mere exposure; Zajonc, 1968), people’s resistance to changes in
their environments (Jost, 2015), people’s close adherence to habits (even when these
habits are harmful; e.g., James, 1890; Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006), and people’s
tendency to conform (Asch, 1952; see Berg & Bass, 1961). Indeed, supporting the role of
domain-general deviancy aversion in such phenomena, Gollwitzer et al. (2021) found that
nonsocial deviancy aversion (assessed similarly to the studies presented here) predicts
and leads to a greater adherence to social norms in terms of heightened norm following
and desiring more pervasive and rigid social norms in society. And, Asch (1952), found
that conformity dramatically decreases when non-conformist actions are made less
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deviant, that is, when a confederate has already violated the conformist behavior (before
the participant has to act). As such, it seems likely that people’s domain-general
sensitivity to deviancy may play a role in these major features of our psychology.
Even more concretely, the current work informs a number of specific findings,
some of which are largely unexplained. For instance, people’s domain-general aversion to
deviancy may help explain why actions are judged as more moral when they are perceived
as more common (the “common is moral heuristic”, Lindström et al., 2018), why people
engage in anti-social punishment—the punishment of individuals who deviate from the
norm in terms of being overly-prosocial (e.g., Hermann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008), why
faces that violate symmetrical regularities are judged as less attractive (e.g., Langlois &
Roggman, 1990), why people experience aversion towards social outliers who are extreme
examples of positive characteristics in society (e.g., the very wealthy; e.g., Smith & Kim,
2007), why certain visual aesthetics are preferred over others (e.g., Palmer et al., 2013),
why certain stimuli are processed more ‘fluently’ than others (e.g., Reber et al., 2004), why
people follow nonfunctional descriptive norms (e.g., Pryor, Perfors, & Howe, 2019), and
why we respond negatively to purity violations (even when they are technically harmless,
e.g., Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Moreover, our findings align with a number of claims
regarding the role of deviancy in social constructs, for instance, that a low-level aversion
to deviancy plays a role in the development of children’s sense of morality (e.g., Kagan,
1984; Kochanska et al., 1995), that irregular visual scenes can induce irregular, anti-social
behavior (see Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008; Kotable et al., 2016), and that predictionerrors across differing domains (e.g., word mismatches and attitudinal dissonance) induce
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negative arousal (Proulx, et al., 2012). In sum, the broad conceptualization of deviancy
presented here may inform a host of overarching psychological concepts while also
shedding light on specific past findings.
5.2.1 Context-Dependency
On top of these contributions, the observed context-dependency of deviancy (see
Chapters 3 and 4) provides an additional layer of insight. For one, the findings argue
against a solely individual- or situation-based perspective on human psychology in favor
of an interactionist perspective—that people’s attitudes and behavior are determined by
an interaction between the individual and the environment (e.g., Lewin, 1946; Mischel,
Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). Moreover, the presented context-dependency findings
provide a potential low-level explanation for why and how people’s social judgments,
such as prejudice and moral judgment, can change over time and depend on the
surrounding environment (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Bloom, 2010; Garcia-Marques et al., 2017;
Payne et al., 2017). For instance, people’s domain-general deviancy aversion may help
explain why prejudice against women is especially pervasive in contexts in which women
are perceived as being deviant—whether that is due to being a statistical minority or other
deviancy inducing factors (e.g., positions in finance; e.g., Mankoff, 1971; Williams &
Teidens, 2016). In the same vein, as certain identities or actions are perceived as less
deviant in society (more normative), people’s low-level deviancy aversion should lead to
an attenuation of their negative attitudes towards these people and behaviors. For
instance, on an applied level, people’s domain-general aversion to deviancy may drive
them to become less prejudiced against minorities as minorities (as a collective) become
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the majority in terms of population in the United States (though, of course, other factors
may outweigh any impact of deviancy aversion, for instance, status threat; see Craig &
Richeson, 2014; Craig, Rucker, & Richeson, 2018). In sum, the demonstrated contextdependency of deviancy aversion can help explain why people’s attitudes and behavior
shift according to the regularities in their specific situations and environments.
5.2.2 An Intuitive, Affective Pathway
Aside from the context-dependency of deviancy aversion, the presented findings
also suggest that the domain-generality of deviancy aversion is likely driven by intuitive,
automatic processing. Specifically, in Chapter 4, I found that the link between nonsocial
deviancy aversion and condemnation of moral violations was stronger for intuitive
thinkers than deliberative thinkers; indeed, deliberative thinkers were able to attenuate
and even eliminate the predictive power of their deviancy aversion on their moral
judgment. These results suggest the following three-part pathway: (1) people’s aversion
to deviancy automatically induces negative affect towards irregularities across domains
(e.g., social outliers, immoral actions), (2) this negative affect leads people to develop
negative attitudes towards these specific irregularities (e.g., prejudice), (3) people
misattribute their negative attitudes and create rationalizations (some of which are
fallacious) justifying these negative attitudes (e.g., judging people who identify with the
opposite gender as threatening social values), and finally, (4) these rationalizations in turn
feed people’s negative attitudes, creating a cycle of prejudice. This framework fits neatly
into past work documenting the intuitionist pathway to morality (see Haidt et al., 1993)
and affective processes leading to prejudice and type-rationalizations (inaccurate reasons
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supporting one’s prejudice; Hegarty & Golden, 2008; LaPiere, 1936; Smith, 1993).
Moreover, if this proposed pathway is accurate, it would significantly extend such past
theorizing by elucidating that deviancy aversion functions as a low-level antecedent or
precursor of these affective, intuitive pathways to prejudice and moral judgment.
5.2.3 Interventions
On top of the above noted theoretical contributions, the presented results may
inform attitudinal and behavioral interventions, especially in terms of recognizing and
overriding our deviancy aversion and adopting positions of tolerance and openness. For
instance, Chapter 3 found that consciously reflecting on the positive attributes of minority
groups eliminated the effect of people’s deviancy aversion on their expression of prejudice.
And similarly, in Chapter 4, deliberative thinkers were able to override the predictive
power of their deviancy aversion on their moral judgment.
Both these findings tentatively suggest that self-regulation interventions (see
Boekaerts, Zeidner, & Pintrich, 1999) could be applied to successfully allow individuals to
modulate their deviancy aversion and the potential outcomes of this aversion. And, given
the assumed automaticity of the effects of deviancy aversion (see previous section),
interventions that target automatic processes may be particularly effective (e.g., Gollwitzer,
1999). Notably, however, such interventions should be developed with both down- and upregulation in mind. That is, while the work I present here indicates that deviancy aversion
contributes to deleterious phenomena, such as prejudice, other work I have completed finds
that deviancy aversion also predicts positive behaviors (e.g., social-norm adherence, such
as following preventative health measures during COVID-19; Gollwitzer et al., 2021). As
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such, interventions should be developed that allow people to down- as well as up-regulate
their deviancy aversion depending on the specific situation (i.e., to reduce deleterious
outcomes and heighten beneficial ones; see Gollwitzer et al., 2017 for one way to do so).
Though the observed findings indicate that interventions may allow individuals to
alter their deviancy aversion and the outcomes of this aversion, these potential
interventions (as conducted in Chapters 3 and 4) should not be directly applied in the realworld. For one, the studies discussed here were not conducted in the field (Paluck & Green,
2009), and thus their generalizability is unknown. Additionally, the observed effect-sizes
of these interventions were quite small, and we did not examine whether these
manipulations had any long-term outcomes. Said another way, even if the conducted
interventions are able to effectively change individuals’ behaviors outside of the
laboratory, the magnitude and meaningfulness of these effects may be trivial. As such,
instead of applying the observed findings directly to interventions, the present work is
useful in that it (1) can shed light on the potential mechanisms underlying existing
successful real-world interventions, and (2) may inform future interventions in the field
that more directly target anti-social attitudes and behaviors.
Regarding explaining potential mechanisms of past interventions, the present
findings may help partially explain the efficacy of interventions that reduce prejudice by
prioritizing individualized over categorized social perception (Miller & Brewer, 1986;
Tajfel, 1970), encouraging integration (Crisp & Hewstone 2007), and re-framing
individuals as part of a single superordinate group (Gaertner & Dovidio 2000; see Paluck
& Green, 2009 for an overview of varying prejudice interventions). Simply put, if clear
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categories are absconded then social outliers are less likely to be perceived as deviant or
irregular (as they have no anchor to deviate from), in turn making it less likely that people’s
deviancy aversion becomes active and heightens their prejudice. Aside from these
interventions, the current results also may help partially explain why interventions utilizing
habituation and exposure to outgroups and stigmatized individuals can (in certain
instances) reduce prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). That is, individuals may
perceive stigmatized individuals as less deviant if they have repeated, regular interactions
with these individuals, in turn reducing their prejudice.
Regarding creating future real-world interventions that directly target anti-social
outcomes, the observed findings suggest that interventions that encourage an open-mind
towards irregularities and deviancy may be future avenues to potentially mitigate antisocial outcomes. Indeed, in the real-world, such interventions may already be utilized, for
instance, in children’s books that teach young children to celebrate uniqueness and reframe
deviancy in terms of being different rather than deviant (e.g., It’s okay to be different; Parr,
2011; Sapon-Shevin, 2010). Taken together, then, the presented findings may provide
insight into the mechanisms that underlie successful interventions, as well as provide an
empirical foundation for future applied interventions that directly attempt to reduce
prejudice and other anti-social behaviors.
5.2.4 Implications Summary
In sum, the presented research should have a significant theoretical, and potentially,
even an applied impact. As noted above, it is difficult to stress the sheer number of
phenomena that are potentially influenced by how we feel and think about deviancy in our
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environments. For instance, how we feel about deviancy should inform the extent to which
we tolerate social outliers and eccentrics, whether we follow important norms and rules,
how we respond to innovation, and whether we embrace or abscond rigid social and
political policies, among many other outcomes. As such, although the proposed
conceptualization of deviancy as domain-general may be quite simple (and indeed this is
in part why it has such broad implications), as elucidated above, this broader
conceptualization can shed substantial light on unexplained variance underlying a vast
variety of different phenomena.
5.3

Functionality
While the present work suggests that a domain-general sensitivity towards deviancy

is a component of our social cognition and psychology, it does not explain why this would
be the case. One potential explanation comes from a body of work documenting that
constructs that are seemingly independent (but semantically or conceptually related) are
actually driven by domain-general processes. For instance, physical and social pain have
been shown to overlap (e.g., taking pain killers reduces emotional pain after a breakup;
Eisenberger et al., 2006), as have physical and social warmth (e.g., people feel physically
warmer when thinking of loved ones; Williams & Bargh, 2008; Inagaki & Eisenberger,
2013), and physical and social distance (e.g., priming closeness in nonsocial physical
distance impacts feelings of social closeness; Williams & Bargh, 2008b). To explain these
findings, researchers have suggested that these overlaps exist because higher-order
processes are built off of low-level processes. That is, abstract and complex concepts are
scaffolded off of (or at least develop in tandem with) simpler low-level ones, such as
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physical experiences and perceptual analysis (e.g., movement, physical sensation,
propulsion; e.g., Casasanto & Bottini, 2014; Clark, 1973; Mandler, 1992; Williams et al.,
2009). Indeed, this possibility is supported by the principle of neural-reuse (see Anderson,
2010); for instance, Inagaki and Eisenberger (2013) observed shared neural activity for
physical (nonsocial) as well as social warmth. Potentially this explanation applies here.
Namely, people’s responses to higher-order deviancy (e.g., social deviancy) may be
‘scaffolded’ off of (or develop in tandem with) people’s responses to lower-level deviancy
(e.g., deviations in terms of simple shapes) to promote cognitive efficiency (e.g., by sharing
common neural circuitry).
Additionally, it is unclear why participants in our studies judged deviancy across
varying domains negatively—why are deviant stimuli, events, or actions generally
experienced as aversive? On a proximate level, deviancy may be aversive because it does
not neatly fit into pre-existing categories and thus requires substantial cognitive effort
(which can be an uncomfortable experience; e.g., Kurzban, 2016). Relatedly, deviancy may
be perceived by individuals as disfluent and therefore feel aversive (Reber et al., 1998).
These explanations are limited to the proximate level, however. From a more ultimate,
evolutionary standpoint, people may experience deviancy aversion to aid survival—
deviations from regularities and repetition may signal danger (Shermer, 2008). Indeed,
Gollwitzer and Clark (2019) found that people are more comfortable with deviancy after
being primed with feelings of interpersonal safety and security. Relatedly, people’s
aversive response to deviancy may aid survival by functioning as a low-level evolved
motive that drives people to conform to their surrounding and cooperate with others in their
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community (see Argyle, 2013). Despite these potentially viable explanations, it remains
largely unknown, at least to my knowledge, why people are generally averse to deviancy.
Future research should investigate this question.
5.4

Open Questions and Speculative Thoughts
The presented work opens a number of deeper questions, for which I do not have

empirical data, but wish to briefly speculate on. First, consider the potential bidirectionality of the presented findings. In the presented work, I found that manipulating
lower-order deviancy can influence higher-order deviancy (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2019)
but also, that manipulating higher-order deviancy can influence lower-level deviancy (e.g.,
Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). While these findings suggest a cyclical causal relationship at
the proximate level, from an ultimate, more evolutionary perspective, the question remains
which came first (a classic “chicken or the egg” issue). That is, did people’s aversion to
physical deviancy develop evolutionary before their aversion to social deviancy (or the
opposite)? Or, potentially, did these responses develop in tandem over the course of human
history? Some developmental work and theorizing suggests that social or higher-order
concepts may be based off of low-level experiences (e.g., Casasanto & Bottini, 2014;
Clark, 1973; Mandler, 1992). And indeed, it seems more intuitive that low-level responses
to deviancy evolutionarily developed before high-level ones. Yet, this does not necessarily
need to be the case. That is, numerous recent findings have shown that infants already have
complex social systems and exhibit social biases shortly after birth (e.g., Bloom, 2013;
Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). As such, it remains a possibility that the causal
direction—at the ultimate level—began with people’s responses towards social or higher206

order deviancy evolving first, and only later did this aversion conceptually transfer to more
low-level stimuli. Alternatively, of course, lower-order and higher-order domains of
deviancy aversion developed in tandem, allowing a single system to simultaneously and
thus efficiently deal with both lower-order threats (e.g., poisonous foods) and higher-order
threats (e.g., outgroup members).
In a similar vein, while I do not have concrete data supporting specific evolutionary
causes of the observed domain-generality of people’s aversion to deviancy, I wish to
speculate on some possibilities. First, it is possible that a low-level (and high-level)
aversion to deviancy is evolutionarily quite functional (as proposed earlier, for instance in
terms of safety and fitting-in in one’s community). To provide some perspective on this
claim, consider research indicating that people exhibit a natural aversion to pointy or sharp
objects (compared to curved objects), presumably, as a result of the high historical risk of
death from infection (e.g., Bar & Neta, 2006; Bar & Neta, 2007). Considering this
phenomenon, Bar and Neta (2007) write, “Our brains might be organized to extract these
basic contour elements rapidly for deriving an early warning signal in the presence of
potential danger.” Perhaps, similarly to this early ‘sharpness’ warning signal for danger,
deviancy may also be processed rapidly in an effort to identify potentially dangerous
stimuli; that is, stimuli that are out of the norm, whether nonsocial or social, should receive
greater attention and be generally avoided given their potential danger. Future research
should examine these questions. For instance, researchers could use foraging paradigms or
other computationally-based games to quantify the degree of reward versus danger in nonnormative objects or events (e.g., Giraldeau & Caraco, 2018; Prpic, 2019). Or, researchers
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could, from a comparative cognition perspective, examine whether and how the deviancy
responses of non-human animals differ from humans, and how this can inform the ultimate
origins of humans’ domain-general aversion towards deviancy.
Finally, in terms of open and speculative questions, consider that some individuals
exhibit a stable counter-normative preference for deviancy across varying domains. Across
the data I have collected examining deviancy, approximately 15% of participants appeared
to actually prefer deviancy over order. And, notably, in some work not reported here, I
found that this 15% (in terms of individual differences) is fairly stable across divergent
cultures (~7 different countries I have examined, including some cultures that are not
WEIRD: Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic). These findings raise
the question of why a stable portion of the population—approximately 15%—responds
positively to deviancy. Potentially, such a distribution may be functional in order to prevent
stagnation and encourage creativity in society, as well as signal to others which actions are
deviant versus normative in the first place (Durkheim, 1985). In a sense, then, for any
society to progress, a portion of people may be needed who hold a domain-general
preference for deviancy, and in turn question existing norms and regularities. And, these
individuals often serve a thankless job. Though they are integral to the furtherment of their
communities, they often face the brunt of societal criticisms and prejudice (Bonetto, 2021).
5.5

General Limitations and Constraints
The presented findings have numerous limitations. For one, the generalizability of

the present findings is limited; many of the included measures were self-report measures
that were measured online and may not necessarily generalize to behavior in the field. And,
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as noted earlier, this is especially relevant for the included interventions (see Paluck &
Green, 2009). Second, though we examined the causal impact of nonsocial deviancy
aversion on prejudice, we did not present evidence showing that such aversion also causally
impacts moral judgment (indeed, moral judgments may be too stable to alter in this
manner). Third, we did not test whether individuals’ accuracy at detecting deviancy plays
a role in our findings. Suggesting that this is not the case, several studies I conducted (not
presented here) found that individuals’ performance on odd-ball visual-search paradigms
(e.g., accuracy at identifying a square in a collection of triangles presented for a short timeperiod) does not relate to their degree of aversion towards nonsocial or social deviancy.
Fourth, and relatedly, while I observed domain-overlaps in terms of people’s affective
responses to deviancy (i.e., aversion), I did not examine whether participants’ cognitive
judgments towards different types of deviancy also overlap. For instance, do individuals
who perceive nonsocial deviancy as more ‘weird’ also consider social outliers as more
‘weird’? Supporting this possibility, several studies I conducted (not reported here) have
found participants’ tendency to judge nonsocial deviancy as deviant to predict their
tendency to judge norm violations as deviant (though, these studies are still preliminary).
Fifth, the present work only examined whether nonsocial deviancy aversion overlaps
with two higher-order constructs—prejudice and moral judgment. In work not covered
here, however, I have found nonsocial deviancy aversion to also overlap with social norm
adherence (Gollwitzer et al., 2021) as well heightened anxious attachment-style (in terms
of close-relationships; Gollwitzer & Clark, 2019). Future research should nonetheless
examine additional domains, for instance, whether deviancy aversion also plays a role in
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conformity, authoritarianism, and anxiety, among other topics. Sixth, I did not consider
varying subtypes of deviancy. For instance, deviancy may occur specifically in the form of
pattern deviancy (deviations from regularities or patterns in a specific context)31, prototype
deviancy (deviations from people’s stable representations of a category), and functional
deviancy (deviations from the intended function of a stimulus). Future research should
consider these potentially differing subtypes and whether they have divergent outcomes.
Seventh, and relatedly, I did not directly examine the potentially differentiating role of
objective deviancy (more perceptual) versus subjective deviancy (more value based). That
is, while I find that the domain-generality of people’s responses to deviancy exists across
perceptual and subjective stimuli (e.g., images of broken patters, face-valid measures,
images of people with a physical disability), I did not directly examine whether deviancy
in these two differing formats may diverge in meaningful ways.
Eight, I largely did not consider what causes deviancy aversion. What are the
antecedents of such aversion and in what contexts is such aversion particularly active?
While this question remains largely unsolved, some work I have conducted indicates that
priming feeling of insecurity in terms of social relationships heightens individuals’
aversion to deviancy. At the same time, a number of other contexts may modulate people’s
deviancy aversion. For instance, boredom may induce people to perceive deviancy as
desirable (as it can change the current negative state; Nederkoom et al., 2016). Eighth, and
relatedly, I largely did not consider the cases in which deviancy may be perceived as

31

Predominantly this form of deviancy, pattern deviancy, was measured in the studies reported here.
However, the reported findings likely also hold true for prototype deviancy because prototypes are in part
formed by descriptive regularities—the ‘pattern’ that one has previously witnessed (Posner & Keele, 1968).
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positive. Though, I did consider positive social deviancy in Chapter 3 (in terms of social
outliers who deviate in terms of ‘positive’ characteristics), and Gollwitzer and Clark (2019)
found priming feeling of relationship security to reduce people’s deviancy aversion, future
research should still examine the cases in which we embrace deviant stimuli.
The presented findings also have clear boundary conditions. Particularly, the
impact of deviancy aversion may not be observed in cases in which other factors,
especially strong social or societal factors, take precedence. A perfect example of this is a
finding discussed in Chapter 3: while deviancy aversion substantially influenced
prejudice against various types of stigmatized individuals (e.g., individuals with a
physical disability), it did not meaningfully causally influence racial prejudice (in terms
of prejudice against Black individuals). As explicated in section 3.7.4 Types of Prejudice,
numerous historical (e.g., segregation; Amir, 1969), social (e.g., group-threat, dominance
motives, group-position, resource competition; e.g., Sherif et al., 1961), and large-scale
societal and structural (e.g., Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972) factors contribute to the
force of racial prejudice against Black individuals in the United States (see Quillian,
2006). Importantly, these factors likely override or suppress any total effect of deviancy
aversion on racial prejudice. And, such boundary conditions may not be unique to
prejudice. For instance, people’s deviancy aversion may not heighten social norm
adherence (Gollwitzer et al., 2021) in contexts where other factors take precedence, for
instance, if an individual is primarily concerned with lashing out against the presented
norms.
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5.6

Conclusion
Though deviancy has been discussed in a wide variety of areas and findings, a

unifying framework of deviancy has yet to be considered. Here, I presented findings
supporting a broad re-conceptualization of deviancy by showing that people’s responses to
deviancy overlap across highly divergent domains, including nonsocial and social domains,
visual and nonvisual domains, and explicit and implicit domains. This re-conceptualization
may help inform research on a large number of phenomena that are potentially influenced
by how we feel and think about deviancy in our environments (e.g., prejudice, moral
judgment, social norm adherence, conformity). Said another way, though the proposed
conceptualization of deviancy as domain-general may be quite simple (and indeed this is
in part why it has such broad implications), this broader conceptualization can shed
substantial light on the variance underlying a vast variety of different phenomena.
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